


JPRS-NEA-91-030
23 MAY 1991



JPRS Report



Near East & South Asia

19980203 171

DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 3

REPRODUCED BY
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
NATIONAL TECHNICAL INFORMATION SERVICE
SPRINGFIELD, VA. 22161

Near East & South Asia

JPRS-NEA-91-030

CONTENTS

23 May 1991

ARMENIAN AFFAIRS

Dashnak Political, Economic Goals in ArSSR Outlined [Beirut AZTAG 22-23 Mar]	1
APM Deplored for 'Dictatorship' Remark [Beirut AZTAG 4 Apr]	3
AZG, Ramgavar Party Organ, Appears in ArSSR [Paris HARATCH 21 Mar]	3
ArSSR Bar Association Weekly Reviewed [Paris HARATCH 19 Mar]	4
Status of Relations With Georgia Viewed [HARATCH 16-17 Mar]	5

NEAR EAST

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

Iraq, Jordan Discuss Communication Links [Amman JORDAN TIMES 21 Mar]	6
--	---

PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

Refugee Camp Conditions, Political Representation [Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST 29 Mar]	7
Hamas Charter, Origins, Ideology Discussed [Paris AL-WATAN AL-ARABI 29 Mar]	8

EGYPT

Columnist Suggests Qualifications for Cabinet Members [London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT 6 Apr]	11
---	----

ISRAEL

Economic Effects of Gulf War Assessed [ISRAEL BUSINESS Mar]	12
Ministry of Education 'Tracking' Proposal Analyzed [HA'ARETZ 21 Mar]	13
Jabaliya Refugee Camp Profiled [YEDI'OT AHARONOT 4 Apr]	15
Immigration, Absorption Issues Reviewed [DAVAR 22 Mar]	18
Polling Data Released on Soviet Immigrants' Attitudes	20
Complaints About Bureaucracy, Social Adjustment [YEDI'OT AHARONOT 6 May]	20
Employment Problems Cited [HA'ARETZ 9 May]	21
Immigrants' Spokesman Comments on Relations with Ethiopia [HA'ARETZ 17 Mar]	21
Editorial Discusses New Strategic Perspective on Syria [HA'ARETZ 22 Mar]	22
Apathy in University Student Politics Analyzed [HA'ARETZ 24 Mar]	23

JORDAN

New Export Development Company Planned [THE STAR 4 Apr]	24
Sharp Decline in Phosphate Company Profits [JORDAN TIMES 28 Mar]	25

MAURITANIA

Softening of Government Policy Detailed [London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT 20 Mar]	26
---	----

MOROCCO

Analysis Traces Gulf War Press Coverage, Attitudes [London AL-MAJALLAH 9 Apr]	27
Report Views Changes in Southern Farming Town [AL-TARIQ 22 Mar]	30

SAUDI ARABIA

- Impact of War on Foreign Investment [London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT 30 Mar] 31

TUNISIA

- Economy Minister Discusses Tax Reforms [REALITES 4 Apr] 32

REPUBLIC OF YEMEN

- Reform Leader Explains Opposition to Constitution [AL-SAHWAH 21 Mar] 35
North, South Airline Merger Discussed [AL-THAWRAH 22 Mar] 37

SOUTH ASIA

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

- In Retrospect: Indian Peace-Keeping Force in Sri Lanka [Colombo THE ISLAND 28 Mar] 39

INDIA

- Officials Cautioned Against Influencing Polls [THE HINDU 21 Mar] 42
Haryana: Editorial Recommends President's Rule [DECCAN HERALD 28 Mar] 43
Commentary Upholds Benefits of Strong Administrative Setup [DECCAN HERALD 28 Mar] 43
Socialist Janata Dal Merger With Congress-I Said Imminent [DECCAN HERALD 28 Mar] 45
Jharkhand Development Council for Bihar [THE HINDU 1 Apr] 46
Marxist-Leninist Panel Tells Lenin's Mistakes [THE TIMES OF INDIA 18 Mar] 46
U.S. Arms Policy Endangers Mideast Region [THE STATESMAN 16 Mar] 47
U.S. 301 Stand Termed 'Wrong Signal' [THE STATESMAN 16 Mar] 48
Industrialized Countries Asked for Aid [THE HINDU 25 Mar] 49
'Major' Pakistan Attack on Kashmir Repulsed [THE TIMES OF INDIA 26 Mar] 49
Spokesman on Concern Over Afghanistan [THE HINDU 6 Apr] 50
Outcome of Indo-Pakistan Talks Reported 50
 Report on Communique [THE TIMES OF INDIA 8 Apr] 50
 Defense Agreements Signed [THE TELEGRAPH 7 Apr] 50
 HINDU Analyst's Report [THE HINDU 7 Apr] 51
Minister Reports Food Situation 'Comfortable' [THE TELEGRAPH 4 Apr] 51
Provisional Figures From India's 1991 Census [THE TIMES OF INDIA 26 Mar] 52

IRAN

- Private Sector Role in Industrial Procurement, Distribution [RESALAT 30 Mar] 53
Education Protocol Signed With Soviet Azerbaijan [RESALAT 31 Mar] 53
New Bridge Links Iran to Nakhichevan [KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL 31 Mar] 53
Tehran-Moscow Passenger Train Begins Operations 6 Apr [ABRAR 3 Apr] 53
Second Phase of Abadan Refinery To Begin Operations in April [ABRAR 25 Mar] 54
Customs Permits Domestic Companies To Set Up Special Warehouses [ABRAR 25 Mar] 54
Locals Demonstrate Against Land Policy, Highway Construction [ABRAR 8 Apr] 54

NEPAL

- Government Civil Service Policies Said Causing 'Mess' [THE MOTHERLAND 22 Mar] 54
Candidate Selection Said Causing Discontent [THE RISING NEPAL 29 Mar] 55
Editorial Supports Uprising in Bhutan [THE RISING NEPAL 28 Mar] 56

PAKISTAN

- Nawaz Sharif's Government Criticized [VIEWPOINT 14 Mar] 57
Sindh: Reign of Terror Described [VIEWPOINT 21 Mar] 57
Undercurrents of Restlessness in Sindh Analyzed [DAWN 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31 Mar, 1 Apr] 59
Islamabad: 'Policy Drift' Outlined [VIEWPOINT 21 Mar] 68

Commentary Views MQM Infighting [VIEWPOINT 14 Mar]	70
Editorial Supports Accord Between Government, Opposition [THE MUSLIM 4 Apr]	71
Opposition to Death Penalty Editorialized [VIEWPOINT 21 Mar]	72

SRI LANKA

Nongovernment Organizations Said Lacking Coordination [DAILY NEWS 27 Mar]	73
Editorial Supports Seeking Reemployment in Gulf [DAILY NEWS 27 Mar]	74

Dashnak Political, Economic Goals in ArSSR Outlined

91AS0839A Beirut AZTAG in Armenian 22-23 Mar 91

[Interview in two installments with Hrair Marukhian, member of the Bureau of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation; place and date not given; first paragraph is the AZTAG introduction]

[22 Mar 91 p 4]

[Excerpts] The January issue of AIM, an English-language monthly that began publishing in the United States about a year ago, carries a comprehensive and wide-ranging interview with Hrair Marukhian, a member of the Bureau of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation [ARF], shedding light on nearly all the current major problems before the Armenian people and the ARF. Below is a translation of the interview:

[Passage omitted]

[AZTAG] What are the most important points of the political agenda of your party, and how do they differ from the proposals of other parties and political groups, in particular the Armenian Pannational Movement [APM]?

[Marukhian] We have always disagreed with the fundamental changes that have been proposed by certain movements in Armenia and several republics. In this context, our political course and economic program are congruent with each other because they propose gradual (as opposed to abrupt) changes. We disagree entirely with the view that the solution of Armenia's problems are rooted in the disintegration of the Soviet Union. We consider such an approach irresponsible. Although we struggled against the Soviet system for 70 years, we do not link the path to Armenia's independence to the disintegration of the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union against whom we fought for so many years and the Soviet Union of the last few years are not the same. That does not mean that we approve their policies of the last five years; it means that we have taken certain realities into account within a comprehensive framework.

We defined our strategy clearly in our platform. The course of independence and the pursuit of the territorial demands of the Armenian people must proceed at the same pace and with the same priority. In other words, one must complement the other. Neither of these objectives can be realized overnight, but the Armenian nation will eventually attain both goals if it pursues them concurrently. If the political leadership in Armenia forgets and lays aside our national demands even for a moment, we would turn into a nation which buries its historic rights with its own hands. Our platform admits no middle solution to this problem. It says that our demands include Artsakh, Mus, Van, and Vaspurakan, that is, all parts of historic western Armenia.

[AZTAG] What is your appraisal of the status of the members and sympathizers of the ARF in the fatherland?

[Marukhian] In our view, the party cadres in Armenia are made up of prominent figures: lecturers, university graduates and intellectuals. There is also a local popular layer, which is the most important element and which operates in villages and rural areas. The party tries to operate unobtrusively in Yerevan because, first, Yerevan is the capital, and, second, the infamous communist institutions which have taken organizational roots there over the past 70 years must be taken into consideration. Also, we must not forget the mafia-style groups which are concentrated in Yerevan and which have gained significant political influence.

We decided not to participate in the parliamentary elections in May [1990] despite the massive solidarity we enjoy because all indicators suggested that the elections were not as free as they were portrayed. Our suspicions were subsequently confirmed. The elections could be termed as free, but only in comparison to past elections. We did not wish to blemish the image of our party by participating in a dirty campaign which the candidates of the Communist Party and the APM pursued and which was marked by blackmail, threats, and bribery. I do not want to say that we would have won the majority of the votes had we participated in the election, but getting elected would have given us a significant foothold in the government.

As for the number of ARF members, that is not very clear at this time. We will have a clear picture on numbers at the regional congress that will be held in Yerevan soon.

Here I would like to remind you of a Dashnak principle which has been part of our program since the first days of our struggle for the liberation of Armenia: The number of Dashnak members must not be more than 1 percent of the population of a given region. That should give you an idea about our position on the number of our members.

In view of this 1-percent principle, the Dashnak party can have at most 35,000 members in four or five years in the best of circumstances (based on a population of 3.5 million). It is very easy to have 100,000 members, just as the Communist Party which handed out membership cards to 200,000 people. However, a serious political party must not operate in that manner.

I must emphasize that the ARF will operate in Armenia in the same way that it operates in the diaspora with its cultural, humanitarian, educational, and athletic organizations. Some organizations are already pursuing that course. [passage omitted]

[AZTAG] Presidential elections are scheduled in Armenia in the coming months. Does the ARF have any plans to field a candidate in those elections?

[Marukhian] Now that the party is an active organization in Armenia, there is no reason not to participate in elections and not to field candidates. However, I must emphasize that the ARF does not intend to bring any leader or party chief to power. It is very likely that it will support a candidate who may not even be a member of the ARF. The party will support the candidate who has the best capabilities to be the president of Armenia.

[AZTAG] Does the ARF plan to form any coalitions with other parties in future parliamentary elections?

[Marukhian] We will definitely participate in future elections. We have no reason not to participate. As for the issue of collaborating with other groups, we not only envisage such a step, but we have declared publicly on numerous occasions that we believe in the importance of unity at this critical juncture in our nation's history. We are deeply convinced that the Armenian people can overcome the political, territorial, economic, self-defense, and other problems awaiting it only through united efforts. That is why we are prepared to collaborate closely with the APM, the Hunchak Party, and the Ramgavar Party, when they, too, establish their organizations in Armenia (although we do not understand the propaganda campaign that has been unleashed against us recently).

We also envisage to collaborate with philanthropic organizations and even a "purified" Communist Party. I underscore the word "purified" because we will never collaborate with the old mafia. [passage omitted]

[AZTAG] Turning to economic issues, what concrete participation does the ARF envisage with regard to the revitalization of Armenia's economy?

[Marukhian] Let me first state that regardless of what party is in power, we are prepared to contribute to the rebuilding of Armenia's economy. We consider the government the vehicle through which we will make our economic contribution.

A nine-member commission, which includes experts with Dashnak, non-Dashnak, and even anti-Dashnak sentiments, prepared a comprehensive economic program at the initiative of the ARF. The commission completed its studies, held consultations, traveled to Armenia several times and organized seminars in Yerevan. Its work is so detailed and comprehensive that we learn from reliable sources that even Moscow has realized its value and that it has taken steps to implement some of its recommendations.

The next step of this commission will be to go to Armenia in late November and to organize preparatory work for the implementation of this program which was endorsed by the previous government. Once that work is completed, the commission will return to the diaspora and will form a national central body which will coordinate the different stages of the implementation of the program. This body will be made up of economists,

industrial experts, joint venture participants, and affiliated groups and organizations from different cities and countries in the diaspora.

[23 Mar 91 p 4]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted]

[AZTAG] How does the ARF view the solution of the Karabakh problem?

[Marukhian] The Artsakh question is of primary importance for us, and I do not wish to engage in demagoguery by saying that. As Stepanakert mayor Maksim Mirzoyan recently said in Los Angeles, "in the final analysis it is essential to understand that the path of national territorial demands passes through Karabakh." Apart from the right of the Karabakh Armenians for self-determination, our success on that piece of land is of vital economic, strategic, and military importance.

Our struggle will be monumental given our location in the region among Azeris and their allies, not only in Moscow but also overseas, principally Turkey. An immediate and practical step must be to secure an autonomous status quo for the Karabakh Armenians, so that they have control over economic, social and cultural issues. The internationalization of the Artsakh problem is absolutely essential to realize that goal. We will pursue that goal whether we cooperate with Armenia's leadership or not. Although these leaders rose to power because they fought for the reunification of Karabakh with Armenia in the past, today they seem to be disowning their national cause.

[AZTAG] What relations must Armenia have with its neighbors?

[Marukhian] We must develop our relations with Russian intellectuals, politicians, and influential circles as part of our campaign to internationalize the Karabakh problem. Such relations did not exist for a long time, or if they did their possibilities were not fully utilized.

As for our neighbors to the north, whether we or they like it or not, the Georgians and the Armenians are natural allies in the Caucasus. First, certain territorial disputes (historic Armenian territories in southern Georgia) must be sidestepped. This is an issue in which the Armenian people can accept a political middle ground and make concessions to the Georgians in order to consolidate our traditional friendship with them. This is a serious issue, especially in view of the prospect of having access to the sea.

I do not mean that we should renounce our territorial claims in Georgia. Political dialogue creates opportunities for a compromise solution, and it is this mutual give and take that gives meaning to political negotiations. If concessions are unilateral, as has been the case in Armenia's current relations with our "big neighbor" (Turkey), they cannot form the basis for a healthy relationship.

Bartering light bulbs for meat does not ensure political trust and, in the current general situation, is in fact childish.

We have always believed in and called for a political dialogue. That is why in the past we had a meeting with Turkish officials in Zurich together with other Armenian parties. We believe, however, that any such a dialogue must take international diplomacy into account. Negotiations with Turkey solely on the basis of bartering meat and bread for cotton and Hayelektrotek machines cannot be a politically gainful dialogue for Armenia. We believe that the negotiations must take place at a higher level and that we must convey the message that Armenians have not given up on their territorial demands.

[AZTAG] Could you say more explicitly what concessions the Turks and the Armenians can make if conditions are favorable and if a dialogue between Armenians and Turks begins?

[Marukhian] It would not be anything new if I said that the Turkish leadership is highly competent and flexible. During the Gulf crisis, the Turks managed to turn their political obligations into a colossal advantage. We must admire their astuteness.

If they demonstrate this same talent of farsightedness and flexibility to come to terms with the reality that the Armenian cause cannot be eradicated and that sooner or later they must accept public opinion and officially recognize the genocide; if modern Turkey, as they call themselves, finally wakes up and acknowledges that the Armenian genocide has occurred and realizes that it could not in the last 50 years and will not be able in the future to populate the Armenian territories in eastern Turkey; and if it takes a pen and redraws the map, then I think that the Armenians, from the ARF to all the other parties and Armenia's government, will be sufficiently flexible to step back from their aspirations for a sea-to-sea Armenia.

APM Deplored for 'Dictatorship' Remark

91AS0840A Beirut AZTAG in Armenian 4 Apr 91 p 4

[Article by Vache Prudian: "Fig Leaf?"]

[Excerpts] Armenian Pannational Movement [APM] president Vano Siradeghyan's public declaration that the APM will establish a "dictatorship" if opposition to Armenia's authorities continues and that the APM "has all the means" to do that is disconcerting to say the least.

Obviously, we are not "interested" in whether the APM really has those "means." However, after having suffered in the claws of Bolshevik tyranny for 70 years, our fatherland must be spared from a new form of despotism, this time by forces who speak on behalf of democracy. [passage omitted]

The APM, which rose to power thanks to populism based on demagogic and cheap attacks against the nomenklatura and glitzy slogans of "national awakening," has now threatened, through its own president, to abduct the fatherland from its people—in other words, to return our fatherland to where it was only a short time ago, the whirlpool of despotism.

The legislative rule of the APM (which, incidentally, is not even a majority in the parliament) is not even one year old, but it has exhibited, on more than one occasion, peculiarities (to avoid a worse description) which concern the entire Armenian nation. On the sensitive issues of Armenian-Turkish relations and the genocide, the APM acted with the intoxication of having gained power and not with the wisdom of taking all the interests of the people into account.

Disclosures by Ktrich Sartaryan about the press last fall stunned everyone intoxicated by the comparative success of democracy and made everyone realize that 70 years of tyranny had left a deep imprint on the subconscious of even people who stepped forth with the slogan of combatting tyranny. [passage omitted]

Opposition inside or outside the parliament is a natural phenomenon for a democratic government. What is unnatural is the opposite—what Vano Siradeghyan gives himself the right to threaten if opposition continues.

Now let us look at the other side of the coin.

If the remark about "dictatorship" is a personal opinion, then the APM should officially retract it.

If, on the other hand, that statement represents the posture of the APM, then the parliament and the government must make their stance clear because what is at stake is the legitimacy of the government and a parliament that has been elected by the people's votes for the first time in 70 years.

AZG, Ramgavar Party Organ, Appears in ArSSR

91AS0840D Paris HARATCH in Armenian
21 Mar 91 p 2

[Article by Arpi Totoyan: "The New Title in Armenia's Press: AZG"]

[Excerpts] The first issue of this eight-page tridaily is dated 16 February 1991. It is the official press organ of the Democratic [Ramgavar] Liberal Party as stated immediately below its title. The first issue also includes the English inscription "AZG Armenian Newspaper," which appears to be a curious entry because even a quick glance through the paper reveals that there is not the slightest hint of English in its pages. After reading the editorial entitled "This Paper," it becomes entirely obvious that the paper is addressed directly to an audience in Armenia.

In the said editorial, the paper, edited by Hagop Avedikian, summarizes the factors that gave rise to its birth as follows: AZG considers dissemination of news as its most important function "because AZG is a newspaper before anything else." In addition, the paper expresses the desire to extricate the people from the news blockade around them and "their habit of viewing the world from their own window." [passage omitted]

AZG continues to enumerate its objectives as follows: The paper will be a forum of free and unrestrained expression of thought and fair criticism; it will strive to restore the nation's internal balance, instinctive common sense, realistic thinking and tendency to act quickly at decisive moments; it will try to unite the nation under the slogan "one homeland, one people, and one destiny." AZG will also be a forum for airing democratic and liberal ideology and policies. [passage omitted]

On the "Encounter" page we find an interview with Catholicos Vazken I in Echmiadzin by correspondent Yervant Azatyan. In response to a question on the new form of relations between Echmiadzin and Antilias and the unity of the Armenian church, the Catholicos says optimistically: "There are no longer any political considerations. Consequently, there are no longer any grounds for the old concepts and conflicts affecting relations between Echmiadzin and Antilias. The political parties no longer need to use the church to buttress themselves. Today their buttresses are the motherland and the Armenian people."

The pontiff believes that the time has come to end confusing situations on the basis of a single and indivisible church. He sees no reason for the continuation of secessions from the Mother See observed in the last few decades either in Iran or in Greece. He finds the situation in North America more complex. [passage omitted]

Objectives, contents, and layout aside, AZG's readers cannot help noticing a singular phenomenon regarding the prose and spelling used in the paper. It is true that Armenia's press has turned into a small tower of Babel as a result of a concept of broadmindedness that is hard to understand; some newspapers continue to be published in the absurd spelling known as "Soviet" while others have decided to rectify the imposed mistake despite the difficulties and hurdles (e.g., BEM and LUSAVORICH). Still others, such as HAYASTANI HANRAPETYUN and HAYRENIKI DZAYN respect the authors' preferences. AZG has managed to be different from all of them. Its spelling incorporates all possible alternatives, although the dominant form is the new spelling of 1921. [passage omitted]

Such a situation cannot be explained by principles of broadmindedness or freedom. A lack of experience or "newness" would have been the most plausible explanation had it not been for the fact that the managing editor, H. Avedikian, is the former editor of ZARTONK, a daily

published in Beirut which is one of the most solid centers of linguistic heritage in the diaspora. [passage omitted]

ArSSR Bar Association Weekly Reviewed

91AS0840C Paris HARATCH in Armenian
19 Mar 91 p 2

[Article by Arpi Totoyan: "New Publication With Old Concerns"]

[Excerpts] This new publication, edited by Ignat Mamyan, features on its cover a collage of the significant events in Armenia in the last 3 years: Raised fists in Liberty Square, the old men and women of Artsakh, loudspeakers, placards, armed brigades, Movses Gorgisyan, Levon Ter Petrosyan, a semidevastated structure in Spitak, a scene from the parliament and a large church bell. These pictures are topped by the weekly's title: DZAYN ORINATS [Voice of the Laws]. The title betrays the weekly's affiliation; it is the press organ of the Bar Association of Armenia. The weekly began publishing on 17 October [1990]. Its eight pages contain professional news and a list of the members of the Supreme Court as well as the civil and criminal courts. In addition to an article and an interview also related in one way or another to the legal profession, there is a column where readers' questions are answered by appropriate specialists. The remainder of the paper's contents are no different from that of other papers that surfaced as the press gained freedom.

The center pages of the 20-27 February issue are devoted to an unending topic, the disaster zone. An article entitled "Strength" by Nayiri Arakelyan and "The Voice of a Wounded Village" by Varuzhan Melkonyan bring echoes from the zone.

The first article describes the situation in Gumayri [formerly Leninakan] after the disaster. Not much has changed since the earthquake because the underlying causes have not changed: Building materials cannot be delivered because of the blockade, foreign construction crews have left, and so on. The list can be extended, but that is meaningless if the same deaf ears are listening to it. [passage omitted]

The second article is about Ghursalu, a village on the foothills of the mountains on the right side of the road from Spitak to Kirovakan. Currently, the village is populated by Armenians who have fled from Azerbaijan. It was initially proposed to change the name of the village to Tartu to honor the Estonian construction workers. However, soon afterwards, the Catholicos visited the village and promised to help in the reconstruction work. Encouraged by that promise, the inhabitants proposed to rename the village Vazgenashen. However, the pontiff's promise remains a promise, and the name of the village remains Ghursalu. [passage omitted]

Status of Relations With Georgia Viewed

91AS0840B Paris HARATCH in Armenian
16-17 Mar 91 p 2

[Article by Arpi Totoyan: "Georgia a Friend?"]

[Text] Recent teleprinter reports from ARMENPRES suggest that there is serious trouble in the Armenian-populated southern regions of Georgia. The Armenian population of Akhalkalak has for some time been resisting the measures imposed on them by the republic's authorities. The most recent problem was related to the renaming of Bogdanovka, an Armenian-populated region, and the appointment of a governor to that region. The region was renamed Ninodzmenda by the Georgian Supreme Soviet and a Georgian was appointed governor of the region. The Armenian community of the region protested the measures. A similar situation also arose in Akhalkalak. Representatives of the popular movement in Akhalkalak appealed to Supreme Soviet President Zviad Gamsakhurdia personally and offered him their own candidate [for governor], but the president agreed to appoint the named candidate only as deputy governor. The Armenian representatives did not accept that proposal, and the problem remains unsolved.

It is obvious that relations with Georgia, among all the other neighboring states, are the most important for Armenia. The arbitrary blockades imposed by Azerbaijan, the support Moscow gives to Azerbaijan and the uncertainty of prospective controversial relations with Turkey constitute the strongest affirmation of that importance.

Good relations, however, must be based on good will from both sides to become a tangible reality and so that it does not remain at the level of aspirations and emotional and empty words. Given Armenia's circumstances, it is advantageous to establish and to cultivate good relations with Georgia: Such relations offer various advantages by reducing the pressure of the blockade to some extent and by allowing Armenia to extricate itself from its isolation and to open up to the Western world.

Where does Georgia stand on this issue? The rejections of the appeals of the Armenian communities of Bogdanovka and Akhalkalak already provide some answers to that question. The republic has even deeper internal problems with other minorities.

The 2 March issue of HAYASTANI HANRAPETYUN carries an interview with the Georgian president by correspondent Levon Arsenyan. The answers Gamsakhurdia gives during the interview suggest much about our neighbors' dispositions about good relations.

When asked "how relations between Armenia and Georgia should develop in the future," Gamsakhurdia begins his answer by underscoring the need for "good

relations" but immediately refers to "hurdles" which upset relations and which must be removed immediately. He cites as examples of these hurdles the activities of the Karavan and Javakhk organizations and demands that those activities be terminated. Of these, Javakhk is the organization that attends to the problems of Akhalkalak Armenians. Gamsakhurdia does not even attempt to show any signs of flexibility on Georgian dispositions when he says: "If the Armenian people do not restrain them, our relations will be seriously threatened with highly undesirable consequences."

His disposition is not any different even when the next question broaches a more innocuous subject: "Will Armenian churches be turned over to Armenian congregations?" Gamsakhurdia replies: "We do not have a determining role on that issue. That matter is within the jurisdiction of the leaders of the Armenian and Georgian churches. They have to decide, and we cannot intervene."

In response to a question about ethnic minorities, Gamsakhurdia dispels any doubts that their lives will be complicated if Georgia secedes from the Soviet Union. He says: "On the contrary, a sovereign Georgia will give broader rights to ethnic minorities. No one intends to repress them, but if they try to set up their own states on our territory, we will oppose them."

As we continue reading the text of the interview, the limits of good relations are further blurred when Gamsakhurdia responds to a question on his "position with regard to the construction of a rail line between Batumi and Yerevan." He says: "We will never allow that. Georgia is not a passageway." He does not even consider that such a venture can also be profitable for Georgia.

The only expression that can be considered positive—if the thorn hidden in it is ignored—is related to the Artsakh problem. He says: "I have always argued that Nagorno-Karabakh belongs to Armenia. Although this is a contested territory, the only solution at the present time is to turn it over to Armenia. I have always said that." It is not hard to see where Gamsakhurdia's remarks are addressed even when talking to an Armenian reporter on mutual relations when he says "this is a contested territory."

In closing the Georgian president expresses the desire, with the tone of a demand, that HAYASTANI HANRAPETYUN "always publish true and confirmed information" about Georgia and particularly about himself. He adds with dismay that there have been distortions in the past. Conveying his best wishes to the Armenian people, Gamsakhurdia expresses the desire that the historic friendship, mutual understanding, and solidarity between the two nations be restored. Even there, in view of the general tone of the interview it is hard not to be skeptical about good relations when he concludes by saying: "We must live as we have lived throughout our history."

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

Iraq, Jordan Discuss Communication Links

91AE0386A Amman JORDAN TIMES in English
21 Mar 91 p 3

[Article by P.V. Vivekanand]

Amman—The telecommunications corporations of Jordan and Iraq are in contact for resuming microwave links between the two countries, but no clear details have yet been obtained on the extent of damage caused to the system in the allied bombing of Iraqi facilities, a senior official said Wednesday.

"All efforts will be exerted to repair the damages and reestablish the microwave link in the shortest time possible as soon as the damage assessment is carried out," said the official, preferring anonymity.

In the meantime, "there is no communication between Jordan and Iraq, at least not on the civilian side," added the official. "We hope to have a fair picture of the situation soon on the state of Iraqi facilities," he said.

Telecommunication facilities in Iraq, notably in Baghdad, are among the worst hit in the allied air assault which began Jan 17. Several satellite centers in the Iraqi capital have been repeatedly hit, some of them seven or eight times. Indicative of the allied objective of total destruction is the view of a seven-storied building in the heart of the Iraqi capital. Every floor of the building appeared to have been systematically targeted, leaving a steel and concrete hulk with millions of cables hanging loose.

"These are complete write-offs. There is no way anything could be salvaged from the wreckage," according to an Iraqi Information Ministry official who took reporters on a tour of installations damaged in the bombing.

"We have to start from scratch," he added.

Every communication tower and ground facility between Baghdad and Tirbil, on the border with Jordan, has been destroyed; in some cases, the tall steel towers with the satellite dish are still standing in the middle of the desert, but adjoining small buildings which house related equipment have been totally smashed. Some of the steel structures resemble the leaning tower of Pisa.

Officials point out that Iraq had some of the best communications systems in the Middle East although they were never used to their full potential in view of the security situation during the eight years of war with Iran and the no-war-no-peace situation on the front until August 1990. The situation remained static with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in early August to the extent that "some of the equipment and systems were never tested for optimum purposes," said an industry expert, offering an explanation to the erratic communications with Iraq even during peacetime despite the availability of sophisticated infrastructure.

Estimates of the damage from the bombing range between \$2 billion and \$4 billion.

According to experts, the first and relatively easier option available to Iraq is to resurrect the microwave link with Jordan which will facilitate telecommunications between Iraq and the outside world through Jordanian satellite stations.

Postal Services

Meanwhile, moves are under way for Jordan's postal services to facilitate the flow of Iraqi mail through the Kingdom.

"We expect to begin the service in a few days' time," said Dr 'Abdallah Jazi, head of the Post and Postal Savings Corporation of Jordan. "The Iraqis have requested us to handle the mail, which will be sent to Jordan overland bearing Iraqi postal stamps, and to channel it through Royal Jordanian (RJ) planes," he told the Jordan Times.

"We have agreed to the request, and we are ready when the Iraqis are," added Dr Jazi.

Iraq's postal system had been partially active until the outbreak of the war. Iraqi Airways used to operate one daily regular flight to Amman until the morning of January 17, when the allied blitzkrieg rendered Baghdad airport inoperative.

Kuwaiti Communications

The Telecommunications Corporations (TCC) said meanwhile that calls had been coming into Jordan from Kuwait through satellite facilities set up in the emirate after the end of the Gulf war.

"People in Jordan can receive calls from Kuwait but not vice versa," said TCC Director-General Muhammad Shahid Isma'il. The system is set up by the American AT&T through its satellite facilities, he said.

"They have established ground facilities with dishes which are hooked up with the AT&T satellite, and this allows them to make calls outside," he told the Jordan Times. But the system does not allow calls into Kuwait from outside pending repairs to Kuwait's own telecommunication facilities," he added.

The Kuwaiti authorities have not approached Jordan to fix its side of telecommunications with the emirate.

According to one Jordanian who received a call from his sister in Kuwait City on March 9, more than one week after the allied forces entered the emirate following Iraq's withdrawal, AT&T has set up several "public call" booths around the city and people are allowed calls outside upon the "discretion of Kuwaiti militiamen."

PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

Refugee Camp Conditions, Political Representation

91AE0366A Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST
in English 29 Mar 91 p 8

[Article by Jon Immanuel]

[Text] "Welcome to the Holy Land," a Balatah grocer shouted, as he hawked his falafel. Then he roared with laughter. Refugees, being at the bottom of the social scale, usually wear their suffering on their sleeve, but they have recently developed a sense of irony absent before the Gulf war.

Visitors who came to Balatah, 'Askar and the other hardcore centers of Palestinian radicalism around Nabulus, in the first month of the Gulf crisis would have been confronted by raised fists, marches, surliness and sly glances. And that was a time when thousands of young men were off in Tel Aviv working, while this week almost none of them had jobs to go to.

Now it is Ramadan—a month of fasting and spiritual replenishment, and normally a time of heightened political tension—the camp seemed calm. If there had been any fanaticism, the jovial falafel salesman, selling his wares at 2 p.m., would have been the first to know.

Has there been some sort of catharsis? The sight of Scud missiles sailing over Mount Gerizim to Tel Aviv satisfied a deep-seated resentment in most Palestinians. They prefer to exaggerate, rather than play down, a sentiment that most Israelis consider morally depraved. Nor do they underplay their support for Saddam Husayn.

Israelis could not sympathize with Palestinians who said the cheerleaders wanted Israelis to feel something of the Palestinian experience, "the sense of helplessness, the fear of being outdoors after dark, enforced unemployment, the prospect of sudden home demolition, school closures," as Dr Mamduh al-'Akr, now in solitary confinement himself, put it.

"Yes, we cheered when the missiles came over. You would hear the cheering for miles around," one enthusiastic young man in 'Askar (population 9,000) said this week. In the specific context of the Nabulus area he was probably more accurate than Shmu'el Goren, the former government coordinator in the territories, who said reports of cheering were "exaggerated."

In one house shared by three brothers, it is possible to trace the gradual "evolution" in political consciousness that has developed over the past decade. Husayn, the oldest, is about 35. He is dispirited because he has lost his job at the textile plant at which the worked for 13 years in Tel Aviv. His employer could not take him back because Husayn was one of two Palestinian employees and the new regulations said only groups of 10 employees could work in the Tel Aviv area.

The second brother, 'Abid, looking more composed and sure of himself, has not had time to work because he has served five terms in administrative detention. Administrative detention is considered "nothing special" by Palestinian refugees.

The youngest brother, Ghassan, 22, probably the most self-confident of the three, is serving 14 years in Junayd prison for throwing a fire-bomb at a military patrol in 1986.

The economic situation is depressing. In 'Askar, the owner of the al-Nadi children's dress shop has not sold anything in three days. Business at Abu-Shakir's Balatah "balatot" factory which makes tiles for the building industry, is down 85 percent. Balatah shopkeepers spoke of making NIS [ne Israel shekels] 10 a day. When it was possible to work in Israel, young Balatah residents could make NIS 60 a day.

While almost the entire Balatah workforce of 4,000 to 5,000 worked in Israel before the war, only about 300 have permits to work in Israel now, partly because most of them worked in the restricted Tel Aviv area. Mohammad 'Abdallah, who sells chicken feed to farmers, one of the most basic commodities in the area for Palestinian farmers, says his sales are below 50 percent of last year's sales.

And traveling across the Green Line to buy the stuff from his Israeli distributor means keeping his special pass up to date. The pass contains seven separately-issued stamps, from the income tax and property tax authorities, customs, police, municipality, mukhtar and civil administration. Each stamp is valid for from one week to three months, but the pass is valid only until the first stamp becomes outdated. His driver must also have a pass, so between the two of them they must be sure always to maintain the validity of 14 stamps issued for different lengths of time by different offices.

If single men below the age of 30 are banned from entering Israel to deter knife attacks, the regulation will keep out Jamal Katawi, 24, whose father is a paraplegic. Katawi, the oldest of five children, is the sole breadwinner for his family, who worked as an electrical contractor's apprentice in Ramat Gan.

Israelis see sinister killers and the right to feel secure from attack in the street. Palestinians see a sinister Israeli plan to exploit what they see as isolated attacks as an excuse to impose collective punishment and economic strangulation.

Another element emerges in a picture where no piece of the puzzle held by one side seems to fit any piece held by the other. In recent weeks, the political consciousness of the camps has merged with its economic problems. The common people, especially the refugees, ask why they have no choice but to work in Israel, when more people could have worked near home if funds from abroad had been properly distributed.

"There is something not good in the way the PLO used money. We did not see it. We didn't receive the money in the camps," said Munir, who was recently released from Qetziyot detention camp. "Money went to marginal associations, businesses, but it wasn't used to broaden their foundations and employ more workers. The rich get richer, the poor get poorer."

With sentiments like these, mirroring the ill-feeling of the "have-nots" towards the wealthy Kuwaitis, refugees have difficulty acknowledging the leadership of the Palestinians from the well-known families who have been largely responsible for distributing PLO funds.

This sentiment found greater expression after the decision by the 10 "personalities" to meet with U.S. Secretary of State James Baker, according to Basim 'Id, the Betzelem human rights organization field worker.

The people they mention as their true representatives are in administrative detention. Many but not all are of refugee origin. Some are supporters of Nayif Hawatimah, the leader of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine; almost none are known to the Israeli public.

Their view of Faysal Husayni could have been expressed from the other side by Prime Minister Yitzhaq Shamir himself. "There are independent people who can get up and propose new ideas to the leadership in Tunis," said Marwan in 'Askar camp. "But Husayni cannot, because people do not consider him one of them. Husayni represents a partial view of the Palestinian people. He is one group. There are other people."

The name of Hanan 'Ashrawi, who had talks in the State Department, this week elicited blank stares in Balatah and 'Askar. But these people do not have blank minds. They profess pessimism, but advocate change. "PLO politics must take a look at things with a fresh eye. Then the world will know that everything that the U.S. and Israel proposes is meant to win them time," said Hayan.

Husayni says, "I would love to see elections." He does not claim to be a true representative of the people. He admitted that he was not close to the refugee population, because "If I try to get to the refugee camps, I am prevented by the military from doing so."

This week Radi al-Jara'i, a refugee born in the Far'a camp near Nabulus, and a journalist for the pro-Fatah AL-FAJR daily in East Jerusalem, wrote that the PLO must take new initiatives, with the greater participation of West Bank and Gaza Palestinians, to prevent opponents of the PLO from dividing the Palestinian people.

This brilliantly crafted piece of political rhetoric manages to restate traditional Palestinian prejudices while redirecting them toward a new course. Although it attacks the U.S. by name, using all the old formulas, it does so to show up the PLO's foolishness. "Shall we allow the issues to run rampant and stand with our arms folded as time works against our welfare, and watch the

events upon which we have no effect except to scream, condemn and curse this and that? ... Shall we be satisfied with our declaration of independence and the reaffirmation that the PLO is the sole legitimate representative of our people, when the facts are rapidly changing on the ground?"

It talks about Iraq's "military" defeat but clearly implies that Iraq suffered a political defeat which stands to ruin the Palestinians because it has "tipped the balance of power in the region toward Israeli interests." Gone is the talk of mass uprisings in the Arab world which in the words of last month's Tunis-issued intifadah leaflet will vindicate the "wise leadership" of Saddam Husayn.

Without diverging from PLO official policy at all, it goes way beyond anything the group of 10 led by Husayni would have been able to suggest to Baker. For instance, al-Jara'i not only calls for dissolving the PNC [Palestine National Council] and holding new elections, but demands immediate parity of representation between Palestinians here and abroad. Yet, the PLO maintains that the majority of Palestinians live abroad. He is even ambiguous about the role of the PLO. "If negotiations occur, any participant should represent the PNC and therefore the PLO, or let us say, the Palestinian state," he writes.

The size of that state is not defined, and there are indications that many Palestinians consider the existence of a state more important than a state defined according to Israel's pre-1967 borders.

The day after al-Jara'i's article appeared, it was already a topic of conversation in the camps around Nabulus. Not everyone agreed with it, but everyone agreed that al-Jara'i had the right qualifications. He was reasonably close to the profile of an authentic representative, since last month he was released after serving a two-year jail term; he was also released in the 1985 mass prisoner exchange, and above all, he is a man of the camps.

As for Yasir 'Arafat, there are pictures of him all over the entrance to Balatah camp, but they are less visible inside, as are Israeli troops who stare through binoculars from a watchtower, outside. They seem disinterested in the flag of the out-lawed Hamas Islamic fundamentalists, which flies in the breeze from a telephone line less than five meters away.

Hamas Charter, Origins, Ideology Discussed

91AE0361A Paris AL-WATAN AL-ARABI in Arabic
29 Mar 91 pp 24-25

[Text] In his book entitled "Hamas: The Islamic Resistance in Palestine," published in Cairo in 1990, 'Abd al-Qadir Yasin relates this incident: "When the Communist Party envoy contacted Shaykh Ahmad Yasin, representative of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Gaza Strip, proposing to him that his group join one single front with the rest of the political forces, Yasin explained that the defeat the Egyptian army suffered [in 1967] was only

revenge for Sayyid Qutub [noted Islamic writer and thinker executed by Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir's regime]. The Communist Party envoy immediately replied: Did God choose the Zionists in particular to take such revenge for you on the Egyptian people, soldiers, and officers? What matters, Yasin replied, is that our revenge has been taken. Not giving up hope, the communist envoy said: Let us put the question of revenge aside. The Gaza Strip is now occupied by Israeli forces, would you not join us in order to confront this occupation? Of course not, Yasir replied, at which point talks between the two men came to an end (pp 26, 27). In his book entitled "The Islamic Movement in the West Bank and Gaza," (Acre, 1989) he affirms that the Israelis have opened the doors for the Muslim Brotherhood in the universities in Gaza and Hebron in order to spread their influence (pp 32,33).

Thus, the "Islamic Assembly" [al-mujamma'al-Islami] was established in 1973 as a public institute of the Brotherhood with direct support from the Islamic Development Fund, encompassing all activities, foremost of which is the Islamic University. The assembly leadership consisted of Shaykh Ahmad Yasin, Salim Sharab, Ahmad Ibrahim Dallul, Hajj Isma'il Abu-al-'Awf, As'ad Husniyah, Mustafa 'Abd-al-'Al, Lutfi Shubayr, Ya'qub Abu-Kuwayk, Ahmad Abu-al-Kass, Ibrahim al-Yazuri, 'Abd-al-'Aziz al-Rantisi, Mahmud al-Zahhar, and president of the Islamic University, Muhammad Siyam. In 1979 the Hebrew state granted this massive assembly legal status.

Watchers of the march of political Islam have noted certain incidents. These began with the Muslim Brotherhood attack on 17 January 1980 on the offices of the Palestinian Red Crescent. On 4 June 1983 the Brotherhood set fire to the library of the Palestinian Red Crescent as well. On 10 February 1984 they sabotaged a nationalist procession, shouting "down with the infidels." These incidents took place under the very eyes of the Israeli authorities which adopted a "neutral" stand.

Expressing their [Hamas'] views, one of their writers said: "The land, that is all the land, is either the land of the infidels or the land of peace. No Arab land, Jewish land, or anything of this kind exists." Another writer sarcastically wondered: "If you look closely at a dot that is hardly visible on the map (meaning Palestine) you would see that it is the subject of fanaticism and is being worshipped by those who brag about nationalism instead of worshipping God." Concluding, he said: "Nationalism as a bond appears only in environments where mental decadence prevails" (AL-HADAF 2 April 1984). A colleague of his reiterates: "Revolutionary ideals are incompatible with the situation of Muslims in Palestine" as long as the preparation of youth for revolution is not yet complete (AL-HURRIYAH 18 September 1988). Dissension with the Muslim Brotherhood in the name of "jihad" or for any other excuses is perhaps the result of such ideals. Yet "Hamas" is not a splinter group, but a military wing of the Brotherhood.

The Israelis had stepped up their official and nonofficial terror. This became a daily phenomenon, with those whom the media call [Jewish] extremists perpetrating the terror, the extremists who several times have set fire to the al-Aqsa Mosque, and frequently stormed the Dome of the Mosque and violated the various holy shrines. Directing the Islamic resistance against the Palestine Liberation Organization [PLO] factions was no longer acceptable or justifiable. Silence in the face of Israeli escalation was no longer possible.

The balance of political power in the Gaza Strip following the "Arab Medical Association" elections was as follows: three seats for the Muslim Brotherhood, four seats for Fatah, and four seats for the left. 'Abd-al-Qadir Yasin, quoting an Israeli study, says: "Until the outbreak of the intifadah the religious trends in the Gaza Strip were not considered to be a mainstream trend. If elections were held on the eve of the intifadah the trends supporting the PLO would have won the Gaza Strip's majority vote and the Islamic movement would not have obtained more than 10 percent of the total vote (Hamas p 49).

However, about that time—in the mid-eighties—the jihad movement that split with the Muslim Brotherhood demonstrated a distinct inclination toward resistance, but it was an individualistic and sporadic resistance. As for Hamas, it was born and developed according to a political decision by the Muslim Brotherhood aimed at catching up with the nationalist movement in its heroic struggle under the intifadah banner. On 1 March 1988 a clandestine bulletin was issued in the name of Hamas whose members began distributing leaflets and writing slogans on the walls, which said:

—Our land is Islamic; this is the identity.—Islam is the road to return.—Islam is the solution.—The international conference is a treason.—The land of Palestine is an Islamic endowment.—Disappearance of Israel is a Koranic inevitability.—Revolution, revolution against the occupier; the Koran is the only solution.—The Koran is the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.—After Saturday comes Sunday.

The latter slogan was the most serious since it meant that after finishing with resisting the Jews today, the resistance will move to resisting the Christians tomorrow. Thus deviation from the true course started from the beginning. Its first victim was a Palestinian Christian figure known for his nationalism, namely Hanna al-Atrash, the mayor of Bayt Sahur. In 1988 Shaykh Yasin proclaimed that he will liquidate the PLO's political wing in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The Israelis had succeeded in preventing the PLO from financing its political wing. The pledge that Shaykh Yasin made appeared to be complementary to the Israeli action. In his book "Arabs and Jews: Wounded Souls in the Promised Land", David Shiplar pointed out that Islamic fundamentalists sometimes appeared to be useful for Israel politically because of their differences with the secularists supporting the PLO. From time to time

violent disputes broke out between the two trends in West Bank universities. Brig. Gen. Yitzhaq Segev, military governor of the Gaza Strip, mentioned once how he financed the Islamic movement as a force opposed to the PLO and the communists. He said: "The Israeli government gives me the budget, and the military governor gives to the mosques." When the fundamentalists in 1980 set fire to the Red Crescent Association's office which headed by Dr. Haydar 'Abd-al-Shafi the Israeli army took no action (New York 1986 p 117, quoting Yasin p 87).

If we leave the term "fundamentalists" aside, an Israel academic, using the public name "Hamas", says: "The emphasis that Hamas puts on the importance of liberating part of the territories opens the road before Jordan to the possibility of a settlement of which the PLO does not approve. The position of Hamas enables great flexibility toward the settlement. And since this organization [Hamas] will not take part in the negotiations that Jordan will hold, then the obligation to respect the agreement will not apply to it. It will remain free to continue its demand to expand the Islamic borders and to work for it. Therefore, it can allow itself to silently endorse any agreement Jordan reaches, without betraying its principles." The Israeli researcher concludes by asking his government to seriously look for "points of agreement between Hamas and our interests (Yasin 78, 79).

However, these Israeli observations, which are not unselfish, explain the contradiction between hard-line slogans and flexible behavior, and between public slogans and practical realities.

But this contradiction does not negate the fact that Hamas is an Islamic group within the intifadah movement that has its own work program and charter.

What does the Hamas charter, which was officially proclaimed on 18 August 1988, say?

The charter begins with the Koranic verse that says: "Ye are the best community that hath been raised up for mankind," and with words of Shaykh Hasan al-Banna that say: "Israel will rise and will continue to exist until Islam abolishes it." And words by Shaykh Ahmad al-Zahawi emphasizing that the "Islamic world is on fire and every one of us must throw water, even if a little water, on it in order to put out as much of the fire as we can without waiting for the others to do so."

In the preamble, the charter answers the eternal question: "Why now and why not yesterday?" It says: "The idea has ripened...far from being a temporary outburst of emotions and far from being reprehensible rashness." But what the charter adds dispels the suspicion of acting separately, saying: "Hamas' arms are linked to the arms of all the strugglers," which is a reference to openness toward others.

It is natural for Article I of the new group's charter to concern the subject of Islam, and for Article II to concern

the Muslim Brotherhood—"a worldwide organization and the biggest Islamic movement in modern history." Hamas consists of Muslims "who know their duty toward themselves, their kinsfolk, and their homeland." From the preamble and the text of Article II, we realize the important ideological concessions the march of the Palestinian "Brotherhood" has made, the first of which is to launch resistance against the Israeli occupation while previously it was to be deferred until "the Muslim youth was prepared and trained." The second is that there is a Palestinian "homeland" that is worth dying for, whereas previously Palestine was a "dot on the map" for which struggle and professing fanaticism in the name of patriotism, rather than struggle for God, is impermissible. The third concession concerns the possibility of alliance with "those struggling for the liberation of Palestine," which is a clear reference to the PLO factions.

But in the meantime Hamas shifts Muslim Brotherhood thought from the stage of "deferring struggle until preparation is completed" to that of immediate and comprehensive struggle, and from the stage of being flexible with the Jewish state to that of resisting the Jews themselves. It is perhaps appropriate here to cite the Prophet's tradition that says: "The Hour or Resurrection will come only when the Muslims fight the Jews." The second chapter of the charter concerns the objectives summarized in the "establishment of the Islamic state."

We would like here to discuss the ideological (not the political) aspect in which Hamas crystallizes its claim that "the land of Palestine is a land of Islamic endowment for all the Muslim generations until doomsday...just like every land the Muslims conquered by force."

Explaining these words the charter says that the Arabs, whether as leaders and countries, individually or collectively, have no right to decide the fate of Palestine in any way because it is a land that the early Muslims conquered and, therefore, it is the property of their generations until doomsday. In the same sense, this "endowed" property is not owned by kings, presidents, or organizations "whether they are Palestinian or Arab." Continuing, the Hamas charter says: "This is its judgement in the Islamic Shari'ah."

Of course, this strategy conflicts with the PLO's strategy and its ongoing commitment to establish a democratic secular state in which the followers of all religions are equal. Israel benefits from Hamas' proclamation of its religious principle to liberate Palestine, despite the fact that the Jewish state is one of the original sources of such a principle, which in some respects evolves as a reaction. But Israel's practical benefit from the enthusiastic "proclamation" is greater and stronger. Furthermore, Hamas rejects any international conference on Palestine because "it is a kind of giving the infidels a say in the land of Palestine." Article six frankly says: "It is necessary to link the cause of Palestine in the minds of the Muslim generations to the fact that it is a religious cause. The

article refers to the Islamic places and ignores the rest of the holy places as if they were of lesser importance. It quotes 'Umar Ibn-al-Khattab [conqueror of Jerusalem] out of context. It does not mention what he said about the Holy Sepulcher church when he refused to pray in it so that no one could say "Umar prayed here." Using the holy places as an argument to prove ownership is a serious matter, for there are those who justify Zionist violations of the al-Aqsa mosque as an excavation for King Solomon's Temple.

The rest of the ideological articles imply that we are on the eve of the establishment of the Islamic state for which programs and plans need to be worked out. But chapter four moves us to political action, which is so far removed from ideology. Article 24 says that Hamas does not permit discrediting or slandering individuals or groups. In Article 25 it shows respect for the other Palestinian organizations and "reassures all nationalist trends in the Palestinian arena working for the liberation of Palestine that it will support and help them both in words and in deeds, now and in the future; it promotes harmony and not discord; it preserves and does not squander; it unites and does not divide."

These are the political words that are far removed from shrill ideology. Article 27 directly concerns the PLO, for it is "the closest of all", although interpretations may differ between secularism, which the PLO sponsors and the Islamic state, which Hamas sponsors. It appeals to the PLO to share with it its views. It asks the Arab states around Israel to open their gates for the "holy warriors." But it adds that "struggle is not restricted to carrying arms." It calls upon educated Arabs and Muslims to engage the "enemies in a duel" with their thoughts and culture after "purifying them" from Western thoughts and foreign culture.

Article 31 provides that "followers of other religions should stop disputing Islamic sovereignty over the area, because the day they prevail there will see only killing, torture, and dispersion." No one understands this threat since the Muslims are the vast majority in this area. Nevertheless, "killing, torture, and dispersion" have unfortunately occurred among Muslims themselves and among Christians, because Islam and Christianity are one thing and Muslims and Christians are something else.

However, Hamas' ideological rhetoric is in no way different from its political rhetoric. The Muslim Brotherhood, as the mother organization, is a pragmatic movement that can prepare the ground for or justify every situation with ideological texts if necessary or with political texts should the need arise.

But this does not deny the fact that Hamas is a faction of the current Palestinian intifadah and that in fact it too is making sacrifices. As for its ideological dreams, they become an obstruction on the path of struggle only when it clashes with the PLO and resorts to violence against Christian Arabs in Palestine. Only in these two stands

does it hurl rocks at Israeli soldiers with one hand and present flowers to their leadership with the other.

EGYPT

Columnist Suggests Qualifications for Cabinet Members

91AA0310A London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic
6 Apr 91 p 3

[Article by Mustafa Amin, in Cairo: "An Idea"]

[Text] In Egypt they are now looking for ministers for the next ministerial change. It is easy for us to turn ministers out of a ministry, but it is difficult to choose new ones. We want a trustworthy, honest, capable minister. We want him to be a minister with personality, willpower, viewpoint, and a policy. We do not want sycophantic ministers who receive instructions and carry out orders and are unable to say no.

We want a minister who is popular; we do not want a faded minister who has no flavor or color except for the automobile he rides in and the bodyguard who rides next to the driver so people will know he is a minister.

Employee ministers no longer suit this age. The good thing about an employee minister is that he is obedient, polite, and never crosses his legs or causes problems or crises. He sits in a cabinet meeting with his hands folded like a pupil in elementary school. This type of person is like a prim statue placed in a salon, never out of place, never opposing anything,

But today's minister is not fit to be an employee, nor to stand in line, nor to take a salute. In the past, we grew accustomed to promoting an undersecretary to the position of minister. This was a big mistake. We were losing the undersecretary who knew the ministry well and the minister who was not fit for the ministerial seat. When you review the names of ministers in the United States, England, or France, you find only a very small number of employees. Most of them are members of parliament and businessmen. In the Bush cabinet, for example, you find a number of directors of large corporations and businessmen who distinguished themselves in their companies or transformed losing corporations into profitable ventures. In President Eisenhower's time, he appointed the chairman of the board of General Motors Corporation as Secretary of Defense. He was one of the most capable secretaries ever to be in charge of the U.S. Department of Defense.

I have been present for many cabinet changes. I have seen presidents as they selected the ministers. Some resorted to methods as strange as the game "Eenie, meenie, miney, moe" to choose ministers. I saw the most qualified men removed from the ministerial list because they were "offensive," or troublemakers, or grumpy. The strange thing is that Muhammad Mahmud Basha was a grumpy minister, 'Ali Mahir Basha was a troublemaking

minister, and Hasan Sabri Basha used to make life miserable for every prime minister who worked with him. Each one of them subsequently became one of our most important prime ministers.

We are not asking for troublemaking ministers, but for ministers who have a policy and a vision. The robot minister is no longer fit for the age in which we live.

And by the way, we want two female cabinet members, not just one.

ISRAEL

Economic Effects of Gulf War Assessed

91AE0363A Haifa ISRAEL BUSINESS in English
Mar 91 pp 1-2

[Text] War is not a new experience for Israel. Ever since Independence, almost 43 years ago—and long before that—the life of this community has depended on its ability to defend itself against forces that had only one aspiration: to make the Promised Land judenrein.

The temptation to write of the situation's political and moral aspects is very great. Much is to be said in appreciation of the sympathy and understanding, which Israel now enjoys; however, it also would not be out of place to mention that the menace of virulent Arab nationalism, only recently brought to enlightened world's attention by Saddam Husayn, is what Israel has had to face for decades.

A serious discussion of that question, of its implications for the future of this nation and for that of the whole world, is urgently needed. However, these pages are not the right place for it, nor is this writer a qualified protagonist for such an examination. We shall stick to the economic aspects, immediate and somewhat longer term, of the present situation.

It is much too early to assess the economic cost of the Gulf War for Israel, even though some details already are available. Between August 1990 and January 15, 1991, when open hostilities began, the national economy here lost at least \$600m, about 60 percent of that from higher fuel prices and the rest due to the contraction of tourist traffic.

The first week of fighting cost another \$300m in lost production, according to fairly authoritative estimates. Civil defense authorities first responded to the missile threat by telling everybody to stay home. The decision to carry on, as normally as possible, matured only a few days later, once it became clear that the danger would not pass within hours.

The crisis also made itself felt in other areas. During sunnier periods, more than twenty international airlines find passenger traffic from and to Ben Gurion Airport highly profitable; during the present impasse, all but one—Tower Air, out of New York—took to their heels.

That this caused little real harm is to the sole credit of El Al: Israel's flag carrier handled all the freight and passenger traffic without batting an eyelash. However, it is clear that this experience will have to be kept in mind, before additional steps are taken toward that company's planned privatization.

A similar question mark was raised by the action of international insurance companies, which increased their rates precipitously or altogether refused to provide cover for seaborne traffic from and to this country. However, most of that nuisance was quickly abated, when an official agency here moved to insure those shipments. Afraid that such an arrangement might prove permanent, Lloyd's and other insurers quickly backed down, apparently to protect their future standing in this market.

Reports from Israel's major exporters, on the other hand, are highly encouraging. Their first move had been to reassure distant customers, who justifiably wondered whether delivery schedules could be maintained. In a few instances, it seems, competitors from other lands also had taken the opportunity to point out that they, unlike Israel firms, would not be troubled by Middle Eastern problems.

However, years of consistent effort by Israel exporters are now paying off. The relations, which they developed with their overseas customers, have created a degree of confidence strong enough to protect them against fallout from the present crisis. In fact, some of the leading firms here report that even now negotiations are in progress with major overseas customers, and that additional orders may be expected in the near future.

Most importantly, the threats and perils of war have not detracted attention from the most important development of this period: mass immigration continues in the face of apparent dangers, and that at rates unimaginable even in the recent past. Even while Iraqi missiles continued to threaten, many hundreds of new arrivals deplaned at Ben Gurion Airport and—in an unexplained miraculous manner—found shelter, no matter how temporary.

The basic outlook in Israel remains confident, in general and also in the economic sphere. That, however, does not imply that anybody is shutting his eyes to the very serious difficulties, which will have to be faced in coming months and years. The cost of maintaining a viable defense is only one of those problems, even the reconstruction of missile damage is outweighed, by far, by the needs of immigrant absorption. The aggregate cost of that program is expected to approach the level of \$15 billion between now and the middle of this decade.

In the face of murderous Iraqi words and deeds, Israel has received a great deal of sympathy from the international community. It will not be unreasonable to ask that such sentiments be expressed not only in word, but also in deed. Fortunately, this country's economy—no matter

how sorely strained by war—will not require famine relief; however, it will need a massive injection of credit.

That, precisely, seems to have been the message of leading Israelis—from the Prime Minister down—to U.S. representatives. This may not yet be the right time, but very soon—within weeks or months, at the most—the United States and other foreign governments will be asked to provide massive guarantees, to help Israel raise the credit it will need during the next few years.

Ministry of Education 'Tracking' Proposal Analyzed

91AE0357D Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 21 Mar 91
p 3B

[Article by Nili Mendler]

[Text] "The boy was hit on the head with an axe on the morning of the examination." Thus a mother explained to officials in the education administration of the city government the failure of her six-year-old son, on the eve of the 1990-91 school year, in the entrance examinations for first grade in one of the three special-track schools in Tel Aviv. Her story is not unusual.

Many ambitious parents, whose children were rejected by the special-track schools in Tel Aviv, fought to change the decree, begging city officials to take extenuating circumstances into account. There are even those who tried to use "protektzya" (personal influence). Oddly, it became clear to city officials, many of the children who were turned down by the special-track schools had been ill the morning of the examination. The entrance examinations to these schools for the 1991-1992 school year will be held in the coming weeks. Registration is already closed, and for every place in the six special-track first grades in the city there are four pupils competing.

The assault of the parents on the special-track schools in Tel Aviv may give us an idea of what is going to happen soon in Netanya. Minister of Education Zevulun Hammer decided to change the schools of this city to special-track frameworks in stages, beginning with the next school year. Hammer is relying on the plan of Professor Rina Shapira of the School of Education at the University of Tel Aviv. According to this plan, the principle of parents' free choice will be put into action in the schools of one city, which will serve as a model for experiment. If the experiment succeeds, Shapira suggests, the entire educational system will imitate it. In her position paper, Shapira formulates the adoption of the principles of free economy," as she describes it, in the school system of a local authority. According to her claim, changing the schools to a special-track format will create competition among them for the student population and force them to improve their quality. Registration zones will be abolished and parents will be able to register their children in any school. The schools will then classify and select their pupils according to entrance requirements which they will set. A child who is rejected by one school will be accepted by another school chosen

by his parents as a second option. In order to implement the experiment a school-bussing network will be set up in the city.

A senior education specialist at Tel Aviv University described the Shapira plan this week as the "New Right's Education Plan." He explained his criticism by saying that you cannot turn everything into a competition—"education like shoes." For every act of choice, there is an act of rejection. The Shapira plan is offered, in his words, in a cellophane package.

Shapira claims that her plan will further integration on a voluntary basis and on a basis of shared interest among the pupils. Actually, we are speaking of a process which will cause deep separation in the student population. In spite of the establishment of junior high schools, there is still separation in the educational system. It clearly cannot be completely abolished, he maintains, but we should strive to reduce it.

This opinion is also shared by senior officials in the Ministry of Education. They were shocked by Hammer's decision, chiefly because the ministry was at an advanced stage of preparation for establishment of 13 junior high schools in Netanya in the coming school year. After a struggle lasting years between the ministry and the city council, it was agreed that Netanya too would join the program of reform and integration. But Hammer, they claim in the Ministry of Education, made a pact with the head of the Netanya city council, Yo'el Elro'i, which allows him to escape the reform under the veil of experiment: He suggested to Elro'i that Netanya be the city used for the trial of Shapira's special-track school plan.

Senior officials in the Education Ministry protest, among other things, the fact that the matter was not discussed in a suitable forum in the ministry. They contend that this is no experiment, but the beginning of a process to erase the reform and integration policy.

Naturally, when an alternative to reform is suggested in the educational system, the message is that the reform has failed or that its time has passed, and that new educational frameworks must be found.

Hammer did not present his program for public discussion despite the fact that the decision to conduct the reform in the educational system was accepted by the Knesset in 1968 and about 57 percent of the students in Israel are already included in it. The decision in each city depends on the agreement of the local authorities.

The head of Bar Ilan University's Institute for the Advancement of Integration in Education, Professor Yehuda Amir, headed a commission of experts which recommended carrying out the reform in Netanya because of the deep polarization between the established population in the city and the weaker population.

"If indeed the decision is made to give up reform in Netanya," Amir says, "it will be a mistake. Experiments

in Israel and the rest of the world on tracking in education show, unequivocally, that these frameworks aspire to homogeneity of students of high quality. They want to absorb the excellent pupils and attract so many pupils that they can make a selection and they actually do that. It is reasonable to assume that this will happen in Netanya as well.

If a school principal has the option to choose excellent pupils, why should he choose weak ones? This is almost unnatural. The parents want to see great achievements in learning, and clearly if the pupils are on a high level, the school gains prestige.

In the high schools this is expressed through the proportion of students who take the matriculation examination (out of all 12th grade graduates), the proportion who succeed, and the average grade. Do we not know that high schools expel students purposely in order to raise these proportions?

Amir wonders: "Why halt the process of reform in Netanya, which the committee of experts recommended, only to make an experiment which has still not proven itself? The high school structure in the city is elitist. In a situation like this the city needs reform. A school which has mainly weak pupils lacks two resources which could raise academic achievement. One: a stratum of good pupils which pulls the rest of the pupils upward by serving as an example for imitation and competition; the second: teaching power. Good teachers are attracted to elitist schools.

The Menkowitz report proved that disadvantaged schools receive the smallest outlay of resources (according to 17 criteria out of 19). One of the investments is the average training of the teachers. Wealthier schools have more of these resources.

The Menkowitz report was published 20 years ago, and it has been retested three times since then. The results of each of these retests confirmed the conclusions of the report. Amir emphasizes that the expression "input" does not refer only to budget.

The reform program does not only subscribe to establishment of junior high schools. It subscribes to a whole range of changes. One of them is encouraging the hiring of teachers with academic training. "In elementary schools in Netanya the proportion of teachers with academic training is low (only 25 to 30 percent of them are college graduates). If the seventh and eighth grades are incorporated into a network of junior highs, the changeover to teachers with academic training will be hastened, because in the junior highs very few teachers without B.A.'s are hired (about two-thirds of the teachers in the junior highs are college graduates). This raises drastically the general level of the pupils. Everybody benefits, and especially the underprivileged.

Studies of junior high schools in Israel, the most outstanding of which were carried out by Professor Mikha Hen of Tel Aviv University, prove that the stronger

pupils are not harmed by studying in the reform system, and if there is damage, it is minimal. In contrast, the weaker benefit considerably, and this expresses itself through achievement in studies. Similar findings result from a study carried out three years ago by the Institute for Integration at Bar Ilan University and from a new study of 47 junior highs in Gush Dan, carried out by the Hebrew University. The key principle of the reform is giving equal opportunity to all pupils, especially the weaker ones, where it is clear that unless there is integration of pupils of differing ability levels, the weak pupils will be hurt.

Amir describes as a utopia the claim included in the Shapira plan, according to which founding special-track schools will improve the quality of the teachers, increase their motivation, and guard against resignations due to discouragement. "Do they expect to find university-trained teachers who will agree to teach elementary school? And even if they find them, a teacher who finished university was not trained to teach the lower elementary grades. Graduates of seminars and teachers colleges receive better training for teaching elementary school. On the other hand, many teachers, not only in Netanya, who were trained in seminaries and teach sixth to eighth grades in elementary school cannot cope with the required material." Amir claims that although all the beautiful ideas in education are found in the Shapira plan, these are just ideas on paper. He doubts that the plan will be able to further integration on a voluntary basis.

Hammer's enthusiasm for letting Netanya escape the reform can be understood against the background of the sharp opposition of the established population in the city (which includes a large proportion of religious Jews) to contact between their children and the children of weaker stratum. The Minister of Education undoubtedly would like the weaker pupils to progress and would like to bridge the gaps, but not by losing his popularity within groups of parents who oppose reform and integration. The "established" in the state-supported religious trend in education more than in the state-supported secular trend, adamantly oppose the reform.

The established Ashkenazim (Jews of European origin) are stricter, as a rule, in keeping Jewish law than the Jews from Middle Eastern communities. During his previous term, Hammer allowed separation of the "established" in elitist religious schools like "No'am" and "Horev." It is also remembered how long he sat on the fence during the struggle against reform in Rish'on LeTzion.

About 10 years ago, Hammer set up a commission of experts to examine educational reform. He was very disappointed with the recommendation that the reform be implemented all over the country. His motto then was to let parents choose their child's school from a wide range of frameworks. It seems that Hammer wants to skip between the raindrops to protect his seat.

Hammer denies that he opposes reform and integration and that Netanya is a signpost in the process of retreat from the declared policy of his Ministry. He will not fight to put an end to it in cities which have agreed to implement it, like Ashkelon and Hadera (in 1991/92) and Tiberias and Yehud (1992/93). But he will also not fight for it.

Meanwhile, he is making a laughing stock of the Knesset decision to implement the reform all over the country. What he is proposing—special-track schools alongside junior high schools—does not reflect planning but rather the lack of it.

Jabaliya Refugee Camp Profiled

91AE0350A Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew
4 Apr 91 pp 23-25

[Article by Ariela Ringel-Hoffmann: "The Seed of Hatred"]

[Text] In the morning hours the Jabaliya refugee camp is enveloped in a soft mist that can only improve its looks. Those who went to work left very early. Those who stayed know that it is better to linger in bed another hour. A few children roam around. They are two to three years old, maybe younger. Bare feet, a couple of them bare bottomed, they look far from fresh out of a warm morning bath. Not far from them stand a few brown goats and an elderly woman putting out blankets to air.

There are no day care centers in Jabaliya, no kindergartens, no playgrounds. They begin the day in the decaying yard next to the house and that is where they will end it. Eventually they will tie together a few squashed cartons to make a "train" and hunt down a few scraps of metal to build a play car. That is how they will spend the day, and it will be the same tomorrow, and the year after that, and so on until they turn six and start going to the camp school.

If nothing happens, they will get to be 13, join the revolution and oil its wheels, and by the age of 20, a bit younger or a bit older, they will be the knife wielders of the year 2000 plus. If we consider that the current leaders of the intifadah in the Gaza Strip are the children of the camp to which Ariq Sharon brought order in the 1970's, then no guess is really off the mark when it comes to Jabaliya.

Muhammad Nasir and Ahmad Mabhuah are both 23; in February and May 1989 they murdered the soldiers Avi Sasportas and Ilan Sa'adun. Jihad Rabin, Hasan Nawfal, and Tahir al-Kurd are all 19 years old; in the summer of 1989 they murdered Rachel Weiss, a 60-year-old homemaker from moshav Shafir. Muhammad al-Halabi, 37, in August 1990 killed seven women in Tel Aviv. In October 1990 Rif'at Hamdunah, 26, stabbed and seriously wounded two plant managers in Ashqelon. Muhammad Mustafa Abu-Jalalah, 27, killed four women in Jerusalem on 11 March 1991.

All of them were born in the Jabaliya refugee camp, grew up there, went to school, then went to work in Israel. They stabbed, butchered, strangled, and clubbed their victims to death. They called it revenge, and those among them who were caught and brought to trial refused to express remorse.

People in Jabaliya still take care not to refer to them as heroes, but the accusing finger is pointed at Israel. When I told someone there that I wanted to do a profile of the Jabaliya refugee camp in order to understand where the knifere were born and grew up, he said I should do a profile of the Israeli Government. They had nothing to lose, he said, and that is the whole point.

That is also what A.M. thinks; he is a very nice, very polite man who knows Jabaliya like the palm of his hand and who held an important position there. He does not raise his voice when citing, at dictation speed, figures concerning the refugee camp. He remains calm while discussing the blood price exacted by the intifadah, although for a moment he does fall into despair, and he does not know how the whole thing will end. Only one thing angers him: talk of the stabbings as a new form of fighting the Jews. What do you expect these people to do, he says, as he pounds on the table, what exactly do you want to see here after almost 24 years of occupation?

Nothing really good has happened in Jabaliya in the past 24 years. People went to work in Israel and returned in the evening with money. They were connected to the power and water grid. Here and there the civil administration did something for them, but the intifadah still broke out there.

It broke out there and gave rise to the dispute in Israel whether the intifadah was the outcome of a miserable life or whether it was actually the improved conditions that increased the Palestinians' appetite. For the time being the question is irrelevant, especially because the people of Jabaliya, like others in the territories, say: We want what every people on earth deserve—the right to self-determination.

It all began on 8 December 1987 in the morning, when a Jewish truck driver hit a Gaza car. The driver made a sharp turn in the road, climbed over the Gaza car, killed four of its passengers and seriously injured the rest. By the time the news reached Gaza it was already accompanied by commentary to the effect that the driver was a relative of Shlomo Segel, a Jew who was killed two days earlier in the city. The funerals for the dead were held in the evening and the procession ended in an assault on the fence of the military post in Jabaliya.

That continued until the late evening hours and on into the next day. The story has already been studied and analyzed to death. Anyway, the first victim of the intifadah, Hatam al-Sisi, was "contributed" by the Jabaliya refugee camp.

The Jabaliya refugee camp contributed the first victims to the uprising. It also leads the list in the number of

injured and dead, 34 by December 1990, and in the number of expulsions—six, not counting the last four who are still waiting for procedures to be completed, and in the number of stabbers—eight (fatalities and expulsion figures according to Betzelem [Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Territories]).

It is said there that Jabaliya was occupied once in 1967 and a second time in the early 1970's when Ariq Sharon arrived in the Gaza Strip. And now the Israelis are "occupying" it a third time, and each war is worse than the previous one. And thus, by the end of March 1991, we see in the street 18-month-old babies who are still learning how to walk but can already make the V sign.

In the army they say that Jabaliya is one roof under which tens of thousands of refugees huddle together. From above, that is what it really looks like: one decrepit roof made of tin and asbestos, held down with blocks so that it will not fly away, stretching over a little over one square kilometer.

Between 60,000 to 70,000 people live there at present; no one can cite an exact figure. The first families arrived in 1948, refugees of the Independence War. They came from the south, especially from the area between Ashkelon and Ashdod. Each child knows from where his father came, and if not the father, then the grandfather. Each child knows what the family left behind and the years have only contributed to increase the loss.

Additional families arrived from Lod, Ramla, Yafo, and Beersheba. They have been living in the camp for 43 years now, in impossibly crowded conditions, more crowded than anywhere else in the world. And each son who gets married adds another little tin hut to the parents' house and raises his children there.

Most of them work, or to be more precise, worked, in Israel, and that was the source of their livelihood. Altogether some 50,000 workers from the entire Gaza Strip worked in Israel. Since the war about 15,000 go out to work every morning. The others we met during the day we walked around Jabaliya were shut up in their homes, sitting in the doorway, or pacing up and down, gathering frustration.

There is not one factory in Jabaliya, not even a workshop. The only trade practiced in the camp, if we can call it that, takes place in tiny grocery stores which carry nothing but basic staples.

Most children go to school in the camp. As in Israel, the school system is divided into elementary, intermediary, and high school. Most children finish elementary school. The numbers progressively decrease in intermediary and high school.

At the age of approximately 15 or 16 they go to work. Their first jobs are in the strip, among others at the textile and concrete blocks plants in the city of Gaza. At age 16 or 17 they arrive on the Israeli labor market, as wood cutters and water carriers.

They marry at a very early age by Israeli standards, starting at age 17. Each family raises an average of five to seven children.

Since the beginning of the intifadah the movie houses have remained closed in Gaza; coffee houses close early; there are no alternative forms of entertainment; plays are of course out of the question. And even if all those had been open, at the moment all the money goes mostly to food and a tiny bit for clothing and medicine.

The state does not invest money in Jabaliya, which does not pay the bill for the water and electricity used by its inhabitants. The workers who were laid off from their jobs in Israel will not see the compensation money that was deducted for them by their employers according to the law. The Histadrut continues to preserve its traditional silence when it comes to those workers. They live on UNRWA [United Nations Relief and Works Agency] allowances and on money distributed by various organizations.

Once, when the situation was calmer, people used to go to the beach in the strip. Now even the charm of the beach has faded away. The 20th century did not do a thing for them, except to give them an acute political certainty which, if we consider the actual facts, came as a result of a terrible existential frustration.

In August, after the invasion of Kuwait, the East Jerusalem newspaper AL-SHA'B—of a leftist, PLO-Fatah orientation—carried a long article entitled: "The Armies of Prince Arnault and Prince Holgo Marching on Al-Rashid's Baghdad." Arnault was a Crusader; Holgo was Genghis Khan's son who laid siege to Baghdad; al-Rashid was the Muslim leader who fought the crusaders.

The newspaper then cited the thoughts of Muslim shaykhs from the territories, including appeals to purge the holy places from the abomination of American soldiers.

During those months the shift of the struggle from nationalistic grounds to religious grounds appeared for the first time in AL-FAJR, too. For the first time the term "thawrah al-sakhkin," the knives revolution, appeared for the first time in major leaflets in the Gaza Strip.

In the territories there is talk of "jihad shamil"—general jihad. There is also talk of "jihad fard"—individual jihad, which in practice translates into the knives phenomenon: lone men not sent forth by any organization penetrating our daily lives armed with butcher knives.

Just as you cannot pin the stones down to the ground, says an army man, so you cannot stop the stabbings. For the umpteenth time the intifadah confronts the IDF [Israel Defense Forces] and the police with a challenge that cannot be handled in a democratic state that is having to struggle every day with its image.

Close to 0900 we arrive at the home of Hashim Muhammad 'Ali Dahlah. Dahlah, 31, is one of the four

men against whom an expulsion order has now been issued. He identifies with Fatah and is considered to be one of its activists in the refugee camp. He was first arrested in 1980, charged with membership in a hostile organization and with throwing a hand grenade at a military patrol, and imprisoned. In 1985 Dahlah was released as part of a prisoners exchange deal. In the years since he got married he fathered three children. The youngest, Nidal, six months old, sat in the crib and looked at us.

At the beginning of the month IDF troops came to his house and said they were looking for him. He was not at home; the next day he went to the civil administration office in Jabaliya. That day he was arrested and put in the central jail in Gaza, waiting to be deported.

Hashim Dahlah's parents came from a place called Hammamah, an Arab village not far from the present location of Kibbutz Nitzanim. Their house was blown up in 1980 when the son was arrested, and the house they now live in, a few rooms tacked on to each other, they received from UNRWA. Eighteen people live in the house: an old grandmother, the mother, brothers, sisters-in-law, and everybody's children. One of the brothers has been in the Nafha jail for four years, serving a 24-year sentence.

At 0900 they take out the mattresses and blankets from one room and ask us in: bare walls, colorful straw mats, and thin light coming in through a high, barred window.

The man who talks with us is Nawuf Hamudah, Dahlah's brother-in-law. Hamudah was four years old when the Six-Day War broke out. The rumor in town was that the Israelis were going to shell Gaza, and people fled to the beach. He, his younger brother, his mother, and his grandfather stayed in the house. Two weeks later everyone came back.

In the early 1970's when Ariq Sharon came to the Gaza Strip, Hamudah was seven years old. He remembers soldiers moving nervously in the streets and the voice of riders plowing the alleys at night, unexpected house searches, fear, children crying, armed soldiers standing adults against the wall, the disorder left in the house after their departure, and his mother cursing them.

Until the Gulf War Hamudah worked at a pipe plant in Holon. He has only good things to say about his employer and the Jewish friends he made during the years he worked there. But what he saw there seeped into his blood and is beating against his veins. We are human too, he says, we deserve to live too. I want to have here what I saw you have there. No power will defeat the intifadah, he says, not even the coalition that won in Iraq.

Look at the knives, he says, each one has its own story. And the most important, he says, there is no more fear. Not of the army, not of Shabak [General Security Service], not of jail, and not of death. This is the pressure created by despair. Despair is at the root of everything.

A small story: A. has been working in Israel for years. He is married and has three children at home. A few weeks ago he took his wife and mother to Israel. They were stopped at a roadblock. The wife and the mother stayed in the car, and he was told to get out. First their belongings were searched, then he was told to undress. In the middle of the road, with two women sitting in the car. A. tried to handle, maybe take off only the shirt. The pants, too, one of the soldiers yelled at him. A. dropped his pants and dozens of people who drove by at that time saw him. Or to be more precise, could have seen him, because A. knows that on the main road to Israel no one really sees a young Arab standing in his underpants and waiting for the soldiers to finish their search with his mother and his wife looking on. This is the threat of the knives and its effect on us and on them.

We are escorted into Jabaliya by K., an energetic young man who knows the camp well. K. is what is called "a youth with a past" and he is not allowed in Israel. He has stitches in his belly and has spent some months in 'Ansar. The bullet hit him during rioting in the Rimal neighborhood and he was brought to jail on charges of incitement. The investigator said, you were the inciter. I did not incite, K. said, you incite. What do you mean, the investigator asked. Take your jeep, K. said, and go out into the street. What is going on in the street is incitement. The sewage is incitement. The dirt is incitement. The lousy food in our hospital is incitement.

K. took us to the houses of people waiting for deportation: Dahlah's first, then to the house of Mo'in Muhammad Umm-Silm. His family, too, lives in a house which was built after the first house was demolished by the security forces in 1980.

Neighbors had come to offer consolation to the old father, Muhammad Umm-Silm, who was wounded about one year ago during an army search in the neighborhood; another brother, Rafiq Umm-Silm, 22, who was released two weeks ago after five years in jail; Rafiq's sister Fatimah, who is married to another man slated for deportation, Jamal Abi-Habil.

We cross over open sewage canals, mounds of garbage piled on their edges, children playing in between, and remains of crushed motorized roadblocks and bits of exhaust pipes. We are surrounded everywhere by children in ragged clothing. Someone asks us for money to let us take a picture of his children, and K., embarrassed, explains that people are hungry for bread.

We pass through Shaykh Radwan, the housing project that was supposed to provide an appropriate solution to the overcrowding in Jabaliya. In the middle of the neighborhood there is a big, blue pond surrounded by a low dirt levee. From a distance it looks like a miniature Sea of Galilee which, with a bit of watering, could turn into a green park. But as you come closer you see that it is nothing but a huge, muddy, smelly puddle of sewage

water. This is the fresh aid reservoir of Shakh Radwan. On hot summer days the locals catch a breeze by the sewage.

We sat with Kamil Zakut, whose brother Jamal Zakut, was viewed as the leader of Na'if Hawatimah's Democratic Front in the Gaza Strip and as one of the leaders of the intifadah and who was deported to Jordan. Another brother is in jail, and his sister is married to Majad Labadi, another deported intifadah leader.

There was also Munir Abu-Rizq, 23, who was born after the Six-Day War, and right at the beginning of Israeli rule in Gaza. He was shot three times during the intifadah: once in the leg, a second time in the abdomen, and a third time in the hand. In the course of the same three years of intifadah he was also arrested and spent time in jail.

And Hamid Jadd, 26, who did time at 'Ansar, some of it in solitary confinement, was arrested nine months ago and was released a few weeks later on 7,000-shekels bail. He has to sign a card once a week at the local police station.

And Khalid 'Aqil, 22, who has a platinum rod in his crushed leg. He was arrested during an army search at his house.

Each young man we met in the Jabaliya refugee camp has this kind of story. In all fairness we have to assume that there are youths in Jabaliya who never had anything to do with either the army or Shabak, although the whole day we were there we did not meet any who fell into this category. Young men of age 20 to 30 versed in media exposure took off their shirts, dropped their trousers, and rolled up sleeves to let the photographer take repeated shots of scarred abdomens, legs, and hands.

At one point, when one of them was having trouble finding the right English word to describe the feeling of frustration, he pushed a fist in his stomach, then made a strangling gesture at his throat.

A personal testimony: This is not the first time that we went to Jabaliya, a reporter and a photographer accompanied by a local. But this is the first time that we went in with such a bellyache. Even the nice colonel we met in the town tried to persuade us to content ourselves with talking with people outside the camp. What is going on there is not good, he said, it is not good.

Throughout the visit K. made sure that we did not say a word in Hebrew. We talked only English and everywhere we went he made sure that there were another two to three young men from the neighborhood.

He restrained the photographer, refused to stop in some places, and in one neighborhood, where someone realized we were Jews, he pushed us back into the vehicle and hastened to get away. People here are very tense, he said.

K. said: I am tired, the people of Jabaliya are tired, and you are tired, too. We spill blood, you spill blood, and for what?

Perhaps for the illusion of control. In their book about the intifadah Ehud Ya'ari and Ze'ev Schiff called this "spreading sand on burning coals." For one blessed moment, which may last for a few months, one may have the illusion of being in control. But anyone who is familiar with the area knows that, as we said, more than anything else, these young men have nothing left to lose. This may be the key to understanding what is happening there. It cannot get worse than this, people say in Jabaliya. And the men with the knives believe that only what awaits them in the next world can be better.

K. says, you can see people's faces, but you cannot see what is in their bellies and what goes on in their heads. Even your Shabak cannot uncover the knife wielders.

In the army a lengthy debate is now taking place among the factors involved in connection with the knife wielders, whether indeed they are suicides. This is far from being an academic discussion. The question of whether they are suicides or not is expected to point out the appropriate methods for combating the phenomenon. The death sentence, for example, so hotly recommended by current Police Minister Roni Milo, can only play into their hands if that is the case. "Shahid" is a martyr of the intifadah; the death sentence would turn every killer into a shahid.

One day after our visit to Jabaliya, DAVAR reported that the defense minister is considering new ideas, such as pulling the IDF out of some of the refugee camps in the Gaza Strip, forming ad hoc committees, opening schools, putting a freeze on administrative arrests, and releasing detainees. The internal communication system in Jabaliya is such that what appears in DAVAR reaches them, too. There was no great joy in Jabaliya. This piece of news, if it is correct, may be a small joy.

Immigration, Absorption Issues Reviewed

91AE0357E Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew
22 Mar 91 p 14

[Article by Natan Ro'i]

[Text] The rabbi, Minister Yitzhaq Peretz, initiated a discussion in the government in the spring of 1989 on the subject of absorption of immigrants. It was decided then to create a joint team including the Jewish Agency, the Ministry of Construction and Housing, and the Ministry of Absorption. Peretz requested a budgetary supplement for funding an additional 4,000 immigrants, since 18,000 immigrants were expected that year compared to 14,000 immigrants the previous year.

At that same meeting, it became clear that the Jewish Agency owes money to the Israeli Government; also, that an end must be made to the "clogging" of absorption centers with thousands of Ethiopian Jews, who have not

found housing solutions. It was also estimated that many immigrants would arrive from Argentina. Dr. Yosef Beilin, Deputy Minister of Finance, suggested changing the problems to solutions. To this purpose he proposed assembling in his office all the general managers of the ministries concerned. Peretz was not opposed, because he did not think that Beilin would pose a threat. Thus the Beilin Commission was born, spurred by a desire to solve immigration problems. Dr. Yosef Beilin dreamed then of the great immigration from the Soviet Union and did not think there was a need to relate to it as a miracle, but as a problem to be solved.

The Beilin Commission succeeded in covering a budgetary gap of eight million shekels. The general managers of the ministries loved these meetings. Eventually, serious work was done through the ministerial committee for absorption. This was inactive for a very long time, because the different ministers who were members of it did not attend—among them, Minister David Levi. The commission functioned unofficially, but it wanted to work, and this is a lot in comparison to the lack of action by the Minister of Absorption, Yitzhaq Peretz.

The State Comptroller wrote in her last critique: "Most of the government offices which were inspected had not prepared a plan of action for absorption of the wave of immigration. The existing plans are mainly incomplete, without the detail needed, and are not ready for application." She continued that "the Office of Immigrant Absorption prepared a master plan in 1986 for the absorption of immigration from the Soviet Union. The organizational structure outlined in the master plan was not set up, and the office was not set up when it came to the scope of manpower and structure to cope with the wave of immigration."

Subsequently, a dispute developed between Peretz and Minister Sharon. The insulted Peretz announced to the Cabinet of Immigration and Absorption that he did not intend to present a plan for absorption of 400,000 immigrants that year, unless all the difficulties were ironed out. Close examination of the plan revealed that there were really no problems to speak of—it was just a lot of talk with little action, the side-effect of a lack of seriousness and an inappropriate public attitude. The Ministry of Absorption said that the plan would give the rest of the ministries time to do what they had to for the immigrants. The Ministry of Construction and Housing would be able to build houses, while the immigrants root through garbage cans in Tel Aviv.

Peretz and the general manager of his ministry, Aharon Lapidot, who was a member of the Beilin Commission, could see the writing on the wall: At least 100,000 immigrants, so it was said in the summer of 1989, were expected to arrive in Israel in the next three years—an overwhelming number, compared to the numbers that the Absorption Ministry had faced before. In October 1989, it was clear that hundreds of thousands of Jews from the Soviet Union would arrive in 1990. The Beilin Commission, which had met once a month, began to

meet every two weeks in the office of Yosef Beilin, then assistant minister of finance. Beilin had come to believe that the Jewish Agency was the most professional body in the field of immigration and absorption, and that the institution's managing director, Moshe Nativ, could carry out the absorption process.

In April 1987, the Ministry of Absorption began using two paths for initial absorption of immigrants: the old path, in which immigrants were sent from the airport to Jewish Agency absorption centers and hostels, and the new path called "direct absorption"—where the immigrants are sent from the airport to settlements and rental apartments.

The State Comptroller, in her latest report, emphasized just one of the problems with "direct absorption." "Immigrants, and among them elderly people without families, and single-parent families, have been put into the 'direct absorption' path, and this path is not suitable for them, because they usually are not able to handle the negotiations for renting an apartment on their own, and cannot accustom themselves to Israeli living conditions without a transition framework."

The problem worsened when tens of thousands of needy people, sick people, and single-parent families arrived without receiving special attention from the minister of absorption, Yitzhaq Peretz. The Jewish Agency will soon put its social workers under the control of the local authorities, because of lack of funds. The Ministry of Absorption will continue to symbolize the bureaucracy, and the needy immigrant will be ground into dust.

A visit to the offices of the Ministry of Absorption reveals the sight of thousands of immigrants knocking on the doors and running into a blank wall. There are good absorption workers, but they are exposed to a war of generals: Minister Peretz tries to clip the wings of Dani Toledano, the general manager of the Tel Aviv district of the Ministry of Absorption; Minister Peretz brought about the resignation of the director of the Jerusalem district and the appointment of someone after his own heart, a religious man whose talents as a manager are in doubt. The director of the ulpanim (adult Hebrew schools) is also very Orthodox, and this is not accidental: It is desirable that absorption be "spiritual," in the very Orthodox sense. Thus Peretz's ministry lays out hundreds of thousands of shekels, from the special funds as well as from ministry funds, to print Passover Hag-gadahs, Torah lessons in Russian, and religious training materials with an introduction by the general manager of the ministry—Aharon Lapidot.

The consolation is that volunteer organizations help the immigrants during their first days in the country, because the "basket of absorption" is really a "package of poverty." The State Comptroller, Miryam ben Porat, does not leave this area uncovered either: "The Ministry of Absorption of Immigration planned a new way to allot aid to immigrants, called "Sal Klita" (absorption basket). This refers to a financial "basket" meant to meet

the different needs of the immigrant, in the first year of immigration, and to be given to him with no need of receipts and proof of actual expenditures. But in reality, the funds were given to immigrants according to their actual expenditures and when receipts were produced—something which forced the immigrants, during their first year of immigration, to return over and over again to the branches of the Ministry of Absorption of Immigration.

The newspapers are exploding with dozens of vague press releases. For example, one morning I received a press release saying that the Ministry of Absorption had begun a project for the removal of 1,400 Ethiopian Jews from absorption centers. The project, so it was written, was successful. Upon examination it became clear that only a few isolated families from among the Ethiopians understand the operation, and that they had no chance to get loans to buy apartments. They did not understand what was written in Hebrew in the contracts. The umbrella organization of Ethiopian Jews is actually translating the contracts now. There was a project, but not a successful one. Ediso Masala, the chairman of the umbrella group of the Ethiopian Jews, said that his organization has no contact with Minister Peretz. If, during Minister Ya'akov Tzur's term, the contact had its ups and downs, at least it existed. Today there is no communication at all, and it is lucky that there is a Jewish Agency and an Uri Gordon.

The situation is rather confused: The Jewish Agency takes care of absorbing immigration and the Ministry of Absorption takes care of absorbing immigration. The duplication of roles, which Peretz attacked this week, does damage and harms absorption. Dr. Yosef Beilin, member of the Knesset Commission for Absorption, said this week that it is necessary to examine seriously the possibility of abolishing the Ministry of Absorption entirely, and handing its functions over to a professional body. The Jewish Agency is the most professional body in the field. Peretz will certainly not accept this idea. Instead, in the coming elections to the Knesset, he will speak, it seems, of his great success as Minister.

[Box, p 14]

Peretz in the Cabinet Session

The press is Peretz's real strength. At noon on Sunday, the facsimile machine at "DAVAR" spouted out a notice to the press, telling what Minister Peretz had said in a government session:

"During the government session today, Minister Peretz was asked by Minister Rehovo'am Z'evi, if the fact that 54 percent of the immigrants settle in the central area of the country does not prove the failure of direct absorption. Minister Peretz answered that the policy of his Ministry is to scatter the immigrants to all parts of the country, and especially on the periphery. This trend, said the Minister of Absorption, proved itself when the incentives given to immigrants asking to settle in the

periphery led to there being four families interested for every refurbished apartment in these settlements. Minister Peretz said that in spite of the growth of immigration, the proportion of immigrants settling in the center of the country will drop. Minister of Defence Moshe Arens asked Minister Peretz if the subject of employment for immigrants has been dealt with as required.

"My ministry, together with the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs and the Employment Service, is working to draw out potential sources of employment. Today, 40 percent of ulpan graduates find work, some of them in their own fields. But it is clear that the authorities dealing with the subject of employment must create a suitable answer for creating new work places," said Minister Peretz.

During the government session, the minister of absorption turned to the prime minister, and asked him to call on the Jewish Agency to give up its intention of changing its portion in the basket of absorption from a loan to a grant. Yitzhaq Shamir promised Minister Peretz that he would personally check out the matter, which he described as "complicated."

It happened that at the time Prime Minister Yitzhaq Shamir was telling Peretz that he would check out the matter of the Jewish Agency's loan, the heads of the Jewish Agency in the United States were on their way to a meeting with Shamir. During the meeting, the loan plan was approved in its entirety. Peretz requested. Shamir acted.

Polling Data Released on Soviet Immigrants' Attitudes

Complaints About Bureaucracy, Social Adjustment

TA06051116A Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT
in Hebrew 6 May 91 p 7

[Article by Tamar Treblisi]

[Text] Over 45 percent of new immigrants from the USSR think that the Israeli bureaucracy is as corrupt as the one in the USSR and some 15 percent think that it is more corrupt.

These are the findings of a poll of a representative sample of 600 new immigrants conducted by Dr. Mina Tzemakh for the Center for Volunteers in Israel. Dr. Tzemakh yesterday revealed the findings at an evening seminar in Tel Aviv on "Immigrant Needs."

The poll shows that over 80 percent of new immigrants from the USSR are interested in receiving legal advice and see it as a basic part of their absorption into Israel and 25 percent ranked it first among a list of 17 different needs. According to the poll, Dr. Tzemakh says, the immigrants feel that they are easy prey for Israelis who take advantage of their situation. The immigrants said that in certain situations they themselves create the loophole by which they are taken advantage of because

they continue as they did in the USSR to give gifts to bureaucrats in order to get served by them.

The poll also shows that 45 percent think that they are being cheated when shopping or requesting services. Sixteen percent are uncertain if they are being cheated or not and a third of those questioned claimed that they themselves were victims of fraud and exploitation.

Employment Problems Cited

TA0651116B Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 9 May 91
p 2

[Article by Lili Galili]

[Text] More than half of the immigrants who arrived from the Soviet Union between the months of July and December 1990 are not employed; in one-third of the families who immigrated to Israel at the end of 1989, there is still nobody working. These [statistics] are among the results of a follow-up survey of Soviet immigrants, conducted by the "Tatzpit" research institute—headed by Dr. Aharon Fein—in April.

The survey also indicates that in 15 percent of the immigrant families which arrived in Israel this year, one family member is employed in a full-time position while 70 percent of these do not work as domestics.

Within the framework of the survey, 615 immigrants who arrived in Israel between September 1989 and March 1991 were interviewed. The interviews were conducted in 40 locales with a concentration of immigrants.

The results of the survey show that in 60 percent of the families that immigrated at the end of 1989, at least one family member has a full-time job. A surprising statistic is found in the part of the survey on the political positions of the immigrants. More than half of those polled said that, if a Russian party were to be established in Israel, they would support it in the elections. Approximately 35 percent would prefer to support one of the existing parties. If an immigrant party were not established, 46 percent of the immigrants would support the bloc of Right-wing parties and 21 percent [would vote for] the parties of the Left.

At the same time, 50 percent of the immigrants who support one of the blocs said that they would transfer their support to a Russian party, if it were established. It is worth noting that the extent of support for a Russian party rises in proportion to the extent of the immigrants' dissatisfaction with their situation in Israel.

As to the personality that should head the Russian party, 9 percent of those asked identified Natan Sharansky as a central figure. The decisive majority of those asked responded that they are not aware of such a central figure among the immigrants.

In the section that checked the extent of their satisfaction with the situation in Israel, the results of the April survey

indicate a slight drop in the level of satisfaction, compared to earlier polls which reported that 75 percent of the immigrants were satisfied with the situation in Israel.

In the last survey, only 8 percent defined their feeling as "very satisfied" while 64 percent reported that they were "satisfied" with the situation in Israel. About one-third of those asked replied that they were "not satisfied" or were "very unsatisfied" with the situation.

Immigrants' Spokesman Comments on Relations with Ethiopia

91AE0357B Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 17 Mar 91
p 2

[Interview with Rahamim El'azar, a leader of the umbrella organization of Ethiopian immigrants, by Gid'on Alon; place and date not given]

[Text] [Alon] According to reports that arrived last night from Ethiopia, the regime of President Mengistu Haile Miriam is in danger. Do you think it is possible that the rebels will succeed in expelling Mengistu?

[El'azar] According to information which has reached me, too, Mengistu's regime is in danger. The rebels who are supported by the leader of Libya, Mu'ammarr al-Qadhafi, and who were previously supported by Iraq, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia, are waging a continuous battle against the regime and they are nearing the capital, Addis Ababa. At this stage, there is no certainty that the rebels will succeed in toppling the regime, because Mengistu has proven in the past that he has exceptional staying power and he has succeeded in extricating himself from many perils.

[Alon] Is there a direct connection between the internal struggle over rule and the halt in Jewish emigration since the beginning of March?

[El'azar] Officially, the government in Ethiopia gives technical reasons for the halt in emigration, but it is hard for me to believe that they have completely stopped giving exit passes to Jews just because of technical reasons. According to foreign publications, there is a connection between the tense internal situation in Ethiopia and the halt in emigration. Foreign sources point out that Ethiopia expressed dissatisfaction with the fact that Israel did not fulfil promises of aid she gave, and Mengistu is using the Jewish "card" to pressure Israel and through her the United States, which has reservations about his Marxist regime.

[Alon] On Thursday the spokesman for the foreign ministry published an official announcement, according to which "the hardships encountered in the process of unifying families from Ethiopia have found their solution and soon immigration will be resumed." In your estimation, is there cause for optimism?

[El'azar] I am very happy that the Foreign Ministry spokesman announced that, but I will be even happier

when I see the Ethiopian immigrants arriving in Israel. At this stage, not one immigrant has arrived in Israel since the first of March; this after more than 2,000 immigrants arrived from Addis Ababa during the months of January and February.

[Alon] Do you have complaints against the government and the Jewish Agency that they have not done enough to bring the 17,000 Jews still in Addis Ababa to Israel?

[El'azar] In the last months, we have had no complaints about the government, the Jewish Agency, or Jewish groups working in Ethiopia. They have cared well for the Jews and their condition has improved from the point of view of economics and health. It is also a fact that the number of immigrants has gone up in the last few months. But now it is very hard to envision what their fate will be. If foreign nationals are forced to leave Ethiopia because of the situation and if Israeli Embassy staff are asked to leave, the Jews will be in great danger, because they are subsisting today from the aid given them by various agencies. They have no other means of support. It is clear to me that if a revolution takes place in Ethiopia, the Jews will be the most vulnerable group.

[Alon] That is to say, from Israel's standpoint, it is preferable that Mengistu's regime continue, despite the sharp criticism of it in the West?

[El'azar] Definitely. Perhaps this sounds ironic that I support the continuation of the Mengistu regime, despite its defects. But it is clear that if, God forbid, he is driven out of power, our interests will suffer, for in a fundamental way he supports the exodus of the Jews on the basis of reunification of families, and if he is replaced by another leader, there is no way of knowing what his position will be on the subject of Jewish emigration. In any case, we need to begin anew the efforts to save Jews. That means that in our position, a devil you know is better than even an angel whose character you know nothing about.

Editorial Discusses New Strategic Perspective on Syria

91AE0357C Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 22 Mar 91
p 1B

[Article by A. Schweitzer]

[Text] There are countries—not necessarily the happiest among them—who need a dangerous enemy to help a regime lacking self-confidence to keep its public standing. Israel, sadly, shows signs of being like this. For added security, it grasps at an entire stock of enemies of the aforementioned kind: Sometimes these are the miserable Palestinians, sometimes somebody else. But the preferred enemy in the storeroom of dangers said to exist is Syria. And if Syria is not convincing in its role as this kind of enemy, then the shapers of public opinion of all kinds will blow it up to the dimensions of a threat.

It is agreed that potentially Syria can frighten any intelligent person: Its hatred of Israel is real according to all opinions, and the war machine it has built over the years is the strongest and best armed in all the Arab states. This is especially true after the total destruction of the Iraqi military machine, which was larger and more up-to-date. That is to say, Syria is not the usual bogey—it is what it seems to be.

But, in contrast to the opinion of those who look only at the surface of things—hatred and weapons alone are not enough to bring countries to war. The fact is that until now Syria has not gone to war with Israel on its own. This recoil from a one-to-one test of power has overcome the seduction of being the top leader of those Arab countries ready to translate hatred into acts of hatred. And let us not think that this recoil is special to al-Asad, who is said to be more sensible than previous Syrian leaders. History proves that he, like his predecessors, has preferred to be a hero within a coalition; reason permits the assumption (Saddam Husayn, who did not recoil from the skirmishes with the United States, is a special phenomenon within those who aspire to greatness within the Arab countries), that those who come after him will also behave according to what appears to be tradition.

The political circumstances in which al-Asad finds himself are not likely to encourage going to war against Israel. The sad example of Iraq showed that the political and military support of the Soviet camp at a time of crisis is no longer what it was, and that the Soviet weapons, which have been and will be for many years the backbone of the Syrian armament, suffer from inferiority compared to the American weapons in Israel's hands. And above all, Syria's strategic reserve is the Iraqi army, whose help, in spite of the enmity between the Syrian Ba'ath and the Iraqi, was assured to Damascus in time of war with Israel, and which now is no longer in the picture. And this is no exaggeration: the Iraqi army suffers, and will continue to suffer for many years, from paralyzing shock. The best of its equipment is completely useless, and because of catastrophic lack of means there is no possibility for it to renew its strength either in quality or quantity.

If the manipulators of Israeli public opinion suspect that the Syrian bogeyman by itself will not be frightening enough, it is possible to add to it a dimension of violence, by emphasizing the story of the missiles from North Korea. But, there is no strategic significance to these missiles. The Syrian army was equipped before the Korean acquisition with missiles of different [designations] and capabilities. Beyond that, we learned during the Gulf War that it is possible to terrify the masses with missiles, and in the worst case to kill a few people on the home front, but not to influence the course of the war in any real way. And it is also not just an accident that in spite of the estimated Iraqi capability, the weapons were not armed with unconventional warheads. That is to say, fear of retaliation in kind can be a deterrent to the use of missiles and what is carried in their noses.

And actually, behind the camouflage of the Syrian military threat burgeons the true fear, that Syria, because of the weakening of Soviet aid which gave strength to its annoying-threatening stance, will go over to an appropriate path which suits its integration into the American camp. It will begin to speak of a settlement with Israel. Here and there it is possible to discern signs that in Damascus they are thinking of a reversal like this. If al-Asad is not completely blind, he will be able to observe the grotesqueness which took place of late around the Golan: to observe and to clap his hands. In order to harass Israel and to bring its government to the edge of nervous collapse, he does not need tanks or jets or missiles: A few gentle words will do the work for him.

Apathy in University Student Politics Analyzed

91AE0357F Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 24 Mar 91
p 2B

[Article by Arnon Ben-Nahum]

[Text] Only a few students will trudge to the university on their organizations' election day. And not all of those found there on that day will go to the ballot box. Only 4,000 out of close to 20,000 students at Tel Aviv University voted last week in the elections to their organizations.

"I never saw so many young people tired of politics," said Professor Sam Bachrach, head of the department of Labor and Management at Cornell University, pointing out, for the sake of contrast, the intellectual excitement of the younger generation in Israel in the fields of literature, music, and art.

Professor Bachrach, visiting at Tel Aviv University, feels that there is great energy in the student population, but its present expression is excessive self-searching.

There is no feeling that the campus is a place for political activism, in contrast to the phenomena of activism like that in the United States and Europe in the late 60's and early 70's, and in China in 1989.

"If only there was vision here, a dream or a message," said Bachrach, "undoubtedly there would be politically active students as a student movement. I lay the responsibility for this on the leadership of Alignment, which in place of ideology has strived to assure its own continuing power. It does not understand that a party cannot attract youth as long as it is not ready to see losing an election as part of the price it is ready to pay." Soon, added Professor Bachrach, the Likud will also be busy securing power.

Is it only lack of ideology that has immobilized the students? Dr. Gid'on Doron of the Political Science Department of the University of Tel Aviv determines that the student population needs energy and naivete in order to aspire to change the world. The naivete is lacking in the Israeli student population, and its energy is also limited due to its comparatively advanced age

compared to the students of the world, to the large number of married couples, to the need to make a living and because the students do not live on campus. Another reason is that its revolutionary energy was lost in the army, where the collective framework which serves the objectives of the collective swallowed up much of its individuality.

The collective, he said, builds myths so that the individual will absorb them and the collective identity will be formed. The result is that the individual has given up much of the possibility of shaping the world in the image of his own vision. Those few students who protest against the activities of the Israeli rule in the territories behave in a rather conformist way when they arrive for reserve duty, do what is asked of them, and return to studying and to grumbling.

In Dr. Doron's opinion, there is not and never was a student rebellion in Israel, for the same reason that there has been no general's rebellion: The opportunity is open before them to become politically integrated. But this opportunity applies only to integration in established institutions. There are those who find a place in the lower grades of the Histadrut and the parties. The general or student who is talented and ambitious also succeeds in climbing the hierarchic ladder.

In contrast to this, groups for whom there are obstructions on the way to this kind of established integration—like Israeli Arabs, for example—may create student protest movements, like the one on the Haifa campus. To those students active in the established student framework, the student organization and its institutions, the activity constitutes a jumping off point to the political life. Activism in campus elections thus has a clear direction where they are concerned. In this activism the ideological component is only marginal.

The parties try energetically to connect themselves to the results of the elections to different cells of the student organization on campus, and to give the cell of their choice financial and other support. At one and the same time the students who perhaps might be interested are not able to break into the Israeli political system except through adaptation. Similarly, guarding the parties' interest in keeping themselves in power requires suppression of all budding young leadership, as has happened in the major parties, and this bars the path to a flourishing of party leadership among students.

Unlike the small parties, in the large parties personal careers have taken the place of ideology. "When a process like this goes on in the major parties," said Professor Bachrach, "what can be expected from the students? They can find their true political place only on the leftist fringe or rightist fringe of the political spectrum on campus, in parties which have still not separated from ideology."

The elections to student organizations on campus have no value for the purpose of examining the political positions of this population. One of the reasons for the

irrelevance of the election results is that not all student cells carry the name of "party," despite their identification with them before the elections or after. (In recent years student leaders have no longer officially adopted a party, so that they can appear to represent the students and not the party, despite their strong connections to it.) But the main reason for the lack of relevance is that the percentage of participants in elections fluctuates regularly between 20 and 25 percent. To judge based on the results of elections to the organization means to ignore the positions of 75 to 80 percent of the students. Therefore, only surveys of representative samples of the student population can attest to their political positions.

The apathy of the students on campus has lasted from the 60's to this day. In those cases where they were engaged in exceptional activism—write Professors Rina Shapira and Hava Etzioni-Halevi of Tel Aviv University—it was connected to their financial problems. The academic institutions raised tuition as part of their battle with the government on the subject of their budgeting. When they demonstrated against the government, as they did in 1987, in effect they served the interests of the university.

During the rule of the Unity Government, the student leaders succeeded in adopting a policy of divide and conquer between the coalition partners, and thus also assured themselves of government support. The student organizations and their leaders—write Shapira and Etzioni-Halevi—were swallowed up and mixed then as always in the main stream of political life in Israel. In their opinion, the elitist character of the higher education system made it easier on those who succeeded in entering the gates of the universities to find work suitable to their talents after finishing their studies. This elitist framework of higher education, the open paths of social mobility that the students took advantage of, together with the fact that the political activism of the student has always been part of the mainstream of Israeli politics, may be, in their opinion, a further explanation for the lack of radical and unconventional political activism on campus.

According to Shapira and Etzioni-Halevi, it can be shown that the positions of the students were not usually especially supportive of the political establishment. Based on repeated surveys on the Tel Aviv University campus and on the results of the elections to student organizations, we find that during the period that Labor was in power, most of the students tended toward the right, but during a period of rightist or unity government, the majority of the students supported the left. In this tendency, they differed from the general public. The conclusion of the researchers was that the tendency of most of the students on the right-left political spectrum was also an expression of an antiestablishment position and discomfort with the status quo in Israel.

Very low student involvement in politics was recorded in a survey from March 1990 done by Sam Biderman, research assistant at Jaffe Institute, under the direction

of Dr. Mikhal Shamir of the political science department at the University of Tel Aviv. The survey included 667 from that campus. An insignificant minority of 5 percent of the students reported participation in petitions, letters to Knesset members, demonstrations, or refusal to serve in the territories. Concerning political positions, the outstanding conclusions of that survey were that all over the campus 29.5 percent tend to support the left and only 13.7 percent the right, and that in the exact sciences, too, the trend to the left is greater than to the right, and it is only about 10 percent lower than the trend to the left of the social sciences and humanities.

In this survey, four measures of political trends were used: support for the government, position on the Arab-Israeli conflict, solution to the intifadah, and self-description. The researcher emphasized the measure of orientation toward left or right is not completely clear in the student population. A large portion of those who described themselves as on the left, expressed support for transfer.

At each stage of a three-stage survey funded by the Israeli Political Science Association and carried out since March 1990 by Professor Barukh Zisser and doctoral candidate Gila Kurtz of Bar Ilan University, 300 political science students at campuses all over Israel have been examined. In the first stage, a majority of 60.4 percent was recorded in favor of Alignment and leftist parties. In the second stage, carried out in December 1990, no real change in division of positions was found, except for a slight weakening in Alignment and leftist parties and a slight strengthening of the Likud.

The results of the third stage, carried out after the Gulf War, have not yet come in, but Gila Kurtz's feeling is that a considerable proportion of those surveyed are satisfied with the functioning of the government during the war, and that a considerable proportion claim that they have not changed their political positions.

Professor Zisser, who was a student in the United States in the 60's, also points out the lack of ideology in Alignment and the tremendous difficulty young students have in reaching the top echelons of the party. In the Likud too, he said, ideology has been blurred by conflicting positions and personal conflicts. There is a reaction in Israel against ideology and sentiment. The campus is a political wasteland. "In 20 years not one student has entered my office to talk or to pour out his frustration about the political situation," he said.

JORDAN

New Export Development Company Planned

91AE0371A Amman *THE STAR* in English
4 Apr 91 p 5

[Text] The government has decided to set up a new corporation whose main duty is to develop Jordanian industries. The new establishment, to be known as

Jordan Exports Development Corp (JEDC), will aim at guiding and financing exports-oriented projects in the private sector while promoting and marketing Jordanian products in foreign markets. It will also take responsibility for finalizing deals and protocols in addition to advising government departments on export policies and laws.

The proposed law of JEDC will be financially and administratively independent and will be functioning in accordance with Jordan's companies law.

JEDC activities will include increasing local, Arab and foreign investments in commercial, industrial and agricultural projects in Jordan including the exploitation of raw material. The corporation, whose capital is set at 1.5 million JD [Jordanian dinars] will be owned equally among the government, the Federation of Jordanian Chambers of Commerce and the Amman Chamber of Industry. Its board of directors will include the minister of trade and industry, the deputy governor of the Central Bank of Jordan, the undersecretary of the Ministry of Trade and Industry, the general director of the Industrial Cities Corp, the director general of the Industrial Development Bank, the president of the Federation of the Jordanian Chambers of Commerce and the president of the Amman Chamber of industry among others.

JEDC will charge commissions and fees in return for services rendered while it will set up trade centers and exhibitions inside and outside the Kingdom in addition to providing information and data that will assist exporters in locating new markets and concluding business deals. It will also conclude trade deals for its own benefit by selling, buying, renting or leasing anything relating to industrial and agricultural products.

Once JEDC is formed it will replace the Jordan Trade Centers Corp (JTCC), whose law and regulations will be cancelled. JTCC agreements and contracts in addition to its employees will be transferred to JEDC.

Sharp Decline in Phosphate Company Profits

91AE0385A Amman JORDAN TIMES in English
28 Mar 91 p 3

[Article by Samir Shafiq]

he political events in East Europe combined with tough domestic measures to increase government revenue last year plunged the Jordan Phosphate Mines Co. (JPMC) into an unprecedented negative phase of low sales and lower profit amid a general disruption of production and expansion plans.

Eastern Europe, which ranked second after Asia in terms of Jordanian phosphate purchases, bought only 580,000 tonnes in 1990 while between 1985-1989 the same buyers purchased an average of two million tonnes per year, or 33 percent of all Jordanian phosphate exports.

The sharp drop in sales to East Europe was somehow braked by an improvement in exports to a few other traditional markets, but the end result for 1990 was an unexpected fall in raw phosphate exports, to 4.9 million tonnes from 6.4 million tonnes in 1989.

Production and exports of phosphatic fertilizers and other products from the industrial complex in al-'Aqabah remained within the ordinary range as 612,000 tonnes of phosphatic fertilizers, 18,000 tonnes of phosphoric acid (100 percent) and 16,000 tonnes of aluminum fluoride were exported.

According to the JPMC 1990 annual report received Tuesday, the company's net sales last year amounted to 232.5 million JD, down from 247.8 million earned in 1989.

The report showed that net profit for 1990 was only 41.4 million JD, sharply down from 1989's profit of 107.2 million JD. However, the main foreign exchange earner for the Kingdom said that it would distribute 5.13 million JD in dividends to shareholders. The amount translates into a 15 percent return per JD 1 nominal value of each share.

JPMC blamed the government too for its low earnings and profitability. The company said the government had raised production fees on every tonne of phosphate to 5 JD since September 1989 before which the fee was only 1 JD.

The company, according to the report, was also hurt by the rise in fuel prices started on August 8, 1990 and the earlier cancellation of fuel subsidies which the government granted for exports. The report put the value of fuel subsidies in 1989 at 671,000 JD.

Moreover, the government shifted its policy towards the company by imposing customs and other levies on many items that JPMC previously used to import duty-free.

JPMC's financial plight was further worsened by the rise in port fees for phosphate handling and shipping as the government decided to unify the fees as of March 1, 1990 to become 1.750 JD per ton instead of the previous fee of 0.950 JD per tonne for the first million tonnes, 0.850 per tonne for the second million tonnes and 0.650 JD per tonne for the rest of the amount.

Transportation of phosphate was another area where JPMC suffered because the cost of rail shipments from the mines to the port of al-'Aqabah was also raised by 0.300 JD per tonne starting August 1990. The company expects more problems this year because of the new axial weight law, which took effect on Jan 1, 1991, and which limits the maximum load of the largest truck to 50 tonnes.

The Gulf crisis widened the negative performance of the company due to the searches of vessels and the increase in insurance costs on shipping to the area. The crisis also disrupted supplies of sulphur from Kuwait and Iraq and

ammonia from Kuwait, and forced JPMC to seek supplies from Bahrain and the Soviet Union at higher costs which could not be passed to the ultimate buyers of fertilizers.

The Soviet Union was another factor in terms of competitiveness as it started supplying the Gulf market with aluminum fluoride at prices far less than those of JPMC which was forced to lower its prices noticeably to be able to compete.

The Gulf crisis, more importantly, caused planned expansion at Shidiyah mines to be delayed resulting in additional costs on the one hand and financing problems on the other in addition to the huge investments which were put in the preliminary stages and were left idle with no way to generate income for at least a year.

The balance sheet of the company at the end of 1990 showed that JPMC's fixed assets totalled 155.7 million JD after depreciation and that investments in other local companies stood at 2.7 million JD.

Receivables, after allowing for doubtful debts, amounted to 74.5 million JD while inventories of finished products and under processing totalled 41.4 million JD.

According to the annual report, JPMC's total short-term and long-term debt stood at 52.1 million JD as of Dec 31, 1990.

Salaries and other benefits to employees rose to 24.7 million JD from 21.5 million JD in 1989.

The report concluded that the company had paid to the treasury and other government institutions a total of 73 million JD in various taxes, fees, dividends and rent.

The capital of JPMC stands at 34.2 million JD and total shareholders' equity is 157.9 million JD.

MAURITANIA

Softening of Government Policy Detailed

91AA0294A London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic
20 Mar 91 p 2

[Article by 'Abdallah Ould Muhammadi, in Nouakchott: "Special Report to AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT: Total Amnesty Decision in Mauritania Satisfies Blacks, Prepares Way for Reconciliation With Senegal"]

[Text] The decision taken by Mauritanian President Maaouya Ould Sid'Ahmed Taya regarding total amnesty for all those convicted in state security cases came as a big surprise to those who were betting that Ould Taya would maintain his "big stick" policy to confront the continuing threats presented to his regime by black organizations. These threats have taken the form of repeated coup attempts over the last three years at the rate of one annually, the most serious being that for which organized preparation took place in October 1987. It aimed at bringing an end to the symbols of the military

regime and Mauritanian Arab political leaders. Preparations for this attempt were precise and organized which is why the verdicts issued against the organizers ranged from execution to life imprisonment with hard labor in a stormy trial unlike any previously witnessed in this country.

This attempt, the beginning of the phase of direct confrontation between the black groups consisting of officers and soldiers who for a long time had constituted their military support within the army and the local regime, continued in the form of attempted coups, acts of sabotage, and military operations originating in Senegalese territory. The attempts reached their peak with the bloody events of April between Mauritania and Senegal, as acts of revenge intensified and relations between the black minority and the Arab majority grew more fragile, leaving the door open for more threats and confrontation with the regime.

Authorities dealt with the new situation very frankly. The country witnessed two trials, one of which ended in gunfire. There was a tragic end to four symbols of the black movement when they died inside the infamous Wilatah prison as a result of torture. This tragic end to the leaders of the black movement touched off a broad-scale media campaign by humanitarian organizations demanding the Mauritanian government attend to prison conditions and treat prisoners well. The Nouakchott government responded to the various appeals and allowed the families of detainees to visit them, while those who were being held in the Wilatah prison were moved to the relatively better prison at Aioun. The decision of black groups who led the resistance under the banner of the Front for the Liberation of Africans in Mauritania, better known by its French acronym FLAM, to form a military wing to undertake military operations aimed at Mauritanian army positions on the bank of the Senegal river and Arab-owned commercial or agricultural establishments will have a great impact in heightening the confrontation. Military clashes have become the daily bread of the residents of villages situated on the right bank of the river.

The atmosphere of confrontation between Mauritania and Senegal had the greatest impact on electrifying already explosive relations between the power-hungry black minority and the Arab majority. Although the policy of firmness was not the only option in the struggle game, the Ould Taya government continued to search for an alternative. Some sources speak of a meeting in 1987 between President Ould Taya and leaders of the black tribes most represented in the opposition, the Pular (the Takarir), when he spoke to them of the ties binding inhabitants of the country and preserving its unity.

President Ould Taya declared amnesty for all defendants in state security cases, the overwhelming majority of whom are leaders of the black movement. What are the true motives behind this decision at a time when this movement has made no mention of a change in its objectives?

Mauritanians interested in politics continue to raise this question intently. The varying answers continue to be the focal point of conflicting discussion and predictions in the salons of the Mauritanian capital. Many questions are raised in an attempt to understand this sudden decision, and whether or not it constitutes the beginning of a comprehensive review of political options. Is it the prelude to opening the way for strong participation by all national political tendencies, or otherwise put, for establishing new democratic institutions? Or, is it nothing more than a well-intentioned initiative by President Ould Taya towards the black groups which were the source of threat to his regime, giving their leaders serving various sentences in prison the opportunity to review their ideas quietly?

Lacking a firm answer on these various questions in the absence of clear evidence, one must nonetheless point out that Ould Taya's military regime is determined to see the democratic endeavor through to the final inning and that the new variables on the regional scene will certainly cast their shadow on this country. This surprise may be the first step.

There are also some internal factors which must not be overlooked. An observer of the course of recent Mauritanian internal political events will notice important indicators giving the sense of incipient change in the regime's policy towards the black minority or the correction of certain excesses.

The first indicator is perhaps the dismissal of Jibril Ould 'Abdallah, former Minister of Interior, who was known for his extreme severity towards the blacks.

This is accompanied by the transfer of a number of provincial governors and department prefects in the south who generously participated in operations to expel inhabitants of border villages, especially among the Fulani herder tribes. The Mauritanian government subsequently allowed some of these to return. The basic motive behind these excesses was national fanaticism rather than security. In recent months the authorities have intervened directly to correct a plot woven by one of the slates led by Arabs in the black-majority town of Kaedi to prevent a black candidate from winning the post of mayor despite his great popularity. His Arab opponent won with the obvious help of the local authorities, however central authorities in Nouakchott intervened to correct the situation and allowed free competition to have the last word.

The clearing atmosphere that has begun to appear between Mauritania and Senegal has also had a major effect on this decision, particularly since it helps to remove the embedded impression the Senegalese have that Mauritania oppresses those who are black like them, and that Senegal must protect them.

Finally, we would point out that the decision caused obvious celebration among everyday Mauritanians who see it as hope for an end to news of coups and sabotage attempts.

MOROCCO

Analysis Traces Gulf War Press Coverage, Attitudes

91AA0320A London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic
9 Apr 91 pp 61, 62

[Article: "Morocco: Opposition Press Viewed Crisis With Quarter-Open Eye"]

[Text] If the Kingdom of Morocco condemned Iraq's invasion of Kuwait only a few hours after the invasion, then Morocco's opposition parties and the press speaking for these parties took a reserved position initially and then a different position with the development of the events. The manner in which the Moroccan papers, the majority of which are party papers, dealt with the Gulf war as of the first day of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait has reflected clearly the position of the parties that issue these papers.

If the first week of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait followed the customary course taken by developments of this sort in accordance with the rules of Morocco's political game, meaning that if the majority parties embraced condemnation of the invasion whereas the opposition press was content with conveying the condemnation without comment, then the convocation of the Cairo summit and the position taken on the resolutions issued by that summit was the first sign of the change in the Moroccan party press toward the crisis—a change which resulted in evident sympathy for the Iraqi stance. As for the majority government parties, they published the condemnation statements and embraced the official position.

Within this context, AL-KASHKUL, an independent paper published in the wake of the war, has noted that the majority parties have been the first victim of the Gulf war. The paper has also pointed out the parliamentary majority's failure to develop any initiative to mobilize and crystallize the official Moroccan position, thus providing the opportunity to the opposition parties which succeeded in influencing a segment of the Moroccan scene and in guiding it at the information level. The paper added: "Since the crisis erupted, international news agencies have been transmitting daily what the opposition press says." This press, led by ANWAL, mouthpiece of the Democratic Popular Action Organization, was eager from the time the crisis erupted to desperately defend Iraq's position and to criticize the position of the majority parties with biting words.

The other opposition papers—the most prominent of which are AL-'ALAM, mouthpiece of the Istiqlal Party; AL-ITTIHAD AL-ISHTIRAKI, mouthpiece of the Socialist Union of the People's Forces; and AL-BAYAN, mouthpiece of the Progress and Socialism Party—continued to denounce Iraq's invasion of Kuwait until the emergency Arab summit issued its resolutions in the Egyptian capital. This summit's meeting coincided with the arrival of two envoys from the Iraqi Ba'th Party to

explain Iraq's position to the Moroccan public. The Moroccan authorities hastened to expel the two Iraqi envoys a few days after their arrival on the charge of interfering in Morocco's internal affairs.

The Cairo summit resolutions were welcomed by the official Moroccan press and received with reservation by the Socialist Union Party and the Democratic Popular Action Organization. Meanwhile, they were welcomed tepidly by the Istiqlal Party and the Progress and Socialism Party.

With the onset of the crisis, the Moroccan press headlines ranged from conveying the news to injecting it with the position of the parties issuing the newspapers. Following is a review of some of those headlines:

AL-'ALAM of the Istiqlal Party—opposition—carried the following headlines on 3 August 1990:

- "Iraqi Forces Attack Kuwait and Occupy Amir's Palace."
- "Contacts Between Arab Maghreb Leaders on Iraq's Intervention in Kuwait."

In the days following the invasion, the paper featured the following headlines:

- "Iraq's Invasion of Kuwait Between Arabization and Internationalization Endeavors."
- "Contacts To Impose Comprehensive Boycott of Iraq. Baghdad and Military Government Allude to Revenge."
- "Detonator of Gulf Crisis Between Arab Solution and Military Explosion."
- "Saddam Has Shifted Confrontation to Saudi Arabia."

AL-'ALAM published an editorial entitled "Arabs Alone Are Responsible for Safeguarding Peace and Legitimacy" which in essence urged the Cairo summit to find a solution to the problem "by virtue of being the hope for a solution and symbol of the refrainment of one Arab from fighting another Arab under the canopy of the multinational forces." It is worth noting here that the paper stopped publishing its daily editorial until the Cairo summit convened. A new position began to crystallize then and the headlines assumed a fiery character from then on.

Of AL-ITTIHAD AL-ISHTIRAKI's headlines since Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and the developments witnessed by the region afterward, we will present the following:

- "Serious and Sudden Development in Gulf Region: Iraqi Forces Invade Kuwait."
- "Iraq Justifies Intervention as Response to Appeal by Free Provisional Kuwaiti Government."
- "Arab League Declaration After Four Hours of Debate; Declaration Issued With Approval of 14 Countries, Opposition of Three, and Mauritania's Abstention."

It is to be noted here that the paper carried the declaration and the manner in which the voting was conducted, with emphasis on Iraq's criticism of the resolutions and with failure to provide any information on the other side's reactions.

"Proclamation of Full Merger of Kuwait with Iraq."

An editorial entitled the "Perils of Foreign Military Intervention." It is to be noted that this was the first time since the invasion in which the paper tackled the issue from its own perspective. The paper's inner pages dealt with a number of issues which flow into the course of sympathy for Iraq. Its headlines were as follows:

- "Political Borders of Arab Gulf States Are Volcano Threatening to Erupt; From Sykes Picot to Interactions to Gulf Crisis."
- "Iraqi-Kuwaiti Unity Proclaimed."
- "Several Arab Cities Witness Popular Demonstrations in Protest of Foreign Military Intervention."

AL-ITTIHAD AL-ISHTIRAKI published an editorial entitled "Foreign Military Intervention and Alleged Stability." The weekly issued by the party in French published an article entitled "Gulf: No to Foreign Intervention." AL-BAYAN, mouthpiece of the Progress and Socialism Party, continued to denounce the invasion till after the Cairo summit and continued to urge Iraq's withdrawal as an objective basis for overcoming the crisis. This paper's position did not begin to shift toward supporting Iraq until the Soviet Union moved with the initiatives it launched to prevent eruption of the war. This shift was reflected in the manner in which the war developments were approached. Moreover, new phrases appeared, such as the "allied forces 'committing aggression' against Iraq."

ANWAL, organ of the Democratic Popular Action Organization, expressed its support for Iraq and its defense of all of Iraq's projections as of the first moment. This position persists. This paper continues to consider Iraq the victor and approaches the issue from this starting point!

After the Cairo summit resolutions were issued and after Morocco voted for those resolutions and announced that it would dispatch Moroccan forces to the Gulf, there was an almost noticeable shift by the Moroccan media from the position declared on 2 August 1990. It was also noticed through the interview which the French LE MONDE conducted with King Hassan II of Morocco that there was a change in the official tone. A new position that is closer to neutrality—a position which observers interpreted as an endeavor to keep the bridges open between the two sides—began to crystallize. This is the position for which Morocco has become known in times of crises. AL-'ALAM tackled this position from this perspective in an editorial entitled "Reconciliation and Level Headedness Are Islamic Maghreb's Role." But the opposition parties, including the Istiqlal Party, employed this position to mobilize the ordinary citizen.

If the Cairo summit urged Iraq to announce its unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait in order to prevent the outbreak of war, then the said papers approached these resolutions from a totally opposed starting point. AL-ITTIHAD AL-ISHTIRAKI considered them tantamount to a cover granted to foreign intervention whereas its front page headline on 2 August 1990 read as follows: "Egypt sends a consignment of Arab forces and Morocco considers the possibility of sending forces to Saudi Arabia."

AL-'ALAM and the other opposition party papers followed the same course. Papers speaking for the government parties approached the issue from the angle of conveying the news and urging the development of an Arab solution. Perhaps the most important observation in that period is that the opposition press totally disregarded the activities of the Kuwaiti Embassy in Rabat which organized a demonstration and held more than one press conference. Meanwhile, the official media and the government press discussed those activities briefly.

If these are the indications of the position taken by the opposition parties when the war broke out, then the official media remained loyal to the decision the Moroccan Government announced as of the first day of the invasion, thus exposing themselves to the daily campaign of criticism by the opposition press. We will cite in the following a sample of the headlines of the opposition press and of the coalition parties—headlines which demonstrate to a great degree how the Moroccan press tackled the crisis when it was at its peak.

Headlines featured by AL-'ALAM on 7 February 1991 and afterward:

- "United States Opposed Peaceful Solutions."
- "Secret Accord To Establish Permanent Military Bases in Gulf."
- "Iraq's Burning of Oil Wells Means Six Months of Inferno in Region; Iraqi Army Confronts U.S. Forces Heroically."
- "Large Numbers of Egyptian Troops Joined Iraq's Ranks With Their Weapons."

AL-ITTIHAD AL-ISHTIRAKI's headlines included the following:

- "Squadrons of Israeli Planes Take Part in Striking Iraq."
- "U.S. Acknowledgment of Iraq's Ability to Create Surprise."
- "Washington Does not Want Honorable Solution But Seeks to Destroy Iraq."
- "Iraqi Air Defense Means Are Still Sound."

Even though the Progress and Socialism Party which issues AL-BAYAN stands with the opposition, the paper's approach toward the crisis has been distinguished by a position different from that of the other opposition papers. On 3 August 1990, the paper published an editorial entitled the "Rash Invasion" in which it denounced the Iraqi step. On 5 August, the following

headline featured prominently on its front page: "After Arab Maghreb and Arab Homeland, African Continent Condemns Iraq's Aggression."

On 9 August, this was the paper's main headline: "How Similar Is Tonight to Last Night and How Different Are Nasir and Saddam."

But the escalating crisis and the start of the war compelled the paper to change its tone, even though it continued to hold a distinguished position. Its main headline on the morning of 22 January 1991 was: "With Iraqi People Without Reservation."

AL-HARAKAH, organ of the Popular Movement Party which is a government party, went along with the official position. Its main headline on 4 August 1990 was:

- "Iraq's Attack on Kuwait Is not Rightful Act."
- "Movement Will not Condone Outbreak of Horrible and Sweeping War on Arab Islamic Soil, Regardless of Differences."

RISALAT AL-'UMMAH, organ of the Constitutional Union Party which is the majority party, took a clear position against the Iraqi invasion. In its edition of 7 August 1990, it published an editorial entitled "Legitimacy Is Starting Point." On 18 August 1990, it published an article entitled the "Arabs Are Innocent of Blood of Aggressor." But this paper was compelled to go along with the state of mobilization created by the opposition press and published on 23 February 1991 an editorial entitled: "This Is Position: Opposed to Invasion and Opposed to Foreign Military Presence."

AL-MITHAQ AL-WATANI, organ of the National Liberal Grouping Party which is the government party with the second largest majority, approached the crisis more calmly. On the day following the invasion, it published an editorial entitled: "To Preserve Credibility of Pan-Arabism." On 24 August 1990, it published an editorial denouncing Iraq's invasion of Kuwait.

When the war erupted, this was the paper's headline: "Desert Storm Sweeps Away Dreams of Peace; Our Hearts Are With Fraternal Iraq and Our Sympathies Are With Arabs From Their Ocean to Their Gulf." But it then shifted its course and joined the opposition press. On 4 February 1991, its main headline was: "Iraq's Experience in Ground Battles Confounds Hostile Alliance" and "al-Husayn Missiles Are 'Stones From Hell' Striking Zionist Entity."

A careful reading of the preceding headlines and editorials could lead to a fundamental observation, namely support for Iraq and total disregard for the positions of the Gulf countries. From a purely professional perspective, this is what made the Moroccan press coverage of the crisis unobjective.

Even though the fiery bannerlines of the Moroccan opposition press disappeared after the end of the war and the liberation of Kuwait, this press continued to defend Iraq's position, but less vehemently. This is with

the exception of ANWAL which persisted in its course. At the end of the war, it published an analysis for which it used the title "Iraq Scored 10 Victories in International Gulf War" and in which it made timid references to Iraq's internal conditions and developments, criticized the positions of the alliance member states, and underlined the violations committed against the Palestinians and others in Kuwait. Each of these papers then began to turn its attention gradually to domestic issues in an obvious endeavor to drown their reader with the concerns of his daily life and to stop him from looking back and realizing the grave mistake committed by his paper when it viewed the developments not with an open eye but with a half-open or even quarter-open eye.

Report Views Changes in Southern Farming Town
91AA0335A Rabat AL-TARIQ in Arabic 22 Mar 91 p 8

[Article: "Tata Before and After the Age of the Province"]

[Text] Tata is situated in southeastern Morocco against the southern slopes of the Anti-Atlas Mountains. It consists of a group of villages that extend along the length of one of the dry tributaries of Wadi Dra. Eighty percent of its working population work in subsistence farming that is simple with respect to production and the methods used. The cultivated land is experiencing constant reduction year after year, in spite of the efforts exerted by the farmers of the region, who are known for their hard work and perseverance. The result of that is an intensive emigration of the youth of the region to domestic cities such as Casablanca, Marrakech, and Agadir, in order to look for work to support their families. In view of the marginalization, the grinding poverty, and the lack of many of the necessities of modern life (lighting, water, paved roads, social services) from which the community suffered, the people thought it boded well when the region became a province with Tata as its capital, and they got ready to join "the world of prosperity and growth," and to join the procession of the other provinces. That and other promises left them dreaming of a bright tomorrow that would wipe away the effects of the deprivation of former years. What, I wonder, have the people of Tata reaped in the 14 years since the "happy news"?

In the Economic Field

No change worth mentioning has occurred, for the farmers still suffer from a scarcity of irrigation water, encroachment of desertification, and the spread of the disease fusarium albedinis which destroys significant number of date trees a year. It should be mentioned that the region has vast arable lands and sufficient underground water, and any sincere desire to improve the standard of living of the farmers and thus of the population would start with digging wells in various villages and enabling the farmers to benefit from them equally, and setting up units to package fruit and to help the farmers market it outside of the province. The agencies

of the Ministry of Agriculture for their part should be engaged in educating the farmers and getting rid of fusarium albedinis.

In the Social Field

The severity of the evacuation of the region by its youth has increased. They go to the cities, where they toil under harsh conditions, or to Europe, especially Italy, where they confront social ills which have become abominable in recent years and which the region at one time did not know: the spread of the use of drugs and alcoholic drinks, and brothels.

The Education Sector

About 90 percent of the population of Tata is illiterate; moreover a significant percentage of school-age children are deprived of school, either because of the distance of the school from the home (which usually is large, causing an early end to schooling), or because the family is unable to bear the cost of education, especially if we bear in mind the absolute poverty of most of the families. As for the number of educational establishments, it alone is enough to betray the official policy in this area which concentrates on keeping the Moroccan desert ignorant and its people, a "raw material" to be shaped according to its interests. Thus there are no more than five elementary school establishments that lack the most important essentials of educational work; a single preparatory school, and a secondary school that covers the whole province, or for about 200,000 persons.

The Health Sector

Tata has a health center covering a few square meters. It does not have enough equipment. As for medicines, we go on forever. As a result of people's housing situations (some of the homes are more like the caves of Stone Age people), malnutrition, and the spread of infectious diseases (bilharzia, leishmaniasis), the death rate has gone up, especially among children.

Relationship of the Authorities to the Citizens

It is a government-controlled relationship, characterized by supreme power and contempt. The name of the man in authority is linked to brutality and control of lives. Since independence, the authorities have been able to sow fear and anxiety in the hearts of the people of the region, which the leaders of colonialism and their agents were not able to achieve during the occupation, since the region produced outstanding resistance fighters who made the occupation authorities swallow a bitter pill. As for human rights in Tata, that term is unknown to the authorities, who take pains to ward off from the region the harm of every cultural or political activity which smells of opposition or commitment. They thus own numerous "AWACs" and monitor travellers, those sitting in coffee houses, and those reading newspapers.

In contrast to the situation of the vast majority of the population, which has seen no improvement from Tata's

entry into the "age of the province," we see a group of those who know how to arrange things moving up and benefitting from the spoils, and getting rich in a day. Some are still here, and others have left the province with not insignificant wealth. Minor officials whose level of education does not exceed the preparatory school level (not to mention their newness on the job) have been able to build villas within and outside of Tata, and to acquire cars.

Some might wonder about the role of the people's "representatives" in all this, and we would immediately answer that they look after their own interests, and they would not be there in the first place if not for that. The standards on the basis of which the people's "representatives" are selected, especially in the desert, are no longer a secret to anyone. The best example we can give is a member of parliament, who since his "election" scarcely knows his way either to the parliament or to Tata, for he is absorbed in his numerous projects in Casablanca, Agadir, Taroudannt, and elsewhere. And this person, with the help of powerful influence, has become a big businessman, after having been a simple official.

Can the town and the people be saved from domination and marginalization?

SAUDI ARABIA

Impact of War on Foreign Investment

91AE0342A London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic
30 Mar 91 p 11

[Remarks by Muhammad Ibn-'Ali al-Musallam, the deputy minister of industry and electricity by Hasin al-Bunyan]

[Text] Al-Riyad—A Saudi industrial official emphasized that the recent crisis in the Gulf has negatively affected the economy in the region and the flow of foreign investments to it, but not to the extent that many had expected. Muhammad Ibn-'Ali al-Musallam, the deputy minister of industry and electricity and assistant for industrial affairs, and the general secretary of foreign investment, highlighted, in his remarks to AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT, the kingdom's economic freedom policy and the Saudi authorities' refrainment from intervention in business and economic activities, except within the narrowest of limits. He indicated that the free economy policy has proven its success and is an advantage that promotes both national and foreign investment in the country. These developments are indicated in a study undertaken by an international organization, which shows that Saudi Arabia is among those countries which intervene the least in business and economic activity, which the study considers a great advantage that attracts investment. He stated that the Saudi Government has issued the necessary regulations to create an economic atmosphere suited to development and has provided the necessary infrastructure, leaving businessmen to select

areas suitable for investment. He indicated that the volume of Saudi capital that has emigrated abroad is slight due to the availability of a suitable investment climate and infrastructure in the kingdom.

Regarding the volume of foreign investment in Saudi Arabia and the most outstanding joint investment opportunities in the kingdom, al-Musallam indicated that, as of late July 1990, licensed industrial and nonindustrial projects in which foreign capital is invested totaled 1,438 projects with total financing of about 57,708 million riyals, of which 633 projects are industrial projects with total financing of about 51,340 million riyals.

Investment opportunities open to national and foreign capital are many and diversified. Leading opportunities include the petrochemical and petrochemical products industry, the food industry and the automobile and vehicle spare parts industry, in addition to numerous opportunities for investment in economic balance projects, which concern high-tech industries.

Regarding whether there are specific conditions for foreign investment in Saudi Arabia, Muhammad Ibn-'Ali al-Musallam emphasized that there are no obstacles facing foreign investment. The procedures that exist are mostly regulatory. The Ministry of Industry and Electricity, in cooperation with pertinent agencies, is constantly striving to facilitate the resolution of any problems faced by foreign investors and businessmen who have investment projects in the kingdom or who wish to establish new projects.

A foreign investor may enter into investment projects in Saudi Arabia if he fulfills two basic conditions:

- He must invest in development, production, industrial, agricultural, and health projects and in services and contracts, except those pertaining to the extraction of oil and minerals.
- He must bring with him advanced, technical know-how.

He stated that there are many advantages and incentives for foreign investment. The most outstanding are: Foreign capital enjoys the same advantages enjoyed by national capital; an industrial and agricultural production project in which foreign capital invests is exempt from income tax and the companies tax for 10 years as of the start of production, and other projects are exempt from these taxes for five years; parcels of land in industrial cities are granted to owners of industrial projects at nominal rent; electricity and water services are provided at low rates; and all industrial production inputs entering the kingdom are exempt from custom duties.

The Saudi Industrial Development Fund also grants soft loans to industrial organizations to the amount of 50 percent of the total cost of a project. In addition to these important advantages, there are many other important factors, including the high purchasing power of residents of the kingdom, the kingdom's central location which

gives producers easy access to other markets, and the fact that the producer is accorded the same treatment as that given to a national producer in the Gulf Cooperation Council states and the Arab Gulf states.

Regarding the effects of the recent crisis in the Gulf region on foreign investment opportunities in the kingdom and the future of these investments, al-Musallam emphasized that the crisis produced negative effects for the economy in the region as a whole, and it negatively affected the flow of foreign investments to the region due to investors' fear of instability.

He stated that these negative effects did not have as great an influence as many expected, as highlighted by the fact that requests to establish new industrial projects continued to be submitted to the Ministry of Industry and Electricity even during the crisis. He added: Based on our experience, we expect that the future will be positive, given the good climate enjoyed by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, be it in the form of incentives, infrastructure, or Saudi Arabia's political stability, which is most important as far as investors are concerned.

Al-Musallam dealt with the importance of the economic, commercial, investment, and technical cooperation agreement between Saudi Arabia and Egypt which was recently implemented. He indicated that there are many great investment opportunities between the two countries. The two countries can complement each another in many respects. The kingdom has capital, investment incentives, raw materials for the petrochemicals industries, etc., and Egypt has a large consumer market. These elements can lead to the establishment of joint projects in the two countries.

In addition, a report recently published by the Arab Organization for the Guarantee of Investment ranks Saudi Arabia and Egypt first and second respectively regarding foreign investments in the countries of the region in 1989.

Regarding facilities, in addition to the currently existing foreign investment promotion regulations in the kingdom and Egypt, the agreement provides for many facilities, as well as guarantees of capital invested between the two countries, which are stipulated clearly in articles 15-18 of the agreement.

Regarding arrangements for free capital movements between Saudi Arabia and Egypt, al-Musallam indicated that the agreement stipulates that two contracting parties shall be granted freedom to transfer capital invested by one country or its citizens, both natural persons and bodies corporate, in the other country, provided that such capital movements are effected through banking channels, and provided that the two parties make efforts to encourage the investment of these funds with complete freedom and in all fields, except those prohibited to citizens of the host country or limited to them. This article also stipulates that an investor of one of the two

parties shall be accorded the same treatment in the other country as that given to a national investor regarding facilities.

Regarding the trend toward the establishment of a joint company between the two parties in the governmental sector and the private sector, he stressed that the agreement encourages the establishment of joint commercial companies between the two countries and services related to commerce, such as transport, storage, packaging, and marketing pursuant to laws and regulations observed in each of the two countries. This matter is left to businessmen of the two countries. It is worth mentioning that a joint council for businessmen from the two countries has been established to undertake joint projects and develop bilateral trade.

TUNISIA

Economy Minister Discusses Tax Reforms

91AA0327A Tunis REALITES in French
4 Apr 91 pp 20-22

[Interview with Mohamed Ghannouchi by Moncef Ben Mrad and Salem Guerbouj; place and date not given: "Ghannouchi: 1991 Will Be Decisive for Knowing Whether the Gamble on the Maturity of Tunisians Has Paid Off"; first paragraph is REALITES introduction]

[Text] Improvement of the yield of the tax structure and the introduction, into that structure, of more equity among Tunisians: these are the objectives of the reform of the system of direct taxation in Tunisia. One year later, Finance Minister Ghannouchi takes stock of the results in this exclusive interview.

[REALITES] Many leading figures in politics and the professions underdeclare their income, as for example a man or woman lawyer who despite a prosperous law practice, declares the income of a minimum-wage worker. It is a scandal. Is it possible to publish their names?

[Ghannouchi] These people are well known to us. It is not possible, from the legal standpoint, to publish their names before they are given an opportunity to defend themselves. In a nation of laws such as ours, every person is regarded as innocent until proven guilty in court. In any event, we hope to achieve a condition of complete fiscal openness in which all citizens, moved by a high sense of civic duty, will spontaneously fulfill their tax obligations, motivated by a genuine feeling of citizenship and patriotism.

In any event, the internal revenue service does not have the right to divulge any information concerning taxpayers until all safeguards have been provided to them so that they can exercise their rights. In Tunisia—where we have changed from one system to a different one—we hope to attain the level of certain countries where

taxpayers are happy and proud to post on the city hall bulletin board the tax obligations they have paid.

[REALITES] Are you satisfied with the way direct taxation is structured?

[Ghannouchi] Before the reform, the tax system was perceived as onerous, unfair, demotivating, and very complex. Not to mention its very poor yield.

One statistic will suffice to illustrate this situation: direct taxation accounts for 20 percent of all taxes. Such a system is, to say the least, strongly out of balance. In some democratic countries where the citizens fulfill their obligations, direct taxes represent a larger proportion of overall taxes; this is fairer, inasmuch as people of means are thereby making a larger contribution toward fulfilling the community's commitment to defray the expenses of operating the public services. Indirect taxes—even if they yield more to the State—are less fair, for they affect all consumers indiscriminately. Moreover, they are inflationary.

This constitutes a handicap for a country that is compelled to reduce its inflation differential vis-a-vis its economic partners.

[REALITES] What is the importance of the role played by direct taxes in the overall tax structure?

[Ghannouchi] If we evaluate direct taxes in relation to the GDP [gross domestic product], we discover that they represent approximately 5 percent—2.5 percent for individuals and 2.5 percent for corporations.

Whereas the rate for corporations is comparable to that of other countries such as Great Britain, Germany, and France, among others, for individuals in those countries most rates are around 10 percent. In Sweden, the rate is more than 15 percent! In Tunisia, in 1989, it was only 2 percent! You can therefore see that the yield is very poor, despite the existence of some rates on the order of 65 percent in certain income brackets. Our system was therefore a major source of tax fraud. There were also many exemptions, in that certain allowances were not taken into account.

It was recognition of this situation, moreover, that caused us to speed up the pace of reform and to desire a complete reform of direct taxation. A radical change in this area has accordingly taken place. There is now a single tax in place of the various other direct taxes. The maximum rate has been reduced to 35 percent from 80 percent. Undistributed dividends are tax exempt, in order to encourage investment and enterprise.

This reform has propelled Tunisia into the vanguard. Our experiment is arousing interest in a number of countries, and they have contacted us to learn firsthand about our experiment (Syria and Egypt, among others).

[REALITES] How are Tunisians accepting direct taxation? Are they motivated to fulfill their tax obligations, or are they displaying a certain reluctance to do so, and if so why?

[Ghannouchi] It goes without saying that this reform will not be completely successful unless we can get Tunisians to accept our tax system. Currently they are "divorced" from it, for historical reasons. In the era of the Protectorate, tax evasion was regarded as a tool in the struggle against the colonial power and against despotism. A comprehensive campaign of sensitization and information therefore must be carried out to induce Tunisians to fulfill their tax obligations, in the knowledge that their taxes are compensation for the services that the community provides them.

For if everyone does his duty, it will open up unimagined opportunities for Tunisia.

[REALITES] What opportunities, for example?

[Ghannouchi] Improving the yield from direct taxes—which represent a tiny part of the GDP—will make it possible to take far-reaching measures without endangering the overall equilibrium of the nation's economy.

Nor should we overlook the fact that a citizen who fulfills his obligations is in a good position to demand more rights. This is an important aspect of taxation that for example offers taxpayers an opportunity to participate and state their points of view concerning the management of the affairs of the national community and the allocation of the government's financial resources.

Moreover, by enhancing the role of direct taxation we shall be able to diminish the role of indirect taxes. This is an excellent way to effectively combat inflation, which varies from 7.0 to 7.5 percent and represents a handicap vis-a-vis Tunisia's partners, where inflation does not exceed 3.5 percent.

We shall be able in this way to break the vicious circle by reducing indirect taxes.

A great deal is therefore at stake in carrying out this reform, including the democratic system as well as economic development.

[REALITES] What can be done if some taxpayers still refuse to play by the rules?

[Ghannouchi] We believe the outlook is favorable. We realize that the old system was by its very nature onerous, complex, and therefore a source of fraud. But that was in the past, and in a sense we are today wiping the slate clean. We now want to forget the past and begin anew.

Article 14 of the tax law contains provisions that offer taxpayers themselves the opportunity to correct their previous situation and make a fresh start on a new basis.

To date we have received 65,000 supplementary declarations covering three years, and 24,000 taxpayers have filed amended declarations. Some Tunisians have chosen to play by the rules. Others, unfortunately, have tried to use the occasion to avoid an audit. We wanted to evaluate the maturity of Tunisians. Some Tunisians have filed declarations that are quite acceptable. Others—we hope—will hasten to rectify their position in the future and make an effort to square their accounts with the internal revenue service.

[REALITES] Are the tax audits ineffective?

[Ghannouchi] We have to date emphasized sensitization and the gathering of information. We have held seminars and sent letters calling the attention of the individuals concerned to the new provisions of the tax law.

At the same time, however, the internal revenue service has provided itself with the means to discharge its responsibilities in respect to tax audits.

We do not want more audits than were conducted in the past, much less do we want to initiate an incomprehensible dialogue and unproductive haggling.

The internal revenue service has provided itself with sufficient data-processing facilities. We have 110 audit offices, 70 percent of which are equipped with computers.

A program is currently under way to computerize the remainder of these offices. The introduction of informatics makes it possible to conduct audits that are correct and efficient, in that there is a wealth of information that enables the revenue service to know with precision the income of taxpayers, their life style, and the growth of their assets.

Moreover, within the near future we shall have instantaneous access to information, and with the ability to cross-check information—which is now possible—we shall accordingly know everything concerning the income of taxpayers. Under these circumstances, it will therefore be useless to cheat or attempt to conceal income. When someone transfers funds abroad, enters into a contract of any kind, or acquires assets the transaction will be known, because the system of withholding at the source provides an inexhaustible supply of information that will make it possible to evaluate income with maximum accuracy.

We have also attempted to train and retrain our personnel in order to adapt them to the new techniques. And we are now able to have an idea of the income to be declared by a given individual in a given profession. The complicity that one could count on at this or that level is therefore no longer possible.

We are therefore inviting taxpayers to play by the rules, in the realization that there is no profit in committing fraud and thereby risking punishment.

[REALITES] What is your assessment of the reform?

[Ghannouchi] The year 1991 will be a decisive year for learning whether Tunisians have truly understood the message, for this is the first year that the declarations are made on the basis of the new legislation. The initial returns indicate a slight improvement in the situation, and we await with great interest the results for the year 1991 so that we may be enlightened and know whether the gamble we made on the maturity of Tunisians has paid off or not.

[REALITES] How are the the corporations performing?

[Ghannouchi] We estimate that their tax payments in Tunisia are within normal limits. Their 7-percent share of the GDP and 48-percent share of the direct taxes are comparable to the figures for the other countries.

[REALITES] What about wage earners?

[Ghannouchi] In the case of the wage earners, tax collections are in general within normal limits.

[REALITES] Is the internal revenue service playing according to the rules, in your opinion?

[Ghannouchi] We are currently witnessing a profound change. The revenue service is determined to deal with all instances of complaisance and favoritism. In a planned manner, we are in the process of establishing a democratic society in which everyone must accept his responsibilities.

No one will ever again evade the tax system. Cabinet ministers, deputies, and everyone will henceforth pay their taxes. There will no longer be any privileges for any category of citizens. We are all on a footing of equality, all in the same boat together.

The one privilege that we have retained is intended to encourage our export trade, in which the nation has a major stake and for which it is willing to make the necessary sacrifices, because it is in the national interest to do so. That is the sole exception.

[REALITES] What is your estimate of the extent of tax fraud?

[Ghannouchi] On the basis of the system formerly in effect, we estimate it at 50 percent for the tax on individuals. In 1989 we collected only 200 million dinars instead of the 400 million that was anticipated. We shall see what happens in the future.

[REALITES] At a time when we are talking about self-sufficiency, why not also exempt agriculture?

[Ghannouchi] We have given preference to agriculture. Agricultural enterprises accordingly pay a reduced tax of 10 percent, whereas the tax for the other enterprises is 35 percent. Individuals pay the standard tax. Exempting the income of a part of the population is not acceptable as a matter of principle. The only exception is the export trade, for exporting is a difficult activity and there is strong international competition. It is a policy that has

produced results, and there is no reason to revise it. When we reestablish the equilibrium of our balance of trade, we shall change the policy. For the time being, however, we must stay the course!

REPUBLIC OF YEMEN

Reform Leader Explains Opposition to Constitution

91AE0351A Sanaa AL-SAHWAH in Arabic 21 Mar 91
p 3

[Interview with Shaykh 'Abdallah Ibn-Husayn al-Ahmar, chairman of the high board of the Yemeni Grouping for Reform, by Hammud Mansur; place and date not given: "We Reject Accusing Those Demanding Amendment of Constitution of Being Against Unity"]

[Text] The Yemeni political scene is witnessing a radical intellectual conflict between two groups. One group calls for amending the constitution to make Islamic Shari'ah the sole source of our country's legislation, with everything contrary to it being null and void. The other group wants to retain the constitution in its present form as drafted by a ruler-appointed committee and as approved in an extraordinary way in the former Shura and People's Assemblies.

Shaykh 'Abdallah Ibn-Husayn al-Ahmar, a member of the Advisory Council and chairman of the Preparatory Committee of the Yemeni Grouping for Reform, is one of the most prominent Yemeni personalities espousing the call for amending the constitution to preserve the people's Islamic identity and prevent any future adventures that might go awry and use the constitution itself to impose anti-Islamic ideas on the people.

Shaykh 'Abdallah Ibn-Husayn al-Ahmar is one of the few figures of the September Revolution whose role on the Yemeni scene has continued uninterrupted from the outbreak of the September 26th Revolution until the stage of Yemeni unification. His career has thus passed through the stages of opposition to the remnants of the imamate and opposition to the ventures of Marxist sabotage.

AL-SAHWAH met with Shaykh 'Abdallah Ibn-Husayn al-Ahmar and had a frank conversation with him about what is going on in our country regarding the constitution.

As usual, his answers were frank, clear, and unambiguous. We now present the interview to you.

Media Campaign, Passing the Constitution

[Mansur] Like other citizens, you see the intense media campaign to get the people of Yemen to say yes to the constitution, which contains provisions contrary to Islamic Shari'ah. In your view, why this campaign, and why in this form?

[Al-Ahmar] The truth is that the campaign is no longer limited to the media, but has become both a media and an official campaign. Not satisfied with what the media have done, officials have come out at the highest levels to get citizens to say yes to the constitution. They are now going around the governorates speaking about nothing but the constitution. This method is undemocratic, especially since they have gone as far as intimidation.

I think officials have resorted to this hysterical campaign because they know that the constitution is unacceptable to the citizens. If they were confident that the constitution satisfied the citizens and carried out their aspirations for the future, they would not have needed this campaign which is obstructing citizens' rights to express their opinions freely.

[Mansur] What is the purpose in insisting on passing the constitution with what you consider to be its defects?

[Al-Ahmar] The purpose of this strange insistence on passing the constitution with its provisions contrary to Islamic Shari'ah is to entrench the status quo under which our brothers in the southern and eastern governorates are living. They continue to suffer under oppressive laws that confiscated their property in the name of nationalization, deprived them of their freedom in the name of the national interest and protecting the revolution, and robbed them of their rights in the name of equality. They expected unity to remove all this oppression from their backs and free them from legally countenanced injustice. That was why they were so enthusiastic about unification, as we all saw on the television screen. But they have been badly disappointed. They feel frustrated, now that they find themselves after unification experiencing the same conditions that they experienced before unification. For them, unification has meant nothing but a name.

Those who are insisting on passing this constitution want to entrench the status quo in those governorates as a preliminary to spreading this state of affairs to all the governorates in the north.

Yemen's Ulema and the Governing Council

[Mansur] We know that the ulema have submitted a letter to the Governing Council. They met with the president and vice president and brought up their observations about the constitution. There was a long discussion about it. They issued a fatwa that it was not permissible to vote yes on the constitution unless it was amended. We have learned that you have committed yourself to the fatwa of the ulema. Could you say something about this?

[Al-Ahmar] Our eminent ulema did their duty, thus clearing their conscience before God, and placing full responsibility on the Governing Council, the officials as a group, and all the people. They gave the officials a letter explaining why it was necessary to amend the constitution before putting it to a referendum. They asked that the referendum be postponed until the matter

could be studied, so that a solution satisfactory to the people could emerge. They announced that as long as the constitution was not amended, it was not permissible for people to vote yes.

The Governing Council asked them to submit detailed observations on the provisions of the constitution. They did so, adding to their observations those of constitutional and economic specialists. They noted the provisions requiring amendment and sent an open letter exhorting officials to amend the constitution and stop the media campaign that is seducing the people into voting yes on the constitution.

I wonder why the leaders have not responded to the fatwa and the exhortation of the ulema. We are a Muslim people; our state is a Muslim state. Among Muslim people and in a Muslim state the ulema are the authority in issues of religious law. They are the ones who have the right to say, "This agrees with the Islamic Shari'ah, and this violates it." They are the ones competent in the matter. As God—may He be praised—has said [Koran, 16:43], "Question the people of the remembrance, if it should be that you do not know." And He—may His glory be exalted—has also said [Koran, 42:10; 4:59], "And whatever you are at variance on, refer it to God and the Messenger." The people of the Remembrance are the ulema of Islam. Ruler and ruled alike must respond and heed their view, especially on issues such as this which bear on doctrine. They are more knowledgeable than everyone else. Officials and all of us have the duty of following the ulema.

Opposing Constitution No Crime

[Mansur] The leadership previously passed many things, and you did not object to them as you are doing today. What is your comment?

[Al-Ahmar] Although officials have become accustomed to passing many things without opposition from the people, they must realize that it is not permissible to follow and obey them in what angers God and involves clear violation of Islamic Shari'ah. There is no obedience to a creature in disobedience to the Creator!

At issue today is a constitution under which the people will be ruled for the present and in the future. The people will not approve or agree to being ruled without Islam.

[Mansur] Some assert that those who oppose the constitution are in fact opposing unification and that the constitution was approved by the legislatures in the two halves of the country before unification. What is your reply to this?

[Al-Ahmar] Linking unification and the constitution is illogical. Unity now exists and no one opposes it. It is an obligation under religious law. Those who link the constitution and unity want to impose their path on the people.

It is wrong to accuse opponents of the constitution of opposing unity, just as it is wrong to accuse supporters of the constitution of being unbelievers. The truth about the constitution is that it is a charter between the Socialist Party that ruled the South before unification and the government that ruled the North before unification. The people—all the people, north and south—had no say in it. As for the story that the preunification legislatures in Sanaa and Aden voted on it, everyone knows about how the vote on the constitution took place in the Shura Council in Sanaa. As for the Supreme People's Assembly in Aden, all its members came from the ruling party.

What officials, their coworkers, and the media are saying—that those who are asking that the constitution be amended are against unity—and the level of threat, intimidation, and provocation they have reached are objectionable and unacceptable. They are outmoded methods and a thwarting of democracy.

Grouping for Reform, Opposition to the Constitution

[Mansur] There are forces and personalities who are supporting the constitution and advocating it, while the Grouping is leading the opposition. What is your view of those who support the constitution with its defects?

[Al-Ahmar] From my point of view, the supporters of the constitution with its defects either are Socialist Party members who see the provisions violating Islamic Shari'ah as a protection to themselves and their path and as an entrenching of their principles, or they are secularist elements who believe in separating religion and the state and who do not want the Shari'ah, or they are government employees concerned about remaining in their jobs and who therefore support everything that the government wants, whatever it may be.

Or they may be ordinary people who believe that everything that issues from the government is an achievement of the revolution and should be given their blessing.

[Mansur] Why has this argument raged about the wording of the present constitution?

[Al-Ahmar] In its present form, the constitution entrenches the division of the country into two halves and protects the laws made under division that still govern the southern and eastern governorates—the former southern half of the country. The constitution was formulated as an accommodation between a Marxist regime ruling the south of the country and an Arab-Islamic regime ruling the north of the country.

It was formulated at a time when Marxism was at the peak of its strength and influence. Its provisions harmonized with the state of affairs at the time. Now, however, conditions have changed. There have been many new developments, and Marxism has expired from the south of the country, just as it has in the world. Is it right for us to entrench principles that have failed and fallen on their own ground?

The constitution contains provisions that violate Islamic Shari'ah, that impair freedoms and democratic principles, and that are surrounded by vagueness. It contains provisions offensive to rights and property.

[Mansur] What are your predictions about the results of the referendum?

[Al-Ahmar] Because of the intensive campaign by officials at the highest levels and in the various information media, many simple citizens who do not understand things will be deceived, and the result will be "yes," because the government has the means that enable it to get what it wants by whatever way. Nevertheless, everyone who fears God must satisfy his conscience and reject this constitution, if it is not amended.

Parliament and the Language of Deception

[Mansur] Officials say that the right to amend belongs to the parliament that will be elected after the end of the transition period. What is your opinion on this idea?

[Al-Ahmar] What officials are saying in their many meetings with all groups and in the different governorates—that the right to amend the constitution will belong to the parliament elected after the transition period—is a trick whereby they are trying to mislead the people. The fact of the matter is that they have put into the constitution a provision that makes amendment virtually impossible. They have stipulated that any amendment must obtain the approval of three fourths of the members of parliament. This is a condition that makes amendment utterly impossible.

As long as they have allowed themselves the right to amend and cancel an entire section for their personal interests, why do they not amend the provisions that violate Islamic Shari'ah—for the sake of the general interest and out of concern for national unity?

North, South Airline Merger Discussed

91AE0360A Sanaa AL-THAWRAH in Arabic
22 Mar 91 p 8

[Article by Ahmad 'Aziz al-Hamiqani: "General Director of Alyemda Calls 28th of This Month Final Date for Merger of Two Airlines"]

[Text] 'Abdallah 'Ali 'Abdallah, general director of Alyemda Airlines, said that the 28th of this month, March, is the final date for the merger of the two Yemeni airlines into a single company that will carry the flag of the Republic of Yemen.

In a special interview with AL-THAWRAH, he said that the merger operation had lagged far behind schedule. Airline companies were supposed to have merged first before other institutions; indeed, the merger decision was issued by a meeting of the joint cabinet even before the creation of the Republic of Yemen.

The following is the text of the interview. He began by saying:

"We want to point out that the merger of the two companies has lagged behind schedule. Instead of being among the first government institutions to merge, as the two cabinets approved before the countries united, we see that for technical reasons the merger of the airlines has lagged behind schedule and that many dates have been set for it.

"Recently, 28 March was set as a final date for the merger of the companies. On the other hand, all the related matters have been completed. A legal accountant was recently chosen to undertake the legal and accounting procedures to determine the financial and formal components of the new company.

"A full settlement and determination of the current and permanent obligations of the two companies is about to be finished. With this step, all that concerns the merger can be considered nearly finished."

Name and Logo

'Abdallah 'Ali said the following about the new name and logo:

"First, we want to state that choosing a name and logo is purely a business and legal matter and that the decision is being made by those concerned in the two companies. Normally, the public participates by proposing suggestions by means of an announced contest or other ways that lead to citizen participation in choosing the logo and name of the carrier of the flag of their country.

"Second, we should make it clear that the subject has been raised several times in the press from suggestive different points of view. The subject has been given too much attention. I think that anyone who has been following what has been written by those outside the company would imagine that this subject was the reason for the delay in the merger."

Two Points of View

He added: "In fact, two points of view were raised for discussion by officials of the two companies.

"One view was that the name of the new company should remain the same as it is now, Al-Yamaniyah, in order to retain the reputation that Al-Yamaniyah enjoys and to save the money that would be spent as a result of a name change.

"The other point of view is that for business and legal reasons there must be a change as a result of the merger. Companies never merge with each other without making such a change, even if the change is small. The reasons for this are as follows:

"1. The new name unites the investment of the two companies within the compass of a single reputation for the new company. It will be more beneficial than the reputation of one company.

"2. It improves the image of the new organization in the domestic and foreign market regarding any deficiencies in the operation of the two companies.

"3. A name change does not entail large financial burdens compared with those of retaining the name of one of the companies for the new company. It does not mean changing everything. Some changes can be made immediately, and other changes can then be made gradually.

"We want to stress that there has been no fanatical partisanship, as the press has suggested. The points of

view are derived from the situation and future of the new company. In any case, the two companies have assigned two legal consultants to discuss the legal and economic aspects of the matter, and a formal opinion concerning this has been submitted to the relevant authorities."

'Abdallah 'Ali 'Abdallah said the following about merging the staff:

"We cannot talk about a merger without a merger of the staff of the two companies. We are certain and confident that the new united company will reflect the positive aspects of the individual companies before merger. We are also confident that the new company will be able to overcome any negative aspects that accompanied the operation of the two companies before the merger."

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

In Retrospect: Indian Peace-Keeping Force in Sri Lanka

91AS0842B Colombo *THE ISLAND* in English
28 Mar 91 pp 6, 7

[Article by Lieutenant General S.C. Sardeshpande; quotation marks as published]

[Text] Now that the last batch of IPKF [Indian Peace-keeping Force] has returned from Sri Lanka it is time that an in-depth stock is taken of its 32 month adventure there. Never before had the country experienced such differences in conception, viewpoint and reaction that came to the fore in the expressions of the people of different states, different political hues and different social milieus. Never before had the country's armed forces been subjected to such differing assessment, varying between accusation as known as killers of Tamils and encomium as selfless soldiers who did their duty under difficult conditions. Never before had the country exclusively used its peace-keeping armed forces militarily as its sole instrument in a foreign country to achieve political objectives.

On its expense account are more than 1,150 soldiers dead and double that number maimed and wounded, a total bill of millions of rupees spent to sustain the military adventure for 32 months, a good deal of poison injected into our own Tamil society and Indian polity, loss of credibility in the eyes of not only many other countries in the region but also among large sections of our own countrymen, and last but not the least, doubt in everybody's mind, specially in the armed forces', regarding what they set out to do and what they finally did.

On the credit side is the country's demonstration that it is prepared to go to the military lengths it did in order to safeguard what it perceives as its security interest, followed by the display of its intent of not persisting mulishly in coercing its neighbour beyond a point, whatever the nature of that point and however brought about. All other so-called 'achievements' of IPKF, as mouthed by many politicians, intellectuals, analysts and professionals are only consequences. Achievements are designed, planned and pursued single-mindedly. Consequences are mere fallouts, incidentals, which are neither visualized nor planned for.

Therefore a number of questions arise in examining this exercise.

- Was a military adventure—use of military force against the Tamil darlings, the LTTE [Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam], unavoidable? Was India's security so much threatened in Sri Lanka by the Tamil-Sinhala confrontation that it became our 'vital National Interest?' (One definition of nation's vital interest is that it is an interest over which nations are prepared to go to war).

If it was so, was it visualized and accordingly planned?

What were IPKF's military aim and military tasks in Sri Lanka? What political aim were they designed to support? Did both adequately match?

Was the military instrument given the necessary other-than-military wherewithal to achieve its task in support of the political aim in a foreign country?

Was a thorough reappraisal carried out from time to time as military operations continued and political developments did not always keep pace, as was evident after certain landmark developments easily identified by the conduct of three elections and the Sri Lankan Government—LTTE collusion in June 1989? What type of organization was evolved at politic bureaucratic-military level to study, visualize, plan and guide the IPKF involvement in Sri Lanka and how effective did it prove?

How effective was the IPKF in its operations in Sri Lanka? Did it measure up to the expectations of the Government, and people and professionalism?

Where does the effort of projection of national power stand in the scale of success?

Was Application of Military Force Unavoidable?

Here one must go to the genesis of the problem. That the Government of India and Tamil Nadu were exercised over the raw deal dispensed by the Sri Lankan Government to its Tamils, and Sri Lankan Tamils' struggle to find a place in the sun by resorting to violence and seeking shelter in Tamil Nadu, were well established and justified. That the disturbed conditions in Sri Lanka offered good scope to other countries to interfere and establish foci of influence to the detriment of India's and regional security is unexceptionable.

That India's security interests as reflected in Sri Lanka's territorial integrity (i.e. Sri Lankan Tamils' non-realization of Eelam) and yet safeguarding Tamils' interests (i.e. Sri Lankan Government's acceptance of sharing power with the Tamils) were contradictory and hence extremely difficult undeniable. Equally clear as daylight were the facts that the LTTE, the dominant Tamil militant faction and the most favoured one in Tamil Nadu and by the Government of India, was even so most intransigent, obstreperous and violently fascist in its ethos, approach and conduct, and that even so it was the most popular party with the Sri Lankan Tamils to whom Eelam had become an idea and LTTE a sentiment.

In this scenario, therefore, had the Government of India run out of all other avenues of effort to resolve the Sri Lankan Tamil issue? Indo-Sri Lanka Accord (ISLA) was an expedient agreed to by Sri Lanka as a life-saving device and India as a coercive instrument in favour of Tamils. Yet this pro-Tamil instrument fantasising its role turned against the Tamils—the LTTE—in embarrassed pique! Can fantasy and pique become factors in deciding a nation's vital security interests that dictate

going to war? If confrontation with LTTE it was to be, did it have to be 50,000 troops treading on foreign soil, when it was probably far more easy and less costly in every aspect (except perhaps prestige and image at home) to strangle the LTTE in Tamil and achieve the same goal? Couldn't the confrontation be managed through Sri Lanka forces and LTTE, by helping, and restraining, both so that both would learn the futility of seeking a military solution, though the realization would take long (probably in the same time frame that the IPKF too took ultimately)?

The impression one gathers is that the Government's decision to involve IPKF in a military response was hasty, avoidable, inadequately analysed, unstatesman-like and weighed in favour of failure. Despite the availability of all the impediments of recent knowledge and experience of such interventions and possibilities of counter-insurgency the world over, one wonders what professional advice did the military give to the Government and how forcefully, and to what extent did the Government itself weigh the factors and the advice! One suspects that the Government and the MEA [Ministry of External Affairs] ran out of ideas and the military showed itself rearing to go projecting outside!

Organization Evolved To Control the War

Little is known about the type of organization the Government of India evolved to study, visualize, plan and direct the difficult venture in Sri Lanka. Many newspapers have highlighted the cross-purposes at which the various agencies involved—IPKF, RAW [Research and Analysis Wing], MEA, MOD [expansion not given], IB [Intelligence Bureau], MOH [expansion not given]—were working, leave aside not working in consultation, to an agreed plan. One influential section, as articulated by the then Indian High Commissioner in Sri Lanka, justified military turn-about on the grounds that Sri Lankan Tamil realization of Eelam could set off sympathetic secessionist, non-secular, linguistic, theocratic and ethnic tendencies in Tamil Nadu to the detriment of India's integrity and unity, an idea as preposterous as fantasy can make it? Some papers have alluded to the personalized handling of the entire affair at the highest governmental level.

Three features typify the gross inadequacy of whatever organization was evolved for handling it. Firstly, the clearly visible confusion in identifying vital national security interests and military response to them as reflected in asking the peace-keeping force to start fighting, and fighting the very Tamils and their heroes, the LTTE, whom they went to help and the abominable lack of military preparation to start that war. Secondly, the painful lack of ideas and effort to exploit opportunities brought about by military operations and consequent political changes in the situation, as borne out by the unexplainable absence of political initiative after each of the three elections, and ending in the coup de grace dealt by Sri Lankan Government—LTTE talks to the Indian adventure. Thirdly, the ducks-and-drakes that

started being played by the Government's apparent bankruptcy of ideas and policy, as epitomized in the dangerous jerkiness of halting/slowing/politicizing/recommending deinduction of IPKF's continued presence in Sri Lanka as a pressure point, without realizing that the continued presence of IPKF without any further operational aim and military defined tasks amounted to a mere physical pressure of the weight of so many thousand soldiers, progressively unwanted and hated by one and all in Sri Lanka.

That this would be the beginning of self-inflicted conscious destruction of the IPKF on foreign soil does not seem to have occurred to anyone, and is indeed the very limit of bankruptcy and hobnobbing with disaster. Part of this rush into folly was, as so many reporters have observed, the panicky step of arming and training bunches of unreliable riffraff of the EPRLF [Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front], which rightly, predictedly and surely turned into a pathetic comic, whose brunt had to be borne, as reported in the Press, once again by the hapless IPKF which was only doing its duty as ordered.

Inured to its own peculiar brand of democracy, elections, political activities, etc., the Government of India and its Sri Lanka policy makers obviously failed to take the 'people' in the Northeastern Province in Sri Lanka into consideration, leave aside confidence. Alas, if they had gone to the people and made an effort to assess what they wanted they would have told that they wanted a type of democracy and election, if that was necessary, where the LTTE had a major role and participation, even if that democracy and election amounted to one party (read LTTE) rule.

Having lived in that milieu and suffered for so long they know what they wanted, and had little faith in or enthusiasm for the type of democracy and elections the Indian Government prescribed for them. If that is what the people wanted then who were the Indians and the IPKF to thrust something different down their throat? The big sin was that nobody went to the people. Even the former Indian High Commissioner was out of his depth when he once, and only once, spoke to the Jaffna citizens in late 1988 just prior to elections. Even the Indian Press failed to find out from the people as it fell prey to the hypnotism that the LTTE had always spread for it and to the valiantly frantic efforts made by the Indian Government (and the IPKF), in self-arrogated righteousness, towards its wrongly enthusiastic intent of bringing in its own brand of democracy among its assumed proteges in Sri Lanka.

No thought seems to have been given by the policy planners to India's vulnerabilities born out of limitations of its policy, latterly aided by its growing military muscle encouraging political ventures abroad in the region India's desire and compulsion to maintain Sri Lankan territorial integrity thought to be so necessary for Indian and South Asian security is well understood by

Colombo, which seems to be convinced that India can only go so far and no further in backing the Tamils against it.

The Sri Lankan Tamils know that they are the only agency through which India can retain its influence in Sri Lanka, and that other socio-cultural-religious-linguistic ties with Tamil Nadu can be fully banked upon for India's support in their just struggle for a place in the Sri Lankan sun. Thus India wants both but cannot have them on its own terms. These vulnerabilities are fully exploited by both. The Sinhalese have cared a tuppence for India's pressure beyond a point; the Sri Lankan Tamils and the LTTE have cocked their nose in 'ungratefulness' and disdain at India and the ugly Indians. One must discern their disillusionment under the skin of ungratefulness. In sum, since going to war with one party while grimacing at their opponent in Sri Lanka was apparently justified, unavoidable and the only solution as events have shown, was the policy-making and directing organization evolved by the government adequate, mature and responsible enough to advise the government to take realistic, wholesome and statesman-like policy decisions?

How Effective Was the IPKF?

What were IPKF's aims and tasks, and what resources it was given to achieve the same. While in any armed confrontation there is the political factor and the military factor, both of which have to go hand in glove, in a foreign intervention and counter-insurgency conflict politico-military combine assumes far greater relevance. Military operations have to be very carefully discerned and military tasks equally carefully framed by the Government. Both have to be constantly kept under scrutiny and control, and carefully orchestrated. In Sri Lanka one wonders what military aims and tasks were assigned to the IPKF!

The ambiguity and confusions are reflected in the contradictory, varying and absolute questions that have been asked of IPKF's operations and achievements. Why did it not succeed in disarming the LTTE? Why couldn't it fully marginalize LTTE? Why did it indulge in excesses? What kind of security environment does it boast of as having been brought about by it? How has it ensured Tamil security as it deinducted? Why did it arm and train the TNA [Tamil National Army] and whom did that help? What did it achieve anyway after its war for two and a half years and suffering so many casualties? These questions would have not arisen, or far fewer would have, if clear-cut military tasks, derived from the government's political goals, had been assigned. In any case when military force is used it means only one thing—killing and destruction have to take place.

War is not playing marbles, it is traumatic, it hurts badly, and hurts everybody including the innocent and the uninvolved. Barring GOC [General Officer Commanding] IPKF no one else has said that IPKF's as a politico-military task; a military formation being also

given a political task. No clarification, if it was wrong, has come forth. No contradiction has been voiced—not even by the conguoscenti, the analyst and the Press. Is it not a mute witness to the ambiguity in the mandate given to the IPKF?

If politico-military mandate it was, was the IPKF then given the necessary other-than-military organizational and advisory wherewithal to handle such complex functions in the nation's power projection abroad? The answer is an emphatic no, because what was so clearly visible and has been reported accordingly as that all agencies were working not only uncoordinated but, worse, at cross purposes. It is unfair enough to give a politico-military responsibility to the military, but a bigger sin to deny to it the necessary wherewithal and coordinated backing of the other-than-military sphere. This has led to military officers foraying into politics of the whole adventure (despite Gen. Kalkat's valiant efforts not to be seen as a political general), politician-diplomats playing the soldier (as the former Indian High Commissioner was prone to). But the biggest bane is that very substantially the people have not noticed the nuance, the Government has failed to resolve the ambiguity in tasking the military, and the military has failed to ask for it from the Government forcefully enough, predictably this affected IPKF's overall performance.

But that may not be the factor in the IPKF's performance in the purely professional field. Newspaper analysts have already exposed its being too conventional, its inability to adjust to the surroundings and type of guerrilla war, its handicap due to unsuitable weapons and language problem, and making the cardinal mistake of antagonizing the public. Most of the criticism is true. It is indeed strange, if not painful, to see Indian soldiery floundering in this manner despite its long acquaintance with counter-insurgency and jungle warfare for over three decades in north-east India.

There is also a Counter-insurgency and Jungle Warfare School for imparting training. Should the finger rise at its weakness in fundamental training, motivation and cybernetics? Or at the large-scale eye-catching manoeuvres like Brass Tacks and Chequer Board which perforce impinge on unseen, mundane but vital fundamental training at unit level? Or at the absence of 'cause' and clear military aim and well defined military tasks?

A word about morale, which is a major factor in the soldier's performance. It is indeed true, as Gen. Kalkat says, that there was no drunkenness, drugging, frugging, murder, etc. in the IPKF, which is an indication of its high morale. That is fine. Soldiers have two levels at which their morale operates. Internally, from within the unit, and as a professional, the IPKF soldier seems to have done splendidly. He has discernible capacity to take punishment stoically, and give it back in ample measure. This ability does not seem to have diminished. Externally, he has had a very disturbing experience. Dispersations from eminent and responsible leaders like Karunanidhi, Gopalaswamy, Nedumaran, Krishna Iyer,

Venkateshwaran et al; lionization of LTTE leaders in Tamil Nadu by way of open display of their posters even during local elections; public accusation of IPKF as killers of Tamils in Sri Lanka; people throwing stones at armoured vehicles in Madras as they were proceeding to the harbour; LTTE's threatening letters addressed to IPKF Tamil officers that their families would be exterminated in Tamil Nadu; sheltering of LTTE militants in Tamil Nadu, who would kill IPKF soldiers in Sri Lanka after getting medical treatment and collecting warlike material in their known camps strung along in Trichi, Madurai and Ramnad districts; and the general sullen and unsympathetic attitude discernible in the Tamil Nadu Government have made deep impressions on the soldier's mind. These, albeit, ate democracy's fallouts.

The soldier has taken them in his stride. But how much of it he will put up with and how long he will remain unaffected require to be attended to shoving it under the carpet or dismissing it summarily as of lesser consequence will cost dearly in later ventures, of which he may not fight shy but will certainly be wary and withhold his best.

Winning the hearts and minds of people (Americans call it WHAM) is an important aspect in any counter-insurgency war. In Sri Lanka the people could not be won over by giving doles of medicines and rations, or repairing a few schools and places of religion. As highly educated, politicised and hardened sufferers, as the cheated and betrayed but proud people of Sri Lanka in search of their Tamil identity and legitimate right, their expectations were high and clearly beyond what IPKF could do for them. This was clear to even a novice. IPKF was waging a war over them, over their pride and sentiment and heroes. Which agency that kicks can win over the kicked, without compensating them? It is obvious that no resources of commensurate compensation were placed at the disposal of the IPKF by the government. Large scale visible reconstruction of the Tamil's prostrate economy and rehabilitation of thousands of uprooted families was the one and only compensatory activity that could have helped it win the people over. This never obviously happened; another cardinal blunder by the Government in not undertaking this economic reconstruction, and the military in not insisting on it!

How Does the Adventure Measure in the Scale of Success?

Neither did the Government think through the adventure and assign carefully evolved military aim and tasks, nor did the military apparently insist on it. The Government was wanting instant solutions, the military seemed raring to go. Neither did the Government provide commensurate wherewithal to the military, nor did the military demand it forcefully enough. The government and the IPKF set out to do something but could find only incidental fallouts, consequences, which are now being brandished as achievements. If only this was to be achieved, one wonders whether there was a need to go to

war, and kill-wound so many soldiers, militants and innocent civilians. Our people, Press and intellectuals have apparently made little effort to realize that the military is not a machine but an organismic, living organization, and its utilization as a national (ultimate) instrument needs much deeper deliberation than has been displayed in these three years of Sri Lankan adventure.

There has been a great deal of bungling, woodenheadedness and what is American usage has come to be known as 'operating the levers of powers' when ideas run out. The adventure has all along, right from the beginning, advanced under the shadow of failure in its perpetuation of folly. People like K. Subrahmanyam, tongue in cheek are pontificating with an air of robustness that there is no need for the military to be bitter about the misadventure. He quotes India's peace-keeping in the Congo etc., totally non-contextual and misleading. Such efforts from intellectuals and their illuminating blindness drive the simple soldier into the amnesia of praise and make him a fattened unthinking sacrificial goat.

The British gave 'grog' to their soldiers and opium to the Nagas to keep them as efficient sacrificial warriors. The danger is that such innovations may drive the military into what Israeli historians call 'amoral familist.' It won't fight as well next time!

One hopes that the entire adventure including the IPKF's performance is debated and discussed in various fora and lessons drawn and correctives implemented so that we commit less mistakes and stop strengthening machines creating widows and post-humous heroes, and manufacturing military history.

INDIA

Officials Cautioned Against Influencing Polls

91AS0801A Madras THE HINDU in English
21 Mar 91 p 9

[Article by K.K. Katyal: "Chandra Shekhar Government Imposes 'Ban' on Itself"]

[Text] New Delhi, March 20—The Chandra Shekhar Government has imposed some criteria on itself under which decisions having a bearing on the course of the polls will not be taken in the next 10 weeks or so.

At the instance of the Prime Minister, the Cabinet Secretary has issued a directive to senior Central officials that they should "refrain from taking any major policy decision or passing orders relating to proposals which provide for undue advantages to any group of people, association or organisation, etc., as these are likely to influence the electorate."

The attention of officials has been drawn to para seven of the model code of conduct prepared by the Election Commission for political parties and candidates. Ministers are prohibited from combining their official visits

with campaigning and sanctioning grants out of their discretionary funds. Also, Government transport is not to be used for furthering the interest of the party in power.

The Constitution does not provide for a "caretaker Government," or a "caretaker Prime Minister" nor does it impose restrictions on the powers of a Government, with polls pending but an embargo is voluntarily accepted by politicians in power and, under their instructions, by officials.

Smooth so far: In the present case, it has been smooth so far. So much so that the President, Mr. R. Venkataraman, saw no need to specify the bars on major policy decisions in his press release last week when the Lok Sabha was dissolved, or to convey it formally or informally since then. Obviously, he is satisfied that the Chandra Shekhar Government has, on its own, accepted the restrictions.

It was not so smooth in August-December 1979 when Charan Singh headed a caretaker Government for some five months. The then President, Mr. Sanjiva Reddi, had to intervene to ensure that the Government did not take major decisions.

For instance, Mr. Sanjiva Reddi opposed the proposal for a major policy change—job reservations for backward classes. He took a firm stand against another proposal—to enter into a long-term commercial contract with a foreign party. He also vetoed the move for new judicial appointments.

Mr. Sanjiva Reddi had successfully resisted the plan for the official funding of poll candidates. This was how he later [word indistinct] that episode: "When Charan Singh sought to implement this idea by promulgating an Ordinance after the Election Commission had set in motion the electoral process and, in fact, after nominations had been filed, I resisted him, much to his annoyance.

"He pleaded that his Government was incurring much larger expenses on various purposes than this proposal involved and that there should be no objection to the initiative. I told him that it was not the quantum of expenditure that mattered but a major change in the country's electoral law was involved, which his Government ought not to introduce, and that too after the election process had already begun.

"I added that if his Government persisted, I would not only have to overrule but to resort to other drastic action. He saw that he had no option and gave in," Mr. Sanjiva Reddi had said.

Haryana: Editorial Recommends President's Rule

91AS0768B Bangalore DECCAN HERALD in English
28 Mar 91 p 8

[Text] In recommending dissolution of the Haryana Assembly and seeking fresh elections simultaneously

with the Lok Sabha poll, Chief Minister Om Prakash Chautala has taken a step which must be welcomed. He acted only after his Janata Dal (Socialist) party was reduced to a minority following the disqualification of three of its legislators under the anti-defection law, but that does not mean he was reacting to Speaker H.S. Chatha's decision. There are reasons to believe that he was preparing for early Assembly elections, regardless of the outcome of the proceedings under the anti-defection law. Indeed, it appears the primary reason for Mr Chautala's assumption of chief ministership last week, displacing Mr Hukum Singh, a self-proclaimed dummy, was to keep the reins in his own hands at election time. For, there are limits beyond which the likes of Mr Chautala will not trust even their most loyal followers. In disqualifying Minister of State for Sports Vasudev Sharma and two other legislators as defectors because they switched sides after the Janata Dal split, Mr Chatha merely followed the precedent set by Lok Sabha Speaker Rabi Ray. An immediate consequence of his decision was that the effective membership of the Assembly went down to 80 and the strength of the ruling Janata Dal(S) fell to 39. The Chief Minister having lost majority support, his recommendation to dissolve the Assembly is not binding on the Governor. But since there is no possibility of anyone else being able to form an alternative government, the Governor has no choice but to accept the recommendation.

The coming Lok Sabha and Assembly elections are extremely crucial for the Devi Lal-Chautala dynasty. Given the dismal record of the father and the son, the chances of the elections being free and fair while they hold sway are bleak. With Mr Chautala as caretaker Chief Minister, there is a real danger of Meham being re-enacted on a State-wide scale. In the circumstances, placing the State under President's rule is a course worth considering.

Commentary Upholds Benefits of Strong Administrative Setup

91AS0768D Bangalore DECCAN HERALD in English
28 Mar 91 p 8

[Commentary by N.S. Ramaswamy: "Stress Must Be on Governance"]

[Text] India may not have political stability for a long time to come. In that context, only a strong administrative apparatus and a courageous civil service can lend stability to the governmental system.

Unfortunately, over the years, the leaders have been abusing the system and demoralising the civil servants. The only sections still maintaining unity and stability are the civil servants and the armed forces. But the Orissa IAS [Indian Administrative Service] Officers have started an agitation and are threatening to go on mass casual leave.

Ill-Advised

If this spreads to the 4,000 IAS officers, only the armed forces will be left to run the government, as has happened in many countries in the Third World. In their own interest, the leaders should stop provoking the civil service.

The recent conflict between the Chief Minister and the former Chief Secretary in Karnataka should be of concern to the citizens. Strange things may happen to the political parties and their leaders due to the criss-cross alignments and the haggling that goes on.

Mature democracies, such as France and Italy, have had many changes in the political part of the executive, but the administration has not been affected. Unlike these homogeneous cultures, we are a subcontinent with many sub-national loyalties and are prone to disintegration. India, therefore, needs a strong administrative set-up.

The transfer of a Chief Secretary is not, by itself, a matter of serious concern, but suspending one is unusual. Risking his career, at the end of an unblemished record of service, the former Chief Secretary, Mr Sankaranarayanan, has bluntly described certain events and the personalities involved. The fact that a self-effacing and mild-mannered officer went to the press in this manner shows the extent of his anguish. Those who say that he should not have gone to the press, ought to realize that what Mr Sankaranarayanan did may be in the public interest so that such incidents do not recur.

This unfortunate incident is a sign of the growing discontent and disgust over the manner in which some political leaders are misusing the administrative apparatus and ill-treating civil servants. The incident needs to be analysed from an all-India perspective, and not as an isolated case in Karnataka.

Prior to independence, transfer of officials was according to established procedures, and departures from them were rare. Nowadays, shifting civil servants is the first thing some politicians do on assuming office.

It is understandable that political leaders want capable officers who are committed. But that does not mean that officers should be made to bend the system to accomplish discreetly what cannot be done otherwise. Some leaders resort to frequent reshuffles of officers in order to accomplish their hidden objectives.

At the other end, some civil servants are becoming politically oriented. In order to succeed, they identify in advance the people they should back and cultivate them with the appropriate gestures. In Delhi, the equation of civil servants to their chosen godfathers is no longer a secret.

In some States, the function of civil servants has been largely reduced to implicit implementation of orders or file-pushing. Nehru, Patel, Rajaji and other eminent

statesmen of the post-independence era respected competent civil servants, who reciprocated admirably with loyal, non-partisan service.

After the Nehru era, a new breed of committed bureaucracy came into being, with encouragement from some leaders and the rot set in. Now it has assumed alarming proportions.

Unlike the Western democracies, the new class of whole-time career politicians are ruling over empires, with powers which would be the envy of any despotic monarch or dictator.

Manoeuvring

Instead of framing policies they are making money through purchases, contracts, permits, licences, etc. A deep understanding of the system is required to acquire the necessary ability to manoeuvre through it without personally getting hurt. In the Eighties, the Neta-Babu nexus developed the necessary expertise in manipulation. To those who refuse to toe the line the consequences of dissent are made obvious. A Prime Minister has used a press conference to show his displeasure with a civil servant. Decency and fair-mindedness are ignored.

Though sensitive citizens and decent politicians are appalled at such behaviour, they are helpless and accept these aberrations as the inevitable ills of democracy. After all, as somebody said, democracy is the worst form of government till somebody discovers something worse. As a consequence, the people's faith in democracy has eroded to the lowest level. Under similar circumstances, most developing countries fall prey to authoritarian regimes. India too may be pushed into an identical situation. Well-meaning leaders should express their strong disapproval of such goings-on.

Favourites

In the American system (unlike the British), when a new President or Governor takes charge, top officials are changed, as they are constitutionally recognised as political appointments. Now, in India also, when the Prime Minister changes, the Prime Minister's Secretary, the Cabinet Secretary, the Finance Secretary, etc., are changed. In the States, the Chief Minister wants a new Chief Secretary, and Ministers their favourites as Secretaries.

Shifting senior officers, at the whim of the changing political boss, may demoralise and cripple the service. Such a policy encourages subservience to political leaders, whereby their intrinsic value to the government is lost. Many political leaders seem to be too short-sighted to realise the danger in this.

During the last ten years, some of the new rulers have discarded traditions, dismantled organisations, distorted

procedures and destroyed morale. These trends are not merely unhealthy, but actually endanger the stability of the nation.

By and large, in spite of grave provocations, civil servants have been taking these beatings in silence. However, the dam is developing cracks in some places, the repercussions of which could be disastrous. The latest is the case of Orissa, where the IAS officers have decided to go on leave because a senior officer was summarily suspended for an incident which occurred over three years ago. The Government had then stated in the Legislature that the officer was not to blame. The suspension is said to be to cow down the officer who refused to toe the line of a Minister.

The root cause of the growing malaise among leaders and civil servants is that the nature of governmental functions has changed enormously. From simple governance and traditional responsibilities, government has become a monstrous monolith, discharging thousands of mind-boggling functions—that of entrepreneur, manager, money-lender, insurer, hotel-keeper, baker, watchmaker and so on.

Such intense and active participation in economic development means decisions and transactions involving thousands of crore of rupees in purchases, investments and allocations to sectors and States, among others. Every decision means big business. In such a case one group may be favoured against another and corruption cannot be avoided.

The compulsions of the political system as we have it is that politicians have to take care of many interests—party, caste, language, etc. Even men of high integrity and national consciousness are compelled to be partisan. Further, huge funds have to be collected in order to maintain the party machinery and to fight elections, besides reserving something for themselves for a good life or a possible winter.

All these have to be accomplished by tapping a percentage of the transactions. When business men contribute to party funds, they have to be compensated with quotas, permits, licences, etc. When individuals lend support, they have to be favoured with positions. Therefore, as long as the present political system continues, either confrontation or co-operation are inevitable between the political executives and the civil servants. Some collude, while others collide.

In spite of all this degeneration, there are still bright spots. We may ridicule the bureaucracy. But it is the one well-knit establishment that lends continuity to the system. The majority of the civil servants are still maintaining the highest traditions expected of them. Similarly, there are also many honest leaders.

Unity

The civil service and the defence forces are the chief instruments for sustaining a country's unity and integrity. Their role is crucial as India is in the midst of political confusion and chaos, which may only get worse. Disunity, centrifugal forces, violence and defiance of the rule of law are increasing.

Civil servants can maintain high standards only if politicians do not interfere too much with them. But many politicians are bound to interfere because government has become a giant business house, with plenty of opportunity for all in the system to amass fortunes.

The solution lies in governments giving priority to governance and in not yielding to the temptation of obtaining more power and making money.

Socialist Janata Dal Merger With Congress-I Said Imminent

91AS0768E Bangalore DECCAN HERALD in English
28 Mar 91 p 9

[Text] New Delhi, 27 Mar (DH News Service)—With the fate of the Governments of Uttar Pradesh and Gujarat at the mercy of the Congress(I), it is increasingly becoming apparent that the Janata Dal will have to agree to fight the Lok Sabha elections jointly, party leaders say.

Uttar Pradesh Chief Minister Mulayam Singh Yadav and his Gujarat counterpart, Mr Chimanbhai Patel, were expected to reach Delhi late tonight for a meeting of the eight-member JD(S) committee that will select candidates for the poll and decide the strategy.

Party spokesman Satya Prakash Malaviya told journalists today that only the panel could decide whether JD(S) should have an alliance with the Congress(I) or go it alone.

He said the alliance issue had never figured in the past during meetings of either the executive or State Party Presidents.

Asked if he would welcome a tie-up with the BJP [Bharatiya Janata Party] in Rajasthan and the Congress(I) in Uttar Pradesh, he said his personal opinion was that there should be no alliance with the BJP.

Asked if the Chief Ministers had ever told him about their frequent meetings with Congress(I) President Rajiv Gandhi, Mr Malaviya said they did sometimes brief party leaders about it.

Stumbling Block

One stumbling block for an alliance with the Congress(I) is that leaders of both the parties have been calling each other names ever since the Government of Mr Chandra Shekhar fell.

A way out was found by expanding the five-member committee by inducting hardcore Congress(I) sympathisers such as Dr Subramanian Swamy, Mr Deve Gowda and Mr Yashwant Sinha. With five of the eight members agreeing to support the Congress(I) the decks will be cleared for a formed announcement, he said.

Mr Chandra Shekhar and Mr Gandhi have been away electioneering and are expected to be in the capital on Thursday. Mr Gandhi casually commented the other day that the picture would be clear after 27 March, so did Mr Yadav to one of his supporters.

One fear that may have propelled the JD(S) into seeking an alliance is that party leaders fear a near-total rout of his party. Even Mr Malaviya admitted that the prospects for any party seemed dim and a hung Parliament might be likely. At such a time, there would be political realignments. The JD(S) perhaps hopes to cash in on being earlier in the game of tying-up with the Congress(I).

Jharkhand Development Council for Bihar

91AS0872A Madras THE HINDU in English
1 Apr 91 p 9

[Text] Patna, March 31.—In a move to upstage the Union Government as well as to woo the tribal voters, the Lallu Prasad Yadav Government on Saturday approved the draft of an ordinance seeking to set up a Jharkhand regional development council for the "integrated development" of the tribal region comprising north and south Chotanagpur and Santhal Paraganas.

The council seeks to replace the three autonomous regional development authorities for north and south Chotanagpur and Santhal Paraganas set up in 1978 as they have failed to achieve their avowed objective of promoting the development of the tribal belt. The council with a tribal as chairman and a "local resident" as vice-chairman, to be nominated along with its members by the Chief Minister for a five-year-term, will hold office at the pleasure of the Governor.

Administrative powers: It will be vested with financial powers to mobilize its own resources through taxes and levies as well as administrative powers to "appoint transfer, punish and dismiss" officials. However, the council would be debarred from collecting taxes levied by the Union and the State Governments.

The council would be authorized to raise its own fund to which the State Government might credit its grants for schemes relating to agriculture, animal husbandry, tourism, rural roads, minor irrigation, and rural and urban development.

It would also be empowered to settle government lands. Significantly, the ordinance has left industries and major irrigation outside the purview of the council in spite of the fact that the tribal populace has been uprooted

following implementation of major industrial and major irrigation projects, resulting in widespread resentment in the region.

Council members: The council would also include Ministers, MPs [Members of Parliament] and legislators of the tribal region as well as chairmen of municipalities and mayors of corporations besides five members who would be elected by it. The State Government would issue directives to the council from time to time and, in case of a dispute, the former's decision would be final. On important matters and issues the council would have to abide by the State Government's directives. The regional development Commissioner of Ranchi would function as the member-Secretary-cum-Chief Executive Officer of the council.

Marxist-Leninist Panel Tells Lenin's Mistakes

91AS0802A Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA
in English 18 Mar 91 p 12

[Text] The Times of India News Service—Thiruvananthapuram, March 17—The Naxalite group led by Mr K. Venu, the central re-organisation committee, CPI-ML [Communist Party of India-Marxist-Leninist], is of the view that the concept and practice of the dictatorship of the proletariat (DOP) put forward by Lenin had been faulty and finally ended up in the dictatorship of the party in socialist countries leading to the present crisis in them.

In a document on the democratic upsurges in the Soviet Union, China and in East Europe and the questions they have raised, the Naxalite outfit says the absence of any mention of the role of party in the scheme of the DOP by Lenin "was a serious lapse leading to the basic error in developing the understanding of the DOP."

The document points out that though in the political structure of the Paris commune, on which Lenin was "fully relying" to develop the concept and practice of the DOP, the Communist party did not have any direct role, in the case of the Soviet Union the party "was going to play a crucial role because by the time of the October revolution a party had already been developed as the vanguard representing the class interests of the proletariat. After the seizure of power in October, the Congress of the Soviets became the formal authority of the new political power...but actually, the party was playing a crucial role in evolving all important policies and tactics behind the scene. In effect the party was controlling the Soviets, though its specific role in the new state structure was not defined," the document says.

It argues that the Soviets were relegated to the background though the crucial slogan of the October revolution raised by Lenin was "all power to the Soviets." A political system functioning through the Soviets as the representative bodies of the workers, peasants and soldiers was envisaged as something similar to the commune of Paris.

But Lenin "justified" the relegation of the Soviets to the background, saying the proletariat can exercise its dictatorship only through the party, the Naxalite group says. Lenin also justified the new role of the party on the ground that the working class had "degenerated making it unable to rule as a class.

"Moreover, Lenin was not raising this question as a specific problem of Russia, but as a universal problem, thereby, making it a principle that only the party can exercise the dictatorship. Hence Lenin had reached a position just opposite to that of Marx."

The radical group which still believes in a violent revolution contends that Lenin did not translate the concepts of Marx and Engels into practice. "He did not understand the necessity of evolving a qualitatively new political system under the DOP. On the other hand his whole attempt was to achieve this change by changing the leadership of the state."

The document says that in evolving a qualitative break in the understanding of political power, everyone from Lenin to Mao, failed. The system of DOP practised by them revolved around the seizing and maintaining a political power through a centralised state structure. Apart from not initiating any process of reabsorption of power, the system only resulted in more concentration of power.

The document argues that the concept and practice of the DOP right from the time of Lenin till now had been "marked by serious deviations." One such deviation was Lenin's "class reductionist tendency"—analysing society only in terms of class and class struggle, thereby, neglecting the non-class aspects.

"Lenin's one-sidedness in understanding the complexities of the DOP and his total neglect of the need to develop a political system will have to be attributed to this class reductionist approach, which is still very dominant in the whole communist movement," the document says.

The Naxalite group similarly feels that another tendency encouraged by Lenin's stand on the party's central role in the DOP is the dominant thinking in the Communist movement which considers that the party determines everything in relation to social revolution.

"One-sided subjective approach towards party and the blind faith in the party get strengthened as a result of this tendency."

In this context the document points out the open declaration of Stalin that the DOP is in essence "dictatorship of the party." Any opposition to the leadership could be suppressed using the state machinery."

The assessment says that the Communist party can play a vanguard role in social revolution only if it has a realistic understanding and is capable of constantly remoulding its style of thinking and practice in order to

make its policies and programmes conform to the ever-changing reality. "If such a dynamic and flexible approach is not adopted any party will easily degenerate and will be discarded by the people," the document warns.

It contends that the social system in "former socialist countries" had degenerated into capitalism and therefore the recent upsurges should be seen as an expression of the severe crisis faced by "this particular form of capitalism."

U.S. Arms Policy Endangers Mideast Region

91AS0797A Calcutta THE STATESMAN in English
16 Mar 91 p 7

[Article by Warren Unna]

[Text] Washington, March 15—It's no time for altruistic idealists. With the fresh example of how an encouraged arms build-up enabled Iraq to menace its neighbours, the rescuing USA is ignoring the lesson and creating the wherewithal of a repeat—for others in the volatile West Asian region.

President George Bush and his top aides have been piously voicing the need for arms control—but scrupulously avoiding specifics. In his report before a jubilant joint session of Congress last week, Mr Bush declared one of the key "challenges" in the post-Gulf war period is arms control: "It would be tragic if the nations of the West Asia and Persian Gulf were now, in the wake of war, to embark on a new arms race," but then Mr Bush singled out only Iraq. And he limited his arms control "challenge" to "the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the missiles used to deliver them"—i.e., nuclear, chemical and biological devices.

No mention of fighter aircraft, tanks, artillery—the conventional weapons by which the Gulf war actually was fought. No mention of restraining the supply of these weapons; no mention of restraining their purchase by the oil-rich customer nations.

On the contrary, the U.S. Government now is contemplating permission to American arms merchants to go ahead with some \$33 billion in foreign sales, two-thirds of these weapons shipments to West Asia.

On Wednesday, when President Bush visited Ottawa, the Canadian Prime Minister, Mr Brian Mulroney, his close collaborator in fighting the Gulf war, suggested continued collaboration in curbing future arms sales to the region. President Bush, responding at a Press conference, said he hoped the destruction of Iraq's military threat might mean "we will just not have ever-increasing arms sales." But then he quickly added: "That doesn't mean we're going to refuse to sell anything to everybody. We're not going to cut off all weapons sales."

Prime Minister Mulroney ruefully noted: "It doesn't make a whole lot of sense" for the five permanent

members of the U.N. Security Council—the USA, the Soviet Union, China, Britain and France—to talk about seeking a lasting peace in the Gulf when these five were the main sellers of the arms which made the area such a powder keg.

Here in the U.S. capital, Mr Paul Wolfowitz, the U.S. Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and one of the real powers in the Pentagon, claimed the U.S. past record of helping West Asian nations arm for defence was vindicated by the results of the Gulf war. In other words, such wisdom should be continued.

But Mr Paul Warnke, who was both a key figure in the Pentagon and later U.S. arms control chief during more liberal administrations, counters: continuing to heavily arm West Asia represents “a combination of venality and stupidity.” By venality, he had in mind the aggressive hustling of American arms manufacturers to make profits. By stupidity, he recalled the USA’s history of having armed the Shah of Iran “as our pro-consul” in the area—before his fall; then assisting Iraqi President Saddam Husayn to counter the Shah’s successor, the Ayatollah Khomeini—before Saddam’s defeat by the USA itself; and now the move to build up Syrian President Hafiz Assad as a counter to Iraq; and the U.S. determination to continue heavily arming Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and the Saudi royal family—despite ominous undercurrents of dissatisfaction from their respective citizenry.

The over-arming of West Asia has several causes: (1) The determination of Israel to hold on to its post-World War II statehood and prevent hostile Arab neighbours from repeating Hitler’s holocaust on its Jewish inhabitants; (2) The determination of the suddenly oil-rich Gulf nations to convert some of their vast oil revenues into prestigious arms; (3) The hustling for lucrative business by arms merchants; and (4) The U.S. and the Soviet Union Cold War which used client states as their surrogates.

The Big Five nations, not just allowing but encouraging their arms manufacturers to hustle, have been led by the USA and the Soviet Union, in that order, and followed by Britain, China and France. The nations also happen to be the five permanent members of the Security Council of a United Nations devoted to maintaining global peace and stability.

The USA, although in the lead, has been suffering from a recession. This means the arms manufacturers’ traditional client, the Pentagon, has had its budget tightened and therefore been forced to cut back on its contracts. Such leading arms companies as Boeing, General Dynamics, McDonnell Douglas and Martin Marietta—all in the aircraft business—have been making it clear to the Pentagon that attrition will force a halt to production, and that restarting production lines for future U.S. defence needs will be very, very costly. The Pentagon sympathizes with its traditional suppliers. So do many

members of the U.S. Congress whose constituents back home depend upon arms manufacturers for employment and prosperity.

Even last fall, when the real war against Iraq had yet to begin, the Bush Administration was asking Congress to accelerate shipments of some \$26 billion in new arms to countries which felt threatened by Iraqi President Saddam Hussayn.

But then last month, with the Iraqi defeat imminent, the U.S. Secretary of State, Mr James Baker, testified before Congress “The time has come to try to change the destructive pattern of military competition and proliferation in this (West Asian) region and reduce arms flow into an area that is already over-militarized.” The Secretary also reportedly told a fellow diplomat the pre-war arms build-up of Iraq was “absurd.” (The USA itself sold Iraq some \$1.5 billion in advanced technology items between 1985 and 1990, a period when Mr Baker was both White House Chief of Staff and Secretary of the Treasury under President Ronald Reagan and George Bush was U.S. Vice-President.)

But, Secretary Baker’s last month regrets notwithstanding, the Administration he represents now wants Congress to approve its recommendation to allow U.S. arms manufacturers to sell some \$18 billion in new arms to five of its Gulf war partners: Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Egypt and Turkey. Almost half of this sum—\$10 billion—is for purchases by the nation with the most petrodollars, Saudi Arabia. But even Egypt, as poor as Saudi Arabia is rich, is to be allowed to buy some \$1.8 billion in F-16 jet fighters, bombs and air-to-ground missiles.

The NEW YORK TIMES editorial this week questioned: “Just how much reassurance do the Saudis, Israelis and Egyptians need now that the U.S. is planning a larger permanent (military) presence and more (military) exercises? The USA would be better off restraining arms sales to West Asia and getting other states to do the same. As Iraq’s aggression shows, the world can ill afford business as usual on arms of all sorts.”

U.S. 301 Stand Termed ‘Wrong Signal’

91AS0804A Calcutta THE STATESMAN in English
16 Mar 91 p 6

[Editorial: “Wrong Signal”]

[Text] The points raised by the U.S. delegation at the recent New Delhi meeting of the Indo-U.S. Joint Business Council relating to problems that American businessmen face in India indicate the basic hurdles in the way of foreign investors generally operating in this country. The three aspects highlighted referred to the policy regarding equity participation, export obligations, and indigenous content of products manufactured by American entrepreneurs. From the point of view of foreign investors, American or otherwise, the exasperation which these difficulties result in among those who

want to make the highest profits in the most efficient way possible is easily understandable. Indian investors in foreign countries would react in the same way if faced with an identical situation. But then all three points of complaint relate to a much broader framework of economic development which was drawn up by the government after mature deliberation. This is not to suggest that the policy is the best in the given circumstances (it is far from that), but the fact has to be recognized that unless there is a change in policy, foreign investors will have to make the best of the given situation. The recent downturn in Indo-U.S. trade must be attributed to reasons other than the three factors mentioned above, not the least important among them being the difficult operating conditions facing Indian exporters in the USA.

Indeed it has to be acknowledged that the U.S. Administration's recent decision to keep India on its priority watch-list under the Special 301 provision of the 1988 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act because of the "inadequate protection" New Delhi gives to intellectual property rights is not the right signal to send to this country at a time when American businessmen seem eager to improve contacts with their Indian counterparts. On the other hand, the U.S. delegation to the New Delhi meeting is reported to have appreciated the Indian side's complaint that exporters were facing problems because of the U.S. practice of imposing interim duties during the period of anti-dumping investigations. Clearly, the aim should be to work effectively within the rules set by the host Government, which is not to suggest that there is no scope to liberalize further Indian investment laws. To take one example, it is truly regrettable that U.S. businessmen still have to complain about the long delays in processing investment projects, a practice of longstanding which has become the bane of official decision-taking.

Industrialized Countries Asked for Aid

91AS0800A Madras *THE HINDU in English*
25 Mar 91 p 1

[Article by K.K. Katyal]

[Text] New Delhi, March 24—In a massive diplomatic effort, India has approached eight industrialised countries for help in tiding over the foreign exchange crisis in the next ten weeks—between now and early June when the new government takes over after the elections.

The magnitude of the bid for immediate relief is far bigger than suggested by reports of contacts with the U.S. for this purpose. The other countries from which relief has been sought are Germany, Japan, the U.K., France, the Netherlands, Sweden and Belgium.

In the last three days, Indian Ambassadors in the capitals of these countries had given to the respective host governments aide memoirs making a case for urgent help. Simultaneously, the requests were reinforced through contacts with the envoys of these governments based here.

In the case of the U.S., the Foreign Secretary, Mr. Muchkund Dubey, raised the issue in his talks with the Administration. The entire exercise is being conducted by civil servants—of course, at the instance of the Prime Minister, Mr. Chandra Shekhar.

In simple terms, India's requirements boil down to ready cash, not tied to any project or to the matching rupee [Rs] component. The current diplomatic bid is unprecedented in the post-independence period but then the financial crisis has no parallel either. The balance of payment position was never so disturbing as is the case now.

The diplomatic move is different from discussions with officials of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank for the second tranche of \$2-billion assistance. The issues arising from these talks will be clinched only when the new government assumes office and provides the complete budgetary picture. The idea is to complete the paper-work formalities for the final decision.

In approaching the eight countries for interim relief, India reiterated its determination not to default on its international obligation and not seek rescheduling of the repayment of the past debts.

The foreign exchange reserve has again dipped, after a rise on the receipt of the first tranche of \$1.8 billions from the IMF. It was Rs. 3,500 crores at the beginning of March, and the problem is compounded by the increase in the trade deficit.

'Major' Pakistan Attack on Kashmir Repulsed

91AS0786A Bombay *THE TIMES OF INDIA*
in English 26 Mar 91 p 1

[Text] New Delhi, March 25. Indian troops today repulsed an attempted Pakistani armed intrusion across the line of actual control (LAC) in the Keran sector in northern Kashmir, reports PTI.

A defence ministry spokesman here said that the intruders were supported by heavy artillery and mortar fire. "There was no damage or casualty on the Indian side," he added.

The spokesman said Indian troops repulsed the Pakistani attack and forced the intruders back into Pakistani territory.

"There were some casualties on the Pakistani side," the spokesman said. The Pakistani attack started at mid-day and till last reports came in the exchange of fire was continuing.

This is the second major attack by Pakistan in Keran sub-sector of Kupwara district in Jammu and Kashmir. Last fall, India had repulsed a Pakistani attack and demolished all temporary defence positions set up after almost 24 hours of heavy fire.

It is not immediately known, whether today's Pakistani artillery and mortar attack was to give cover to intruding Pak-trained Kashmiri militants or an attempt at Pakistani intrusion itself.

With the coming of spring and melting of snow in high passes on the Pir Panjal range, the authorities here expect the Pakistani authorities to attempt to push in more militants across the line of actual control. According to estimates, over 8,000 Kashmiri militants are in camps across the line of control waiting to sneak into India.

Spokesman on Concern Over Afghanistan

91AS0875A Madras *THE HINDU* in English
6 Apr 91 p 1

[Text] New Delhi, April 5.—India today expressed deep concern on hearing reports of renewed fighting in Afghanistan and the involvement of "external elements" in these operations. Well-placed sources here believe Pakistan is involved in fighting on the side of the Mujahideen, though the level of its interference is yet to be ascertained.

The spokesman of the External Affairs Ministry said India always believed that military operations were not in accordance with the Geneva accords and the relevant UN resolution. This country sincerely hoped, he said, that the new developments would not cause a setback to the process of finding a political settlement.

India was convinced, that the only way to resolve the impasse in Afghanistan was through a political settlement which took into account the legitimate interests of all concerned.

Outcome of Indo-Pakistan Talks Reported

Report on Communique

91AS0874A Bombay *THE TIMES OF INDIA*
in English 8 Apr 91 p 1

[Text] India and Pakistan have agreed to resume discussions on some bones of contention, such as Siachen.

This was stated in a joint communique issued today at the conclusion of the fourth round of talks between the Pakistan foreign secretary, Mr Shahryar Khan, and his Indian counterpart, Mr Muchkund Dubey. It said it had been agreed in principle to resume negotiations on the Siachen issue, suspended in 1989, at an appropriate time.

The contentious Wullar barrage-Tulbal navigational project will be taken up in July. It last came up for discussion in 1986.

It was also decided to hold further discussions on the demarcation of the boundary in the Sir creek area in the Rann of Kutch in August.

Another important decision by the two officials was to hold a meeting in July of the Indo-Pakistan committee to check drug trafficking and smuggling.

The foreign secretaries decided to hold the next round of talks in Islamabad towards the end of August or in early September.

According to the statement, the two officials discussed a wide range of bilateral issues, besides exchanging views on international issues of mutual interest. The talks were held in a frank and cordial atmosphere, it said.

The two sides expressed satisfaction at the outcome of the meeting of military experts of the two countries (held here from April 1 to 4) which paved the way for the signing of two agreements on the prevention of violation of each other's airspace and advance notification of military exercises and troops movement.

According to observers, the accords and the general outcome of the discussions are likely to contribute to the building of mutual confidence and lead to an improvement in the overall climate of bilateral relations, which had dipped to a new low following the trouble in Kashmir.

India had clearly indicated that support from across the border to the militants in Kashmir and Punjab was at the root of the problem in both states and called upon Islamabad to take steps that would demonstrate that it was not lending active assistance to terrorists and secessionist elements.

Pakistan, while denying any role in the disturbances, has been charging India with indulging in "suppression". The observers, while welcoming the outcome of the latest round of talks, point out that this basic cause of tension is yet to be tackled.

Defense Agreements Signed

91AS0874B Calcutta *THE TELEGRAPH* in English
7 Apr 91 p 7

[Text] New Delhi, April 6: India and Pakistan signed two agreements today which would help in reducing tension along the borders by non-violation of airspace and both sides providing advance information on troop movements.

The agreements were signed in New Delhi this morning by the foreign secretary, Mr Muchkund Dubey, and his Pakistani counterpart, Mr Shahryar Khan, on the conclusion of the foreign secretary-level talks. These talks had been preceded by a three-day discussion between top-level Army officials from both countries, which worked out the final technical details of the agreements.

The Pakistani delegation was led by the chief of general staff of the Pakistan Army, Lt Gen Shamim Ahmed Khan, while the Indian side was led by the director

general of military operations, Lt Gen K. Nambiar, and were assisted by senior Army, Navy and Air Force officials.

The agreement on prevention of violation of each other's airspace by military aircraft, specifies the air corridors that can be used and makes provision for permitting overflights and technical landings by the military aircraft. The agreement will go a long way in reducing the tension which the recent increase in airspace violation by Pakistani military aircraft have generated.

The second agreement relates to providing advance information to the military authorities of the other country on large-scale troop movement in the border areas, and also prior intimation of military exercises and maneuvers. In the past large-scale military exercises near the border areas have led to sharp reactions from the other side of the border.

During the last round of foreign secretary-level talks in Islamabad, it had been decided that the director generals of military operations of both countries would keep in touch with each other.

HINDU Analyst's Report

91AS0874C Madras *THE HINDU* in English
7 Apr 91 p 1

[Article by K. K. Katyal]

[Text] New Delhi, April 6. India and Pakistan today signed two agreements—one on the modalities for advance information on military exercises and another on non-violation of each other's air space—as part of the bid to give a positive twist to bilateral relations. What is more important, they also agreed to discuss the Siachen imbroglio in the near future. At a simple signing ceremony, India was represented by the Foreign Secretary, Mr Muchkund Dubey, and Pakistan by his counterpart, Mr Shahryar Khan.

The technical details of the arrangements envisaged in the two agreements had been finalized by the military experts from the two sides earlier this week. As a result, the Foreign Secretaries had no difficulty in formalizing the agreements. The process was started at the last meeting of the Foreign Secretaries in Islamabad over two months ago. That was after the two sides pledged—in the first of the present series of agreements—not to attack each other's nuclear facilities.

Today's agreements were intended to eliminate the chances of a conflict due to an error or a miscalculation. The technical details laid down the distance from the border of the venues of military exercises and indicated what type of information is to be given for which type of exercise.

As New Delhi sees it, the agreements will contribute to the promotion of confidence-building measures and improve the climate in the bilateral field. The decision of the Pakistan Government to send a high-level military

delegation to India—for the first time in recent years—showed the importance attached by it to the agreements and the preceding discussions. The delegation included Gen Shamim Alam, who may be the next Army Chief, the Deputy Chiefs of the Air Force and the Navy, and the Additional Defence Secretary.

The Siachen issue was taken up both by the military experts and the Foreign Secretaries. The military delegations from the two sides will be discussing this problem within the next three months.

Reversing trend: Today's agreements—along with the earlier one on non-attack on nuclear facilities—will certainly reverse the negative trends which, not long ago, brought the two countries to the brink of an armed conflict. It will, however, be unrealistic to assume that the basic causes of the mistrust—and tension—have disappeared. From the Indian standpoint, Pakistan's interference in Jammu and Kashmir and Punjab and its action in sending arms and saboteurs to the two States is the crux of the problem. There has been absolutely no progress in tackling this obstacle. Pakistan not only denies any role in the disturbances in the Valley and Punjab but also blames India for “suppressing the freedom struggle” in Jammu and Kashmir. The gap in the positions of the two sides is as wide as ever. But the significance of the fact that it did not come in the way of the agreements is not to be minimized. If the foreign Secretaries' talks have not attracted adequate attention in the Indian Press, the reasons is obvious—preoccupation with domestic political issues.

PTI reports: The Pakistan Foreign Secretary called on the Prime Minister, Mr Chandra Shekhar.

Minister Reports Food Situation 'Comfortable'

91AS0871A Calcutta *THE TELEGRAPH* in English
4 Apr 91 p 9

[Text] Coimbatore, April 3 (PTI): The union minister for food and civil supplies, Rao Birendra Singh, today said the country's overall food situation was comfortable, with foodgrains production expected to touch a new high of 180 million tonnes this year.

He expressed confidence that with the bumper food production and sufficient food stock, the government could manage the supply position and meet the demands of various states.

Rao Birendra Singh said the food grain production last year was a record 176 million tonnes and this year the agriculture ministry had projected a higher production estimate ranging from 180 million to 182 million tonnes.

With the country achieving self-sufficiency in foodgrain production, it is now poised for export. Two lakh tonnes of wheat were exported to the USSR and two lakh tonnes of sugar to Europe and Far East last year. Since the

sugarcane crop position in India is good, it would be able to export another two or three lakh tonnes of sugar this year also, the minister said.

Provisional Figures From India's 1991 Census

91AS0787A Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA
in English 26 Mar 92 pp 1, 13

[Text] New Delhi, March 25. India's population has touched 844 million, just 160 million short of the daunting one billion mark, says the census of India, 1991, reports PTI.

From 683,329,097 in 1981, the population has grown to 843,930,861 in 1991, showing a 23.50 percent increase.

The registrar general and census commissioner of India, Mr A.R. Nanda, announced the provisional population, literacy and sex ratio figures obtained from the three-week-long census operation between February 9 and March 1 at a press briefing today.

Though the census does not project any population growth for the future, it is clear that if the growth rate is maintained at the present level the country's population by the turn of the century would reach the one billion mark.

The increase in population over the past decade, by 161 million, matches the growth of population over 30 years spanning 1931 to 1961.

Men outnumber women by over 31 million, according to the census findings. The exact male population as on the sunrise of March 1, is 437,597,929 and that of females is 406,332,932.

Decennial population growth 1981-91 in absolute terms is 160,606,764, working out to a percentage growth of 23.50.

The density of population in 1991, according to the census is 267 per km, compared to 216 in 1981.

The sex ratio of 929 females per 1,000 males, showing a fall from 934 females per 1,000 males in 1981.

Kerala led the states with the lowest population growth rate at 13.98 percent, while Nagaland showed the highest population growth rate of 56.86 percent, Mr Nanda said.

Goa showed a dramatic decline in population growth rate from 26.74 in 1981 to 15.96 percent in 1991.

Among the four metropoli, greater Bombay with a population of 12.57 million in 1991 showed a remarkable growth, from its 97 lakh population in 1981.

Calcutta follows with a population of 10.86 million compared to 91.9 lakh population in 1981. The capital, Delhi, has a population of 8.38 million, compared to 57.3 lakhs in 1981.

Madras's population has increased from 4.2 million in 1981 to 5.36 million in 1991, the census finding showed.

Hyderabad with a population of 4.27 million and Bangalore with 4.11 million figured fifth and sixth among the large cities.

The census commissioner said the provisional population at 844 million was marginal more than the planning commission's projected population figures.

However, it was less than the figures projected by the United Nations and the World Bank, which had adjusted the net undercount of 1.8 percent in the 1981 census.

The census office had not made any addition to the population figure to account for a possible undercount, but the projected population of 7.72 million of Jammu and Kashmir, where the census is to be conducted later this year, had been included.

The literacy rate had shown an increase from 43.56 percent in 1981 to 52.11 percent this year, he said. The male-female break-up of 1991 figures showed 63.86 percent literate males and 39.42 literate females in the country.

Mr Nanda said unlikely earlier censuses which had taken the literacy level from four years and above, this time the statistics were collected for literates of six years and above.

Among all the states, Kerala showed a notable literacy rate of 90.59 percent, followed by Mizoram with an 81.23 percent.

At the other end of the spectrum, are Bihar and Rajasthan with literacy rates of 38.54 percent and 38.81 percent respectively.

India's population formed 16 percent of the world's population now estimated at 5.350 billion, though the country accounts for 2.42 percent of the total world area.

The census 1991, the fifth census to be conducted since independence, employed a veritable army of 1.7 million enumerators to conduct the decennial headcount.

The exercise which began simultaneously in all parts of the country, except Jammu and Kashmir, on February 9, ended on March 1.

Mr Nanda said the provisional figures, calculated from the preliminary data received from all the districts, would be followed by more detailed figures on the rural-urban break-up employment and socio-economic data over the next two years.

The tabulation of data would begin shortly and the final figures were expected to be available by the middle of next year, he said.

The census schedules are being processed in 163 regional tabulation offices spread all over the country, where some 44,500 people are engaged in manual tabulation work of the enormous volume of data gathered during the census operation.

Mr Nanda said basic census tables would be available before the end of 1992, while more detailed cross-tabulations would be transferred on floppy disks. These diskettes, containing all the census statistics, would be made accessible to actual data users over the next few years.

IRAN

Private Sector Role in Industrial Procurement, Distribution

91AS0880A Tehran RESALAT in Persian
30 Mar 91 p 11

[Interview with Minister of Heavy Industries Dr. Nezhad-hoseinian by IRNA in Arak; date not specified]

[Text] Arak. IRNA. The government announced that purchasing and importing raw materials needed by factories is permitted by the owners of private-sector commercial units throughout the country.

Dr. Nezhad-hoseinian, the minister of heavy industries, made this announcement in an interview with IRNA on his recent visit to Arak.

He said: At the present, the procurement of raw materials is one of the major problems of the factories under the control of the Ministry of Heavy Industries, especially the private sector units of this industry in the country.

In this connection, he mentioned the low cash flow of the production and industrial units and the limited annual need for raw materials of the units as well as the unfamiliarity with the purchasing procedures for raw materials as some of the existing problems in the timely procurement of raw materials from other countries for factories.

He pointed out: In order to solve this problem, as in the past, the commercial units of the private sector must become active and the purchasing and importing of raw materials for factories carried out in this manner.

Criticizing the previous distribution situation in the country, the minister of heavy industries also announced: The distribution system in the country is closed and restricted. We hope by imposing new government policies, the existing restrictions will be gradually removed.

In conclusion, he evaluated the new government policies as positive in increasing production and said: This has not only caused the elimination of production restrictions but has also helped rapidly increase the production of factories.

Education Protocol Signed With Soviet Azerbaijan

91AS0880C Tehran RESALAT in Persian
31 Mar 91 p 4

[Text] Based on a cultural agreement between Iranian Azerbaijan and the Soviet Union, a literary magazine will be published simultaneously in Tabriz and Baku.

According to a report by IRNA, Radio Baku announced this statement in a literary program and added: According to this agreement recently signed between the general office of culture and Islamic guidance of the Province of Eastern Azerbaijan and the Nezami Institute of Baku, affiliated with the Academy of Sciences of Soviet Azerbaijan, a monthly literary journal will be published simultaneously in Persian and (Kril) in Tabriz and Baku.

According to this report, in addition to political and economic news, literary activities related to the two Azerbaijanians will be published in detail.

New Bridge Links Iran to Nakhichevan

91AS0846A Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL
in English 31 Mar 91 p 1

[Text] Orumiyeh (W. Azerbaijan), 30 March (IRNA)—'Nekaram,' a new bridge in the Tak-Dagh area on the western flank of a dam over the River Araks which forms part of the Iran-Soviet frontier is to be inaugurated as of Eid ul-Fitr, 16 April, for cross border travel.

The bridge links people in Iran's West Azerbaijan Province and the Soviet Nakhichevan Republic, who share religious, lingual, cultural and even family ties to visit the other side according to an agreement signed between Iran and the Soviet Union.

Previously the people in the two sides commuted through a border checkpoint in Jolfa.

Tehran-Moscow Passenger Train Begins Operations 6 Apr

91AS0880D Tehran ABRAR in Persian 3 Apr 91 p 3

[Text] The first Moscow-Tehran-Moscow passenger train will depart directly from Moscow to Tehran on Saturday, 17 Farvardin [6 April] of this year as scheduled.

According to the public relations office of the railroads of the Islamic Republic of Iran, based on this plan, from now the Moscow-Tehran-Moscow passenger trains will make weekly trips directly along this route.

This train will depart Moscow on Saturday of every week and arrive in Tehran on Wednesday of every week.

This train will depart from Tehran on Thursdays and arrive in Moscow on Mondays.

It should be pointed out that the 10 passenger cars for this train have recently been purchased from the Soviet Union.

Second Phase of Abadan Refinery To Begin Operations in April*91AS0816A Tehran ABRAR in Persian 25 Mar 91 p 2*

[Text] The second phase of the Abadan Refinery will go into operation on Yaum Allah [God's Day], 12 Fardivin [1 April 1991].

This was announced by the manager of the southern oil fields region at ceremonies in Ahvaz for the anniversary of the nationalization of the oil industry. He added: One of the important reconstruction tasks in this phase is the laying of 24-inch pipe from Ahvaz to Abadan in three months by the personnel of the Ministry of Petroleum.

He listed the measures taken in the southern oil fields region this year, and added: This year, in addition to making use of new units, workers in the oil regions were able to put out fires at three burning wells.

Customs Permits Domestic Companies To Set Up Special Warehouses*91AS0816B Tehran ABRAR in Persian 25 Mar 91 p 3*

[Text] Iran Customs is allowing companies and institutions importing more than 10,000 tons per year to build special warehouses.

This measure is intended to reduce the backlog of goods at Customs facilities and to expedite the delivery of raw materials to factories and production units.

Based on guidelines on this matter published by Iran Customs, by signing contracts with Customs authorities, factories can build special warehouses themselves or use warehouses they identify for Customs authorities. After inspecting and accepting the designated warehouses, Customs will permit raw materials for these factories to be transferred to the special warehouses before going through customs procedures, and to be transferred to the factory site under Customs supervision at the required time. The aforementioned contract will be in force for one year, and can be renewed by written request of the owner of the goods and with Customs approval.

This contract also provides that the warehouse in question must be equipped with all the equipment needed for protecting, guarding, loading and unloading, and fire-fighting installations as designated by Customs, and the goods must be stacked in the warehouse in such a way that they can be monitored and counted at any time.

Based on the contract between Customs and the owner of the goods, Customs agrees for the goods to be transferred to the special warehouse when the customs duties, commercial fees, and supplementary costs are precisely specified and estimated for the entire time of storage in the special warehouse, that the goods be authorized and unconditional, and if they are conditional, prior agreement for their import, must be declared by the appropriate authorities, and the owner of the goods must agree that all customs costs will be paid in cash.

Customs is also authorized at any time required to go to the special warehouse and inspect its books, papers, and inventory.

Locals Demonstrate Against Land Policy, Highway Construction*91AS0880B Tehran ABRAR in Persian 8 Apr 91 p 6*

[Text] Sunday morning, a number of residents of Martyr Navvab-Safavi Street in Tehran held a sit-in in front of the presidential offices to protest Tehran City Hall's implementation of the improvement plan for that street.

According to the plan ratified by the supreme urban development council, which is considered one of the comprehensive plans of the city of Tehran, this street is located at the extension of the Martyr Chamran Expressway and must be improved.

According to a report by the IRNA correspondent, the protesters, numbering about 200, have engaged in a sit-in for the third time in the past two weeks.

According to the protesters, City Hall will purchase their property at a low price and will destroy their homes, whereas an exchange arrangement should be made with them for their property.

In an interview with the public relations office of Tehran City Hall, it was announced that the prices have been determined by the Justice Department experts, and the City Hall is only responsible for paying that amount.

This public relations official emphasized that the prices are very appropriate and are based on the market value, which is unprecedented in [land] pricing.

In connection with the question of land transfer in place of the land to be taken for improvement, Tehran City Hall stated that the reason that it cannot do so is that it has no land.

NEPAL**Government Civil Service Policies Said Causing 'Mess'***91AS0806C Kathmandu THE MOTHERLAND in English 22 Mar 91 p 3*

[Text] Contradictory policies regarding the civil services are landing government in a mess. There is the fact that government promised to allow the unionisation of the civil service. The government has also already recognised the national civil servant's unions. It, moreover has already provided the legitimacy for union committees in various government and semi-government organisations. A large section of the activists in these organisations have already been identified furthermore. This very identification coupled with the commitment of the votes the rest have given for these unions make the government decision to disallow gazetted civil servants from union activities contradictory.

Indeed if this is a virtual retraction of the original promise by none less than the prime minister for allowing union activities on the basis of which a large portion of the civil service was encouraged to agitate, the civil service will have felt merely used in the process and naked in the eyes of those wishing to see individual political affiliations of the civil servants. Under the current circumstances, though, government appears to have had second thoughts on the subject merely because union activities in the all-powerful civil service threaten to get out of hand. As has been stressed by us previously too, the civil service and the public sector compose the bulk of the educated employed in the country. This class is by its own in the sense that they have both social mobility and access to government capital. Protected as they are already by Public Service Commission rules and regulations, the clout this gives them will have been increased manifold by an assertive union movement. This clout, as government parties appear to have realised, can hardly be a monopoly of political organisations. Here lies the crux.

Candidate Selection Said Causing Discontent

91AS0806A Kathmandu THE RISING NEPAL
in English 29 Mar 91 p 4

[Article by Sushil Sharma: "Pre-Poll Calculations"; quotation marks as published]

[Text] The resentment that the ticket allocation has triggered in two major contestant parties of the 12 May polls was neither sudden nor unexpected.

Discontent

Both Nepali Congress [NC] and the Nepal Communist Party (United Marxist and Leninist) have witnessed discontent within the party over the eventual selection of the candidates.

This is nothing new in party politics of a Third World country like Nepal. What is important to watch now is how tactfully the party leadership handles the situation so that not much harm is done to the party's poll prospects.

The way tickets have been allocated have nonetheless exposed some weaknesses and shortcomings of these two parties and the leaders, which if not overcome in time, may be exploited by the third force—the Rastriya Prajatantra Parties to its benefit.

The NC leaders did well in exercising caution in giving tickets to the erstwhile panchas who joined the Congress in a large number following the advent of multi party democracy.

That only nine out of the 205 constituencies will have neo-Congressites contesting the polls is reflective of the party's correct assessment of the mood of the party workers and sympathisers.

None of the nine had their 'image' tainted even during the panchayat regime. Some former panchas who were known for notoriety and who have joined the Congress have been denied the tickets.

This should put to rest all speculations about the panchas-turned-Congressites' (with dubious credentials) having sway in the party over the old and committed workers.

Thus, after outsmarting the main rival, the Nepal Communist Party (United Marxist and Leninist) on manifesto, the Congress has once again taken the latter off good. The NCP (UML) hope of cashing on propaganda over Congress ticket allocation has been dashed.

But some mistakes that the Congress has made could prove its undoing at the hustings.

If there was any major threat to the party's poll chances, it was from within. Following the announcement of the candidates, this threat appears to have increased.

Because personal considerations have clearly taken precedence over qualifications of the candidates in some key constituencies, it can have very serious implications for the overall performance of the party.

The decision on those constituencies has the potential to affect the morale of the party workers and sympathisers not only in the constituencies concerned but across the nation as well.

At a time when the communists were further divided and their credibility was being questioned, the congress could have made the most out of the situation. The dissension which would have been avoided with little farsightedness has instead tended to neutralise the advantage that the Congress could have taken from the crisis in the leftist camp.

How the leadership deals with this situation remains to be seen. In fact, a very crucial test awaits the Congress triumvirates.

The challenge of holding the party together before and after the elections awaits them. And, it is not going to be that easy to meet this challenge.

Also on test is discipline and dedication of the party workers. Failure to get through this test by the leaders and the workers alike could have far-reaching implications.

The Nepal Communist Party (United Marxist and Leninist) is not placed in any happy position, either.

The two factions which merged into what is known as the NCP (UML) have not yet been able to sort out their differences on the assessment of their respective strengths and weaknesses.

The erstwhile Marxist faction is in particular not very satisfied with the 'domineering' and 'niggardly' attitude of the 'big' brother—the Marxist-Leninist faction.

Several disgruntled members, especially those belonging to the Marxist factions are said to be preparing to contest the polls as independent candidates while several others are knocking the doors of other communist parties.

More than the internal dissension, it is the credibility question that is haunting the NCP (UML) most. This threatens to mar the poll prospects of not only the UML but of other communist parties as well.

The much publicised one left candidate in one constituency principle has failed to materialise. Division of the communist votes has therefore become inevitable.

On top of that, the communist parties' credibility has taken a big blow because of the failure to work out a leftist electoral alliance.

"Congress-Left unity to defeat the regressive and revivalist elements' designs" had all along been a favourite slogan of the leftists of all colours after the last year's political change.

Nepali Congress' refusal to have any truck with the communists, who stand poles apart on the question of democracy and human rights, and its decision to go to the polls alone, evoked sharp reaction from the communist camp which went on to accuse the Congress of 'conniving' with the regressive and revivalist elements.

Now that the communists, divided in dozens of parties, have themselves failed to forge even an alliance, leave alone unity, for the immediate purpose—the polls—the charge that they used to level against the Congress threatens to backfire at them.

The inclusive talks among the NCP (UML) and a number of other small or big communist parties once again demonstrated the crisis of the left.

Suspicion, mutual distrust, leadership egos and the like which have characterised the Nepalese communist camp resurfaced. It also showed, once again, that the Nepalese communists can never get united.

While the two main contestants suffer from international dissension and credibility crisis, two supposedly big contenders, the Rastriya Prajatantra Parties (Thapa and Chand) appear to be sitting pretty.

Going to the polls as underdog, the two parties have deliberately kept a low profile even as the Congress and the UML hit the headlines. Making clever calculations, member and activists of these two parties, who, after having monopolised the national politics for 30 years have not yet fully reconciled to the competitive politics, are out to cash in on the dissension and crisis in the Congress and the communist camp respectively.

It was not for nothing that they had held up the announcement of their candidates pending the ticket allocation by the Congress and the NCP (UML).

But, given the past background of the panchas and the present credibility crisis of the communist parties because of both national and international factors, Nepali Congress should still find itself in the most formidable position.

Not Immune

Some wrong decisions have greatly undermined the party's strength. But its rival parties too have not been immune to wrong steps and miscalculations.

Editorial Supports Uprising in Bhutan

91AS0806B Kathmandu THE RISING NEPAL
in English 28 Mar 91 p 4

[Text] Oblivious of the democratic aspirations of the Bhutanese people, the Druk regime of King Jigme Singye Wangchuck has stepped up the intensity of the suppression of the popular movement for political reforms, including constitutional monarchy, multi-party system and guaranteed basic human and fundamental rights. The human rights organisation and the banned Bhutanese People's Party have accused the regime in Thimpu of killing over 500 persons in the course of what is essentially a peaceful movement for democracy, launched last September. Many more are said to be languishing in jails for supporting or sympathising with the democratic movement which the Thimpu establishment has described as the work of "foreign elements" and "terrorists."

The popular movement has gained momentum over the months even as suppression of the same has been stepped up. This is also admitted by the official mouthpiece, Kuensel. Thousands of Bhutanese have fled the country to West Bengal in India and several parts of eastern Nepal. Only the other fortnight, some 300 additional Bhutanese refugees were reported to have crossed over to this country. Nepal and Nepalese have special reasons to sympathise with the popular movement in Bhutan. Not only does the movement for democracy in that kingdom champion for causes very similar to those pressed by Nepal's own successful movement for political pluralism recorded last year but the composition of Bhutan's population is such that over 40 percent of the country's total population is constituted by people of Nepalese origin.

Most political parties in Nepal have supported the current movement in Bhutan. The Nepali Congress general secretary, Mr Girija Prasad Koirala, has already appealed to King Jigme to respond to the changing times and the democratic aspirations of the Bhutanese people. During Nepal's own movement for political reforms, many world democracies expressed moral support to its cause and Nepalese leaders have not failed to appreciate the support. It would, therefore, be in the fitness of things to continue to lend our moral support to the Bhutanese movement for democracy. At the same time,

King Jigme and his coterie would do well to read the writings on the wall and introduce democratic reforms before it is too late.

PAKISTAN

Nawaz Sharif's Government Criticized

91AS0773A Lahore VIEWPOINT in English
14 Mar 91 p 9

[Text] Barely four months into office, the Nawaz Sharif Government was reportedly coming into the same kind of conflict with powerful groups in the Establishment that had dogged the short-lived Benazir Bhutto administration—and a spokesman of the People's Party was quick to offer the PDA's [People's Democratic Alliance] cooperation to the IJI [Islamic Jamhoori Ittehad] leader to ward off the perceived challenge if the prime minister agreed to work for certain democratic objectives.

The Nawaz Sharif Government's troubles came as it was complimenting itself on what it called the vindication of its Gulf policy. It claimed that it was right to join in the world-wide condemnation of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait.

In the wake of the resignation of Foreign Minister Sahabzada Yaqub Khan and Local Bodies Minister Maulana Abdus Sattar Niazi (the latter still subject to some uncertainty) came the news that Mr. Nawaz Sharif had asked his Defence Adviser, Mr. Ijlal Haider Zaidi, to submit his resignation following receipt of the report of an inquiry into the alleged faulty construction of the Lahore airport runway. The contract for the runway's construction, it was said in news reports, was awarded when Mr. Zaidi was Defence Secretary.

Displeased

It was stated that the bureaucracy was displeased with the manner Mr. Zaidi was asked for his resignation. It was also insinuated that President Ishaq Khan, himself a former bureaucrat, was protecting Mr. Zaidi, although the president, talking to newsmen in Lahore on Friday, denied this and also that there were any differences between him and Mr. Nawaz Sharif. However, fuelled by press reports and some statements by IJI sources, rumours continued to float all last week that changes were imminent. At the same time, it was given out by some reporters and columnists that Mr. Nawaz Sharif had never looked so confident and the mere fact that he was taking on the bureaucracy—he had also asked some bureaucrats present in an IJI meeting to leave the room—was evidence of this new-found confidence. The U.S. statement, made through an Assistant Secretary of State before a Congressional committee, that Washington appreciated the Nawaz Sharif Government's stand during the Gulf crisis—its "steadfastness"—could have added to this confidence, although for some of the critics of the Government's foreign policy it could be seen as damning by faint praise.

It was in the background of all these rumours that PPP MNA Aitzaz Ahsan said that the "noose around Mian Nawaz Sharif is narrowing and it is not a matter of weeks but days." But this had provided the Prime Minister, Mr. Ahsan said, with an opportunity to consolidate the democratic system and make up with the PDA. In particular, Mr. Ahsan listed improvements in the Sindh situation and the abrogation of the Eighth Amendment as matters on which PDA-IJI cooperation could be built up.

The Sindh situation, however, showed no signs of improving and Chief Minister Jam Sadiq Ali continued with his 'get-PPP' spree. Former Sindh Chief Minister Qaim Ali Shah was arrested for alleged involvement in the firing on MQM camps on 22 August in which 12 MQM workers were killed. The arrest came after Mr. Qaim Ali Shah was refused bail before arrest by Mr. Nabi Sher Junejo of the Special Court for the suppression of Terrorist Activities. Mr. Junejo's court had earlier sentenced three teenagers to death—to be hanged in public—for murder. PPP Co-chairperson Benazir Bhutto's husband, Mr. Asif Zardari, is also involved in the MQM camps firing case, besides other cases.

The extraordinary saga of Sindh MPAs being detained or pressured in anticipation of the Senate elections also continued. The latest in the series was the news that eight MPAs, most of them elected from minority seats, had been sent on a trip to the fleshpots of south-east Asia, to be back in time for the Senate voting. There was a deafening silence on all such reports from the presidency and the prime minister's house. Many MPAs in the Punjab—where the IJI does not need horse-trading because of its overwhelming majority in the provincial Assembly—wished they had been elected instead from Sindh. Ms. Benazir Bhutto said in Peshawar on Sunday that if the victimisation of PPP MPAs in Sindh was not stopped, not only would the PDA continue its boycott of the National Assembly but also consider boycotting the Senate elections.

Sindh: Reign of Terror Described

91AS0773E Lahore VIEWPOINT in English
21 Mar 91 pp 11-12

[Article from Momin Bullo; quotation marks as published]

[Text] The reign of terror let loose by ajrak-sporting and Klashnikov-toting groups of small but powerful gangs of dacoits has all but shattered public peace in Sindh, right from Kaiti Bunder to Kashmore and from Keenjhar to Karoonjhar.

This is a grim challenge for the 'Superman of Sindh,' Chief Minister Jam Sadiq Ali, who claims to have the blessings of one urban and three rural Pirs—Altaf Husain of Karachi, Makhdum Mohammad Zaman Talibul Maula of Hala, G.M. Syed of Sann and Pir Pagara of Pirjo Goth.

The rigours of Gen. Zia's martial law pale into insignificance when compared to the 'dacoit law' imposed by the Matiari-born, curly-haired 'Field Marshal' Mohib Sheedi. When the victims of Gen. Zia's atrocities gather together, they get almost nostalgic about the dictator because they admit that they never experienced anything like what they are having to suffer these days at the hands of these gangs of Sindhi Ninjas.

These ruthless can do what they like—attack villages, rob marriage parties, murder, maim and kidnap people in wanton forays from their jungle hideouts along the highway from Matiari to Dadu.

Marriages cannot take place with any degree of safety, especially in Dadu, Moro and Matiari. This is a new development and the dacoits have raked in millions. Fearing the worst, the landed aristocracy and other rich people have hired the services of guards armed with AK-47 rifles. Rich people from the countryside now hold their family functions in hotels and clubs in Hyderabad rather than in their own villages.

According to preliminary figures, a minimum of 114 people were kidnapped during the first two weeks of March. Another 15 were killed by dacoits on the rampage all over the province.

On the night of Thursday, 14 March, six people, including two women, were shot dead by dacoits in Naushero Feroze. They opened fire on a bus carrying a marriage party when the driver of the bus, instead of stopping as ordered by the dacoits, decided to speed his way out of trouble. The bus was on its way to Pat Feeder in Balochistan. The families of the deceased have not been compensated by the Sindh Government.

In other incidents of lawlessness in the period under review, twenty villagers in Upper Sindh were attacked by dacoits and at least five women and some small children kidnapped for ransom. Two police stations came under rocket fire.

In Kandhkot, in Jacobabad District, more than 70 villagers, including women and children, were rounded up on charges of harbouring dacoits.

According to reports, a gang of outlaws invited itself to a marriage party in Kandhkot and asked to be fed at gunpoint. After having had their fill, the dacoits left at leisure. This was taken by the law-enforcing agencies to mean that the poor villagers had harboured the dacoits. Hence the punitive action against them.

In an identical incident in a village in Tando Adam, about 600 villagers were hauled up by the Rangers for having provided food to outlaws. This happened a couple of miles from Jam-jo-Goth, the Chief Minister's own ancestral village.

In another case, men armed with ancient rifles looted vehicular traffic on the road leading to a new military cantonment of Panu Aqil, while dacoits kidnapped a lady teacher from a bus.

Meanwhile, the DIG [Deputy Inspector General] Police, Hyderabad Range, Mr Saleem Akhtar Siddiqi, is trying to prove himself an efficient and hard-working policeman through every possible means.

During his nearly four-month tenure, he claims that he succeeded in capturing some notorious dacoits. But a new and mysterious trend came to the surface when some people posing themselves as accomplices of Mohib Sheedi surrendered before the DIG. Some people describe such "surrenders" as preplanned and an effort to please the Jam Sidiq administration.

The police have also become more trigger-happy under the DIG. In Kotri, two persons were shot dead by the police simply on the basis that a dacoit was allegedly travelling in a car to Kotri. It is said that actually a dacoit had got a lift from a car going to Kotri. The car was chased by a police van and all the three, including two innocent citizens, were arrested. Later they were brought before the DIG. What happened afterwards is not clear. It is said they were gunned down by the police. It is also said that all the other dacoits who had earlier "surrendered" before the DIG were his own men.

Differences

However, recently, differences have come to surface between the Hyderabad district administration and the DIG. The District Magistrate, Mr Sabhago Khan Jatoti, has criticised the direct interference of the DIG in the administration. He also pointed out that nobody had the right to call a Press conference without permission from the District Magistrate. Interestingly, DIG Saleem Siddiqi has addressed the press more than 30 times during his short tenure. A PDA-MPA [People's Democratic Alliance-Member of Provincial Assembly] says that the DIG should retire from government service and join politics.

The DIG held another Press conference recently where he claimed that the crime rate in Hyderabad had fallen by 60 percent. Answering a question, he said: "We are empowered to kill all those who challenge and attempt to kill policemen." He said the police did not kill dacoits after arresting them.

Meanwhile, the Jail Superintendent of Hyderabad Central Prison, Major Ghulam Hussain Khoso, was transferred after a complaint by MQM [Muhajir Qaumi Movement] prisoners to their Minister. During Major Khoso's tenure more than 16 jail inmates have been killed. He was not touched by the two PPP [Pakistan's Peoples Party] administrations of Syed Qaim Ala Shah and Aftab Shaban Mirani. But just after the visit of a Provincial Minister to Hyderabad jail, Major Khoso had to pack his bags. The complaint against the Superintendent made before the Minister by the MQM inmates was that he used to beat inmates while under the influence of liquor. It may be recalled that ever since the posting of the officer to Hyderabad Central Prison two years ago, almost all political organisations had protested against him.

Undercurrents of Restlessness in Sindh Analyzed

91AS0808A Karachi DAWN in English
26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31 Mar, 1 Apr 91

[Seven-part article by Shaheen Sehbai: "Journey Through Sindh"]

[26 Mar p 4]

[Text]

The House Called Zardaris If the centre of politics for the Bhutto ladies is the release of Mr Asif Ali Zardari, the man in the street in towns and villages, including Larkana, appears little concerned for him. His main grievance is Jam Sadiq Ali and his style of PPP-[Pakistan People's Party]bashing—a problem which equally worries Asif, lodged in Landhi's jail meant for juvenile delinquents.

The meeting with Asif was a sore point for the organisers of the visit of six Islamabad journalists. Since Jam Sadiq Ali had promised us that we could meet anyone, Asif's name was first on our list, but many in the Government, including Jam's Adviser Irfanullah Marwat, were not happy. They tried to postpone it as long as they could until we set a deadline and threatened to call off the visit. We cancelled all official programmes and even then it took us 25 hours of waiting to see Mr Zardari in the Landhi jail.

Asif had not been told by the authorities about our visit. He knew that a request by the Azad Kashmir Prime Minister to see him had been turned down a day earlier and thought whoever was coming now must be having a greater clout than Mr Mumtaz Rathore. He was pleasantly surprised when the Islamabad journalists, accompanied by a protocol officer of Jam Sadiq Ali, walked in the corner room of the barrack where he is allowed only 30 minutes to talk to his celebrated ex-prime minister wife.

Our request to be allowed to visit Asif's cell was turned down by the Jail Superintendent, even after Asif himself repeatedly made that request to him. "This room is bugged and probably they cannot make new arrangements so soon," Asif told us. Nobody from amongst us, however, seemed to be bothered about the bugs. If someone was listening, so what.

Looking weaker than his last showing in the National Assembly, Asif was in high spirits, laughing with verve and enjoying the jokes that we could cut. He was sensitive, even to oblique references to corruption by him or the PPP. When I pointed out that the Nawaz Sharif Government had created its own "Lake View Hotel scandal," Asif was angry. "Why do you relate it to Lake View. It was no scandal," he shot back. But when I suggested that every government gives birth to its own "Mr Ten Percent," he was furious. "You must be working for an intelligence agency," he hit back and asked: "How do you feel now." Smilingly I said: "You are hitting below the belt but tell me when did they

recruit me." "Just when you invented the Mr Ten Percent remark. Nobody has ever dared to say this to me before," he said.

But soon this exchange of punches turned pleasant and Asif was feeling he had been done a favour by us to have met him in his jail. "I miss my small pleasures, the riding, the polo, my friends. How are my horses? A radio set did not exist for me before. Now it is the most precious asset I have as I can listen to BBC and VOA. I am not worried about the 29 murder cases against me. What worries me is the odd accusation like being called Mr Ten Percent or the man behind the Lake View Hotel."

For 90 minutes we talked about everything on earth—politics, the mistakes of the PPP Government, the apolitical approach to the leadership, the chances of PPP making a comeback the Jam Sadiq Government. "He is a one-man show. He has no base. How long can he last. I hear he is soon going for medical treatment abroad with no intention of coming back."

It appeared that Asif and Benazir feel genuinely betrayed by Jam Sadiq Ali. "Don't call him Jam Sadiq, he is Mir Sadiq," Asif repeatedly corrected us during our conversation. Yet he was thankful to God that he and his wife were still alive and the family had not been shot on the day of their dismissal. "We are young and time is on our side."

But Asif was sad when we talked about his mother whom I visited in the Zardari House, behind the Avari Towers, the previous night. "She is old and we do not tell her everything. She is not a modern lady, with little education and coming from the rural background. But she understands," he observed. "She has come to see me in jail twice but it becomes a tiring experience for her."

The continued detention of her son is having telling effect on Asif's mother. When I saw her in Zardari House, it was almost 2 am in the morning and Asif's younger brother, Owais, nicknamed Tuppy, an adopted son of Hakim Ali Zardari, had insisted that I visit his house. Accompanied by Asif's brother-in-law Munawar Talpur, MPA [Member of Provincial Assembly], we drove to Z-House, almost to receive a small shock.

A four-feet high bronze cannon greeted us at the doorstep. But inside, the place was sombre and simple, with worn-out rugs, a sofa set in a shambles, his mother's bedroom like any Liaquatabad bedroom, curtains needing laundry, etc. A telephone set lay on a side with a small lock. "It is a non-STD line as the phone was disconnected once for non-payment," explained Tuppy.

Where are the billions that Asif and his father Hakim Ali are supposed to have made? Tuppy was almost without money in his pocket and the Pajero that we were brought in, was almost without diesel. Was Hakim Ali treating Asif and his mother badly? Was he not giving them the due share in the riches that he is said to have amassed? How can the Zardaris be living in such a hand-to-mouth

condition? These questions haunted us but the old mother, who greeted us warmly, could provide no answers.

"I cannot sleep until 6 am. I have to take pills. My son is innocent. He never did anything wrong. God will help him," the chain-smoking, silver-haired lady Zardari told us from her double bed with a table full of medicines, some juice packs, biscuits and a small yellow radio set lying close by. Tuppy, the college-going brother of Asif, comes and stretches out on the bed, putting his head in her lap. She caresses it lovingly.

"They have power," she slowly says, showing a fist to demonstrate the effect. "They can do anything." Why your daughter-in-law has reached such a stage, she is asked. The old lady says: "Benazir tried her best and she may have made mistakes. But she is not like these cruel, callous people."

Tuppy gets emotional. "This is our house. Please try and find out where are the millions and billions. My father cannot come back because he would be arrested. I cannot go to college because I will be kidnapped and who will then pay the ransom."

As we leave the Zardari House, Munawar Talpur tells us about Asif's most of which have been sent back to the village. The House covers 7,000 square feet in a prime place like Avari Tower. It has little security outside except for a big gate. The two inmates are Tuppy and his mother and a couple of horses, besides an old model car.

The stories that go along with Hakim Ali Zardari, the purchase of some costly flats in London, the corruption the Zardari family is accused of, all do not go together with the condition of Tuppy and his mother. Is it all a put-up show? But we were never supposed to visit the Z-House and not even scheduled to meet. Tuppy or Munawar Talpur, who happened to be at the dinner Iqbal Haider, the new PPP Senator, hosted for us at his Clifton flat. It was just all of a sudden that we decided to visit Tuppy's House.

Whatever the reality behind it, it is certain that Asif's mother is not receiving what she deserves. Whatever Asif may or may not have done, she had little to do with it, even with her son's marriage to Benazir Bhutto, the turning point in their lives which has brought them to such a pass.

"I have a good daughter-in-law," the old lady says of Benazir. "She visits me every week and even twice a week. She is kind to me. Tell Asif no big Jam can take him away from her. My judge is my God."

[27 Mar p 8]

[Text]

An Old, Bitter G.M. Syed

While the Sindhi youth may be confused about the future, their leader and the so-called "father of the

nation," 88-year-old G.M. Syed is not. "The situation is pregnant but how long this pregnancy would take, I cannot predict," he told us at Haider Manzil, just under the shadow of the Mazar of Quaid-i-Azam, a man Syed loved once, but now hates bitterly.

"Our (separatist) movement suffered the most during the days of the PPP," Syed said, accusing Benazir Bhutto of being "corrupt to the core." "They were mercenaries. When the Mohajirs raised their voice, they accepted all the conditions to appease them. If the Punjabis shouted, the PPP gave in. But they themselves were involved in bunglings and they did not bother about the interests of Sindh."

He says the present set-up is a "lesser evil" although this set-up is also mercenary, working for the interests of the Centre. "Their goals are the same. Interference is still at its peak. But the PPP was corrupt, had personal vendetta against me and wanted to keep power by hook or crook. The present people do the same thing but with a little moderation."

Syed was the man who got the resolution for Pakistan through the then Sindh Assembly and says he joined hands with Mr Jinnah to introduce Pakistan to Punjab, the NWFP [North-West Frontier Province] and Balochistan. "But now I hate Pakistan, I hate Jinnah. We were deceived. Our lands were grabbed. People were foisted on us. We were dominated politically by mercenaries. Jobs were denied to us both at the Centre and in Sindh. Whenever we asked for these rights, we were dubbed anti-Pakistan, Indian agents, communists and anti-Islam."

"Some of the Sindhis were purchased, some bowed to pressures, but men like me were put behind the bars for ages. Now we are fed up. There is no other way. We have proposed three alternatives—an independent Sindh, merger with India or a loose Pakistani Federation with just three subjects with the Centre," Syed told us.

The logic of Syed is cold and pinching, but deep inside there is a man who feels betrayed. He now grinds his teeth with rage whenever he speaks of Mr Jinnah or even Benazir Bhutto. He calls Benazir Bhutto "corrupt to the core" and MQM's [Muhajir Qaumi Movement's] Altaf Hussain "selfish to the core," who is not "open to reason." But MQM, in his view, is a lesser evil as compared to the Jamaat-i-Islami.

What this old man of Sindh is going to leave behind as his legacy can be frightful for the powers that want to keep Sindh deprived of its political rights. Syed has not been an electoral success but he has produced a big hard core of militants who are prepared to sacrifice everything for their cause. For these militants, anyone who is arrested while committing a dacoity or a kidnapping is a hero and anyone who dies in action is a martyr.

Young men of all shades of political opinion are influenced by this militancy. During my stay in Karachi, while shuttling between Sindhi towns and cities, I came

across one such phenomenon. I was sitting with a leading industrialist in SITE [Sindh Industrial Trading Estates] when he received a visiting card claiming that the visitor was the grandson of Mr G.M. Syed, son of Syed Haider Ali Shah. Two Sindhi young men arrived and demanded a huge sum of money for a Bhittai Welfare Centre. One of them admitted he was in jail until recently and was an associate of arrested Sindhi leader Qadir Magsi. The industrialist, whose close relative had recently been kidnapped and freed by police in an encounter, was horrified. He promised them some money but explained that he could only pay by cheque.

While I was still sitting and hardly 15 minutes after the first batch had left, another visiting card came, this time claiming to be the son of PPP Communications Minister Makhdoom Amin Faheem. Again three persons walked in led by Makhdoom Shakeel-uz-Zaman. They carried exactly the same documents of Bhittai Welfare Centre and demanded another handsome amount as a donation. While the first batch had indirectly threatened retaliation, the second group was comparatively well behaved. Both were not known to each other and the Makhdoom's son seemed visibly embarrassed. He left without the donation promising that he would find out who the others were. The industrialist was so shaken he ordered immediate top-security measures for himself and his family and informed the police. Probably another target for kidnapping was being assessed, his movements noted down and his security measures evaluated.

Kidnappings by extremists for ransom are a common means to raise money for political and organisational work and it is not considered morally wrong. One incident during our stay in Sindh proved this more than anything else. It was the dramatic release of ex-SITE Chairman Luqman Yahya in an encounter with police near Islamia College in Karachi. The man arrested was Asghar Shah but Sindhi language papers the next day declared he was a Jiye Sindh leader who had been arrested by the police one week back and to cover up the arrest, police in Karachi had shown him involved in the kidnapping and the "fake encounter." In Sindh all is fair, as for them a war is going on.

This declaration by the Sindhi Press is nothing odd. If an ordinary Pakistani was able to read the Sindhi papers, he would be a very disturbed man. Even the NPT [National Press Trust]-owned Sindhi newspaper HILAL-IPAKISTAN has to be so radical in its approach that it does not appear to be a Government paper. Every murder and dacoity in Sindh is justified in the Sindhi papers and those involved are presented as heroes. There may be many reasons to justify such an attitude but the root cause lies in the social and political milieu that now presents itself as a fait accompli within the province.

Conversely the Sindhis are bitter about the attitude and role of the Urdu and the urban national Press. One major complaint of the Sindh University students and teachers in our meeting in Hyderabad was the domination of the Press by the Urdu-speaking people. "We are totally

ignored and we have no way to reach the Urdu-speaking people," was a common complaint, specially of the student organisations. This complaint appears genuine as the national Press, by and large, ignores whatever is happening inside Sindh and its main headlines and front pages are dominated by Urban politics, often under threats and coercion by various city-based organisations.

Acknowledging this handicap, Sindhi intellectuals and men of letters are seriously thinking of launching their own English and Urdu-language newspapers so that their point of view reaches a broader circle of readers. But they are worried that for their Urdu-language newspaper they would have to employ Urdu-speaking workers and over a period of time, the Paper would again be reflecting views contrary to their own. This, however, may not be correct as workers in a newspaper have to follow the policy of the editor or the publisher.

Talking about the Press in the interior of Sindh could be a painful subject for any objective journalist. The newspaper community is deeply divided along ethnic lines and often newsmen act as if they were committed workers of one or the other party. Our experience in the Larkana Press Club amply demonstrated this. Treating the visit of a few journalists from Islamabad as an occasion, office bearers of Larkana Press Club not only garlanded and presented gifts to the Commissioner, DIG [Deputy Inspector General] and other administration officials, many members were not even prepared to listen to an odd awkward question about the government or the local administration.

Almost a riot was triggered off in the meeting when I asked about the reaction of the local people towards the "drama of Jam Sadiq Ali." I had deliberately used the word drama but I had to do a lot of explaining to justify it. The question was about reaction of locals to Jam's Government as Larkana was the bastion of PPP strength. I could hardly get an answer as arguments started among the members for and against the so-called drama of Jam Sadiq.

Likewise, the Hyderabad Press Club appeared to be a strongly MQM-dominated body where the voice of the Sindhis could hardly be heard.

[28 Mar p 4]

[Text]

Terror of the Unknown

As you enter the heavily guarded Defence Society residence of Sindh's new strongman, the wielder of the stick (as the carrot is administered by the Chief Minister himself), cotton tycoon Irfanullah Marwat, two decorations on the wall catch your immediate attention—a picture of President Ghulam Ishaq Khan and a gun with a long barrel. Both probably have been put there for effect.

The visit to his house was the first official engagement of the six-member journalists team, invited to visit Sindh by Chief Minister Jam Sadiq Ali from the Federal capital, after a stormy news conference in Islamabad where Jam Sadiq had a tough time. The Sindh Government had made an open offer to the team to visit any place, meet anybody, write anything.

After almost seven days of running through the province, meeting almost all sections of the society, both in urban and rural Sindh, having long discussions and heated arguments, the impression I return with is, simply put, horrifying. Sindh, and the interior of the province in particular, is sitting on top of a simmering volcano of deprivation, a state of siege imposed by criminals and political waderas protecting these criminals and the might of the State unleashed against political opponents.

"Who will guarantee my safe return to my house, which is the closest as compared to all others, if I tell you the truth about the existing situation?" a journalist asked us sitting in the Larkana Press Club, when members of the local administration, including the Commissioner and the DIG, had left to let us have a free and frank talk. "I am scared of the government, the political groups, the terrorists and the criminals. No one can protect me. No one will tell you in what state of mind we are living in."

These words, coming from a fellow journalist, were not only shocking but demonstrated the depth of the fear and insecurity that has gripped not just the ordinary man in the street but the enlightened classes as well.

We travelled to Sukkur, Shikarpur, Larkana, Hyderabad, its adjoining areas, Khairpur, Pir Jo Goth, Thatta and Karachi. We were given detailed briefings by the Divisional and District administration, words always claiming that the situation was improving, was better than it was during the previous administration and much better than the nearby district or division. The Commissioners or Deputy Commissioners would appear in total control of the situation when talking to the team, but while we were in session, news would come of another mass kidnapping, another dacoity or another killing.

Like in Sukkur, when the Commissioner was briefing us about the improvement in the law and order situation, at least two armed clashes were going on in his area with dacoits, one near Pir Jo Goth where dacoits had first attacked a police station and then walked through the market, picking up people for ransom—unchallenged. Similarly, when the Commissioner and DIG of Hyderabad were telling us of their "successes," armed gangs were hauling up busloads of people on the main highway, to pick up the best hostages from the lot, "strictly on merit, according to the new policy of the government," as the joke goes.

Saleem Akhtar Siddiqi, the DIG of Hyderabad, known to be close to the Chief Minister, was frank in admitting that the root cause of the present situation in the interior was the collusion of the three parties that matter—the waderas, the criminals and the police. "I can admit that

two institutions of the police force, the SHO [Station House Officer] and the DSP [Deputy Superintendent of Police], are totally corrupt and there can be no improvement in the situation unless something is done about them."

"We have a list of politically influential people of the area who support and even house the dacoits and the list includes sitting MNAs [Members of National Assembly] and Senators," DIG Siddiqi said. Privately he even gave us names of some of these politicians, but told us not to print them. They belong to all shades of political opinion. The picture he painted was one with little or no hope of any betterment unless someone with a strong political will, and a stronger arm, comes determined to deal with everyone even-handedly, sparing nobody.

Wherever we went in the interior, we were escorted and fully protected. At least two police vans would move with us, accompanied almost invariably by a First Class Magistrate, in case orders to shoot were needed. Wireless messages would continuously be exchanged to ensure that the two or three vehicles we were travelling in were proceeding safely. A heavy presence of the Rangers would add to the tight security net around us.

Interestingly, almost all the officials and the administrators who would talk of the "improving situation" in their areas in formal sessions, were more than interested to privately support our impression that things were going down in the interior, and pretty fast. "All claims that things have improved during the new government, are just a puff of smoke," a district administrator said. "We know, even we cannot travel at night despite all the escort and wireless fitted vehicles. The dacoits rule the land after sunset and in some areas, even during the day."

Political workers and journalists blame the situation mainly to what they call the "artificially imposed" government of Jam Sadiq Ali, who, they say, holds only one seat and has manipulated a majority. "How is it that Jam Sahib blatantly declares that every criminal or dacoit that he arrests turns out to be a supporter of the PDA [People's Democratic Alliance], and no one other than the PDA challenges him?" is the question repeatedly asked throughout the interior of Sindh.

The interior is overwhelmingly PPP dominated and the sense of deprivation is fast turning from a loss of faith in the government to a loss of faith in the State. "What are we living for?" a PPP worker in Bhutto's hometown Larkana asked me. "If our continued adherence to the Federation and a national policy is interpreted as a threat to the Establishment and the powers that matter, what choice is left to us other than join the nationalist movement working for a separate Sindh?"

And the younger-generation Sindhis are already making new alignments on nationalistic lines. In the Sindh University in Hyderabad, a group of professors and teachers arranged a discussion with the visiting journalists where only student representatives had come to

present their viewpoints as well as lodge their complaints against the urban Press. One student spoke for nine various student organisations including the extremist Jiye Sindh Groups and the moderate PPP-backed People's Students Federation. "We have a joint action committee and this shows that we are working together for our cause," he said.

The professors talk of rights snatched away, of options fast diminishing and of opportunities missed. "There is a strange feeling of helplessness," said one. "Previously we used to look up to the Sindhi political leadership as the saviour, but now that card has also been played and neutralised. We have no future to look up to. No one to pin our hopes on."

But the younger Sindhis still do not believe separation or independence is a viable option for them. I asked the student groups at the Sindh University to give me two students who could briefly speak on the two extreme scenarios for Sindh—future within Pakistan and future as a separate State. I asked them to say what they thought would happen in the near future and how would things shape up in the long run.

The young man representing the nine organisations spoke first for the school of thought representing Sindh's future within Pakistan. "We must get our democratic rights and the Army must get out of politics, leaving the civilians to sort out their affairs for themselves," he said. "If this was not done, we shall have to review and reconsider our line of political thought."

Interestingly, the student who spoke to represent the extremist point of view was not clear about the future. He represented a hardline faction of the Jiye Sindh Students Federation but in the final analysis he also said democracy should be immediately restored in Sindh, meaning that the present set-up, which they think is a mockery of democratic norms, should give way to real representatives of the province taking over.

What the young nationalist could not fathom was that by demanding democracy, he was practically negating his own line of thinking—a separate Sindh. In democracy the nationalists can never hope to become a force to be counted. They have always been outvoted by the widest of margins and G.M. Syed himself has never been able to win an election in the last three decades. Democracy in Sindh would mean a return to power of the PPP, with the Opposition either coming from the urban MQM or, if an agreement to co-exist is hammered out between the two, from dissident waderas or the political houses having a religious background.

[29 Mar p 12]

[Text]

The Iron-Fisted Tycoon

Irfanullah Khan Marwat is Jam Sadiq Ali's chief policeman not because of his political clout but because

of qualifications that matter more. "I enjoy my new job," the starch-moustached Marwat, surrounded always by kalashnikov-toting guards, says without making any attempt to conceal the temporarily acquired sense of real power that he enjoys.

Marwat was interviewed by me shortly before the 1988 elections in a small shop in the PPI [Pashtun-Punjabi Ittehad]-dominated Akhtar Colony area before he had become an MPA [Member of Provincial Assembly]. Then he was quite apolitical, almost apologetic because of his relationship with President Ghulam Ishaq Khan. But both he and his wife, the President's daughter, were working hard to win the seat.

After two-and-a-half years, Marwat is a totally different man, in a different role altogether. All of the accusations of kidnapping MPAs, keeping PPP on the run, hounding supporters of the Bhutto family and protecting the hoodlums who have been creating all kinds of havoc in Karachi streets, has been credited by the Opposition to his account.

His style and mode of operation gives credence to a lot of things said against him. The house he lives in is heavily guarded, with security tents pitched all around. Inside, a battery of vehicles, big and small, impress visitors. The way he walks, confidence almost overflowing, seems to be meant more for effect than anything else.

"I don't mind these charges and we are here for a long innings," he told us at the opening luncheon he hosted for the Islamabad journalists team. "We have long-term plans to deal with all kinds of situations," he says.

Whatever Marwat is accused of doing has been a source of great embarrassment for Islamabad. The PDA boycott of the National Assembly, the kidnapping of five PDA MPAs to keep them away from the Senate polls, interrogation of arrested Opposition leaders, making approvers of persons involved in the cases against Asif Zardari—all have something to do with Marwat's strong-arm tactics.

For instance we were witness to the fact that at least two PDA MPAs, Haji Khan Chachar and Hanif Soldier were brought to the Sindh Assembly under protection of Marwat's men. Soldier got out of a Sindh Government vehicle and wept profusely while Chachar was paraded before the Islamabad newsmen as a model of righteousness in the Chief Minister's Assembly chamber on the day of the Senate polls.

It was an interesting experience as Marwat was sitting just behind Chachar who was seated close to the Chief Minister. "Ask him any question you like," Jam magnanimously offered. Then began the questioning and after just three queries, Chachar was looking left and right for help.

"Where were you all these days," he was asked. "I was on my lands doing my farming." Did you not hear what

PDA was saying about you that you had been kidnapped? "No, I do not get any newspapers in my village." Did nobody tell you that your family had filed a petition in the High Court because you were missing? "I read about it in the newspapers," why then did you not show up? "I was busy."

"Don't ask him questions in English because the man does not understand," Jam Sadiq immediately intervened and picking up the cue, local journalists of the unscrupulous kind, diverted the questioning from Chachar to the expected success of Jam's candidates in the Senate polls. Chachar was in the meantime briskly whisked away by Irfanullah Marwat.

Later, at his lunch the next day, Marwat felt more at ease. "I had all the information about the missing MPAs. Where they were, what they were doing. Every minute, every moment was known to me," he boasted. "Does it not mean that you are admitting all the charges levelled against you," he was asked. "No, it means I am doing my job as the Home Minister effectively."

When Marwat began as a cotton export agent for the Government-owned Cotton Export Corporation [CEC] in the early '80s, after leaving a pharmaceutical multinational company of Germany, he was just a beginner. The then CEC chairman privately admits that he was favoured out of turn to establish himself. Soon Marwat's trading company was listed as one of the few big cotton exporters from Pakistan.

The birth of MQM and consequently the creation of the Punjabi-Pakhtoon Ittehad (PPI), which was a reaction to the MQM, involved Marwat in Pakhtoon politics, leading up to his contesting the 1988 election as a PPI candidate. He was the only one to win but the ruling PPP did not immediately pick him up as an ally. It was after a surprise raid at the Karachi Port by Commerce Minister Syed Faisal Saleh Hayat, that brought him into contact with the PPP.

It so happened in early 1989 that Faisal Saleh Hayat visited the CEC and wanted to find out about the irregularities going on in cotton export about which the Press was persistently raising hue and cry. Someone suggested that the minister should visit the Port where consignments were lying and find it out for himself what was happening. The minister did so and three export shipments were examined. All three were found to have been misdeclared to save export duty. One of them was of Mr Marwat. The exporters were immediately charged the export duty but the minister had no idea till then who had been trapped. Later, when the reality dawned, no further action was taken and then came a day when Marwat was made a cabinet minister in the PPP Government in Sindh, like Jam Sadiq Ali, who was an adviser.

Whatever Jam Sadiq Ali has achieved through Marwat and his strong-arm tactics is little of substance in terms of a better law and order. The situation in the interior of Sindh has been dealt with in other columns in this series

while in the important cities, it is the MQM which determines how much peace and how much of a calm there has to exist, for how long and to what effect. All Marwat has to do is to keep in touch with Azizabad. An odd success against dacoits and kidnappers in Karachi have been due to reasons never ever imagined by police.

What Sindhi politicians and leading analysts are amused about is the manner in which Jam Sadiq has been reposing his full confidence in "Mr Murrawat," as he calls him. Perhaps, some day, when things change, he may get up and say that during his chief ministership, he was forced by the powers that mattered then to take a non-elected member as his adviser and hand him over the Home Ministry, with full powers to execute the anti-PPP plans. That he had to agree, perforce.

[30 Mar p 7]

[Text]

Hyderabad—The Next Battle Ground?

The growing sense of alienation among the rural Sindhis from centres of political power is driving them closer to one another day by day and the realisation is also dawning that their ultimate battle would be fought with the MQM, backed by the Establishment, in the streets of the ethnically—and almost physically—divided city of Hyderabad.

Driving through the city leaves a number of lasting impressions: The MQM-run city has turned into a forgotten land, with no one interested any more in its future. The ethnic divide dominates all other considerations. The Pucca Qilla will ultimately be the last refuge for the militant Mohajirs. Hyderabad will be held hostage by the Sindhis as a bargaining counter for their interests in Karachi. If there has to be a Beirut in Pakistan, it would be Hyderabad with its green and red lines.

No one disputes these far-fetched conclusions. "We are a divided city," the MQM Mayor, Aftab Ahmed, admits. "But I try to work for the interests of everybody. I am the Mayor of Sindhis and Mohajirs." Yet these appear to be empty words as Mayor Aftab cannot sit in his office without kalashnikov-carrying guards. He had been attacked in the past and is alive, despite receiving bullets. MQM youth take over the main centres of their dominated areas in the night. Authority of law is only as firm as the skin of the teeth of the enforcing agencies.

The Sindhis feel they had eliminated the MQM militancy during the Pucca Qilla operation in the PPP Government, but for the last-minute intervention by the military. "We were about to get to the arsenals and the men who form the hard core of MQM," an administration official recalled.

Mayor Aftab strongly contests these claims. "I do not deny that there were arms in Pucca Qilla, but what was recovered in that inhuman operation when for days

women and children were kept in a state of siege? They had searched everything and all they came up with was a few pistols. It was all a sham and an attempt to wipe out MQM."

But scars of Pucca Qilla are visible all around. Sindhis claim the Qilla is now a much better equipped and well guarded fort where at least 50,000 Mohajirs are entrenched for any future pitched battle. The population transfers that had taken place from one place in the city to another have not reversed and people have left their properties only to secure a safer environment. No one seems worried about their fate or losses.

The MQM itself is in trouble. "We have our differences with the Markaz on several points," Mayor Aftab admits. "The Markaz has given the Sindh Government a list of MQM militants, some of whom have already been arrested including the famous Ladla, said to be head of his own group," he says, without realising that Mr Altaf Husain had categorically denied giving Jam Sadiq Ali any such list.

Sindhis and Mohajirs alike blame the Mayor and the MQM for the plight of the Hyderabad Municipal Corporation. They are basically right in this criticism. Roads are dug open, gutters overflow, garbage stinks, heaps and mounds of dust and stones are scattered all around. "We have no money," the Mayor says. "Our main source of income is Octroi and in recent months revenue has tumbled. But recently we have received Rs [rupees] 15 million from the Centre and I will divide it equally on Mohajir and Sindhi projects," he promises.

But the Mayor and the MQM seem oblivious to the growing sense of Sindhi unity and a sense of common cause in "liberating" Hyderabad. While the MQM continues to demand separate educational institutions for Mohajirs in the city, the over-conscious Sindhi intellectuals are working overtime not to let this segregation take any further roots. Sindhi professors and student leaders in the Sindh University took pains to stress before us that non-Sindhis were welcome and do come to study in their institution. But it was a fact that while 50 or so students and professors were waiting for us, there was not one non-Sindhi among them. The reason they gave was that we were late in coming and they had left after the closing time.

Both the enlightened Sindhis and Mohajirs believe the time for an urban-rural patch-up was already past, the best opportunity having been lost both by the MQM and PPP in the early days of the PPP Government. The leadership of the two sides, unchallenged in its credentials to speak for their people, could not rise above their petty squabbles and short-sighted political gains to give the province a lasting peace agreement, a treaty of co-existence, a mandate of mutual tolerance, a recipe of progress and development.

But they also believe that if anyone can still achieve that, it were the same political forces and not the present

set-up. A gigantic statesmanship and maturity of leadership has to be displayed and in the present set-up, no one has proved to be capable of rising above the personal or party interests.

The alternative, they believe, is the inevitable "mother of all battles," to borrow a phrase from Saddam Husayn's vocabulary. The battle lines are almost drawn. Mohajirs have overwhelming control of Karachi and the Ports. They have the industry, the commerce and the money. But Sindhis feel they have the logistic card—they can cut off Karachi with the rest of the country, road, rail, power, gas, and even water at some later stage.

That done, the population pattern shows, the fight would then be over Hyderabad alone. A combined siege would materialise and block Mohajirs inside the Pucca Qilla. How long and to what effect they could fight back or hold on, would only be a matter of time but, ultimately, it would be a swapping of hostages—like the exchange of PPP and MQM hostages under the auspices of the military during the PPP Government. The scenario is frightening but not insane.

Much obviously depends on the attitude and role of other important centres of power, but so far they have been, willingly or unwillingly, acting in a manner that further widens the Gulf. The tacit collusion of the Establishment with the non-representative political forces thrust on Sindh, is the most tragic element in the Sindhi scenario.

Far-sighted Mohajirs, with high stakes, are already busy setting up alternative homes and businesses in Karachi. Liberal minded ones are moving to Punjab or up north. Strategies are being prepared for the ultimate showdown, which many believe may be coming sooner than later, if sanity does not prevail in the corridors of powers in Islamabad, Rawalpindi and the minds of the politicians now at the helm of affairs.

Another opportunity lost could be the last available.

[31 Mar p 15]

[Text]

MQM: Rocking Forward, Backward

Having come a long way from its student-union image, having become a partner in power in the Federation and in the province, having achieved unprecedented unity and remarkable discipline in its ranks, the phenomenon called the Mohajir Qaumi Movement (MQM) has already achieved its peak and is now in for a period of settling down that could see some wear and tear, internal strains and readjustments. But there is nothing very surprising about it. Every political party at one time or another, faces inward and encounters problems having a bearing on internal cohesion.

One group of dissidents has already been purged on the charge of corruption which has neither been elaborated

by the party high command nor the Government which must have suffered the consequences of that corruption.

Political analysts have always been over-awed by the intensity of everything that the MQM has displayed during six years of its existence as an ethno-political group—emotions, discipline, popular support, mobilisation on the streets, its urge for social service, assertion of its striking power. Yet what is now at issue is its capacity to grow into a mature organisation, outliving entirely its college union image and presenting responses to crises that behove responsible men in high Government offices and in august legislative Chambers.

When our group of journalists was touring Sindh, the MQM was engrossed in its in-house problems, with Mr Altaf Hussain still in the Abbasi Shaheed Hospital, its MNAs and Central Committee leaders busy devising strategies to fight their battles with newspapers, and policy-makers worrying about the conspiracies against the MQM by intelligence agencies, or whoever. Thus, despite repeated requests, no one from the famous Azizabad Markaz was available to talk to us. Yet, outside, several views were being aired on how the MQM was doing, or not doing.

The biggest challenge that apparently faces the Markaz is the revolt of the militants like Badar Iqbal, Afaq Ahmed and Aamir Khan—young firebrands who were the main elements of the MQM strike force. Now these insiders are on the other side of the world, claiming that they had been pushed out under threat and their families were hostage in Pakistan. But in communications from their exile, they keep on repeating that they would return to play "their role" in their own dear country.

Analysts who have been watching the MQM from its earliest days recognise a pattern in its responses—intensity of the response being the only clue to the gravity of the challenge facing the organisation. Like when the Pucca Qilla operation was being planned, MQM was crying at the top of its voice that plans to crush the MQM were being made and it had gone even to the extent of appealing to the Chief of Army Staff. Then came the Pucca Qilla crackdown and apparently it was the Army intervention that saved the MQM.

Likewise, whenever a major show of strength is planned by the MQM, it has invariably been preceded by some kind of violence and killings in Karachi and Hyderabad, perpetrated always by untraceable trigger-happy snipers. The Sohrab Goth incident being the first and the return of Mr Altaf Hussain from London, after his operation, being the last. The first resulted in the Orangi Town massacre of 250 innocent people, the last took about 30 lives in sniper shootings in Karachi alone.

So whenever the MQM has raised a hue and cry, it was a prelude to something big that the Markaz feared, and in most of the cases did turn out to be true. Is the current phrase of the MQM's hue and cry another advance warning, and if so, against what?

Analysts and political pundits like the well-informed Pir of Pagara are saying that the fear felt in the Markaz could be attributed to the differences that have appeared in its militant ranks. Pir Pagara has even gone on record as saying that after Ramazan, "there will be no Eid Milan parties but a scenario riddled with bullets, once those who are now away return."

The MQM has, again for no explained reason, gone on record to invite the Chief of Army Staff to intervene. It has repeatedly talked of conspiracies against its leader, and Chief Minister Jam Sadiq Ali has even been handed over some documents. An enquiry by a DIG police is also under way. Some MQM ministers are, meanwhile, keeping away from Government business and even Cabinet meetings. The emotional and harsh reaction to some newspaper reports and the subsequent street action against DAWN, was another sign of uneasiness in the MQM's higher echelons.

Jam Sadiq Ali is going all the way with Azizabad so far, but undercurrents in Sindhi circles may have alerted Azizabad to the possibility that the honeymoon between Jam and MQM may be drawing to a close. The total alienation of PPP from Sindh's power structure, despite its wide popular base and the dominant place given to the MQM, has not been going well with the rest of the non-PPP Sindhi political circles either.

The meetings between former Prime Ministers Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi and Mr Mohammed Khan Junejo, surprisingly at the invitation of Jam Sadiq Ali, are a clear sign of these forces coming closer. Possible meetings between Jatoi and Benazir Bhutto and then a grand Sindhi re-union of three former Sindhi Prime Ministers—Jatoi, Junejo and Benazir, with Pir of Pagara also present, could have serious implications for the Jam-MQM set-up.

Does then the MQM leadership think a situation may arise in which it has to redefine its goal, restructure its priorities and regroup its forces for another round of ethnic-political confrontation. Talk is again heard of a possible dissolution of the Sindh Assembly, and the crystal ball of the Pir of Pagara predicts that at least one elected House has to go.

In this scenario, it must be a nightmare for the MQM leaders to find that their main strike force has been dented with the purge and that the leaders who have gone into exile are not without supporters in the MQM ranks. If a confrontation begins, who knows what part the exiled choose to play.

The situation in Hyderabad is fraught with danger for Azizabad. Many top-ranking MQM leaders openly admit that differences exist between Karachi and Hyderabad.

On the political ground, the much-awaited Jam-MQM accord has not as yet been made public. Calls for the repatriation of stranded Biharis have begun to rise to a higher crescendo and participation of the MQM in

Government business is already in a low key. A major demand by the MQM to remove the ban on fresh recruitments has quietly been rejected by the Federal Government.

Many in the MQM realise that after several years of running the main local bodies in Karachi and Hyderabad, the MQM has not been able to bring about any major change that marks out its rule as being distinct from that of the others in the past. Corruption has not disappeared from these local bodies. The MQM leaders are unhappy about this fact.

The running of the Karachi Metropolitan Corporation and the Hyderabad Municipal Corporation is now being closely examined by the MQM leadership. The results of this scrutiny will be keenly awaited by the citizens of the two cities irrespective of their political affiliations.

[1 Apr p 5]

[Text]

Who Speaks for the Province?

One recurring question that haunts the minds of thinkers, intellectuals and the elite of rural Sindh is whether the present political set-up in the province is genuinely representative to take crucial decisions that could chart the course of history for generations. "Can Jam Sadiq Ali speak for Sindh," they ask.

The question has compelling logic which proceeds from the results of the 1988 and then 1990. Jam Sadiq and his friends were not there in 1988 but in 1990 they could at best reduce PPP strength to an extent that it could not repeat its earlier performance but despite this, it retained its claim to speak as the authentic voice of the rural Sindh.

The rural intelligentsia claims, and with some justification, that the PPP speaks for the whole of the province. "The MQM has never grown out of its urban image and has never taken up issues that could affect the entire province," professors of Jamshoro University argue. "Where is the MQM stand on distribution of Indus waters or provincial autonomy? And wherever they have a stand, it is in the perspective of rural vs urban struggle."

The present set-up has one evident drawback. It does not reflect the rural Sindh's viewpoint and a few independents, or turncoats as some allege, cannot and do not qualify to portray the consensus of the province on major issues. Jam Sadiq himself has been a PPP adviser until he became the caretaker Chief Minister. PPP disowned him and so he lost the political or moral right to represent the large sector that voted for the PPP. His ally, the MQM, is urban and carries a totally divergent view on issues. The independents do not count in policy-making though they do count in providing the numbers for the Jam set-up to stay in its place.

The question took an emotional turn in one of our private meetings with senior professors and academics of Jamshoro University in Hyderabad. When I asked them who spoke for Sindh in the context that their nationalistic views could probably not represent the large viewpoint represented by the PPP, a senior professor got angry and accused me of trying to entangle the Sindhis in "typical journalistic quagmires."

But at an enlarged meeting with student leaders representing various shades of opinion, ranging between moderate and extreme nationalist, the same question was answered by a representative of Jiye Sindh Students Federation more logically. "Today is the era of pluralism and we have many voices that speak for Sindh, including the Federalist PPP, separatist Jiye Sindh and all others in between," he said. Apart from the answer itself, the quality and level of understanding displayed was impressive for a student leader.

Yet Jam Sadiq does not figure in any of these voices and if he does at other levels of decision-making, the rural intelligentsia does not recognise him as their province's spokesman. "What does he have at stake today? If he barters away Sindh's rights in the Indus waters or on Kalabagh Dam, who is going to catch him tomorrow and make him pay for his lapses," they argue.

Even some of the topmost bureaucrats display a sceptical bent of mind. At a meeting with Jam Sahib at his residence, a very senior Urdu-speaking bureaucrat, apparently in high spirits, blurted out that the entire bureaucracy of Sindh was with the PPP and they were trying to sabotage the Jam Government. But when I asked the bureaucrat how he could justify Mr Sadiq's chief ministership when the people were with the PPP and the bureaucrats were also with them, according to him, there was a stony silence.

How would the Sindhi masses receive the major decisions that Jam Sadiq's Government is taking in the Council of Common Interests or the National Finance Commission. G.M. Syed and Benazir Bhutto have already rejected the Indus water accord. The MQM has not yet spoken about it, as it hardly affects the urban Sindh. Whenever MQM takes a position, it would be of academic interest only as the water is a life-and-death issue for rural Sindh and it is their views that would carry weight.

A segment of opinion feels that while the Indus water accord has been signed by the respective Governments of the provinces, no provision has been made for the agreement to be ratified by the Provincial Assemblies, specially in the smaller provinces where opposition is being voiced.

"It is a strange scenario for political students to observe," says a professor of Jamshoro University. "There is a strange mix of coalition governments in Sindh, the NWFP and Balochistan. In all these provinces no authoritative representative government exists, Jam Sahib has a contrived majority. Taj Mohammed Jamali's

strength is even more tenuous. And Mir Afzal Khan is riding so many horses at a time. With these coalitions perched so precariously, how can the masses be satisfied if the historic agreements that have been pending for decades are not even discussed by the assemblies?"

A very pertinent illustration of the sentiment that now prevails is the handling of the 1990 census. The feeling among rural Sindhis that they are being dominated by the urbanites, led by an independent from the interior, is glaringly reflected on this particular issue. In the housing census earlier this year, most Sindhis acted in unison in the matter of enumeration. At most of these places the figures were exaggerated to unbelievable proportions.

But instead of recognising this as an issue and talking to the representatives of the interior of Sindh, the Federal Government cancelled the census exercise altogether, fearing a backlash from the MQM. The provincial Government which should have taken note of the Sindhi grievances, quietly agreed to the cancellation forcing even a moderate leader like Ms Bhutto to come out publicly on the issue in favour of the rural Sindh. Now it appears the census issue would remain pending on the shelf until a prior political agreement is reached between the urban and rural representatives.

As one ponders the present and future of Sindh, the question that comes to mind again and again is: who speaks for Sindh? An independent Jam, the urban MQM, the persecuted PPP or the disparate forces on the periphery now joining hands to make their voice heard?

Islamabad: 'Policy Drift' Outlined

91AS0773D Lahore VIEWPOINT in English 21 Mar 91
pp 10-11

[Text] Irrespective of Sahabzada Yaqub Khan's claim in the National Assembly that the outcome of the Gulf War had vindicated Pakistan's policy, diplomatic circles in Islamabad privately admit that the prospect facing Pakistan today bristles with grave uncertainties.

With all our eggs in the leaky basket of the Mujahideen and their foreign abettors, we are at a dead-end in Afghanistan. The dearth of any fresh ideas on ways of resolving the Kashmir issue keeps the situation on our borders with India on the boil. And there does linger the apprehension in the corridors of Shehrzade that we may have staked too much on one side in the Gulf conflict.

However, the Gulf War is not the only factor in the impasse we see in most areas of our foreign policy. Having sacrificed an independent foreign policy purportedly to buy security from the United States, the impasse has been there since the 1950s. It confronted us during the 1965 war when the U.S. stopped badly needed military supplies. Then in 1971, we waited, in vain, for the arrival of the U.S. Seventh Fleet. We could have broken the impasse after the Soviet military withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989. We did not even try.

Change in Interests

The change in America's strategic interests and the concomitant diminution of Pakistan's value have been postulated ever since the autumn-1989 upheavals in East European countries. After the withdrawal of the USSR from the world scene as a Super-Power, a unified West Europe and Japan were seen as the new contenders for that status. There is little indication that our policy-makers have even tried to adjust to these developments. For them, it seems, diplomacy means only one thing: to prove Pakistan's usefulness to the U.S. This policy is laboriously justified before the nation and it is misled to believe, in effect, that one can eat one's cake and have it too.

To take only one example, the Government declares ad infinitum that our nuclear programme is peaceful. What Dr. A.Q. Khan, however, tells the media is quite the opposite. This is quite logical: if we have the nuclear bomb and our potential adversary does not know that we have it, it is no use having it. We bravely say we won't sign the NPT [Nonproliferation Treaty]. Yet, we keep our hands stretched out for aid. We do not mind the Afghan Mujahideen selling American-supplied arms to the insurgents of Sinkiang and never care about how China would look at it. China is the only neighbour with which we enjoy good relations.

Observers also wonder about the much-touted "strategic consensus" that would have straddled Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan in a modern version of the Chinese Great Wall. Whom were the policy-makers taking for a ride? Surely, not the Turks, nor the Iranians nor the Afghans. Out of the four countries, we can claim to have intimacy of sorts only with Turkey. We have never ceased feeling uneasy about overtures from post-Shah Iran—the only Muslim neighbour of Pakistan besides Afghanistan.

And Afghanistan? Let us say frankly that we do not know how to salvage ourselves from the bottomless pit of our Afghan policy. "We have no Afghan policy now," admitted a Foreign Ministry official in Islamabad the other day.

Everybody is talking with the Soviet Union except Pakistan. Why this was so, the official was asked. He said: "When we talk with the Soviet Union, we must be able to deliver." But we can't do so until somehow the Mujahideen get their act together. Here is the dead-end.

After Iraq invaded Kuwait, one came across a wave of weird glee in some circles in Islamabad: here, it was argued, was a God-send for us to prove our utility to the U.S. and its moneybags, the Arab monarchs. Once Iraq was pushed out of Kuwait, the U.S. would set up a duplicate of NATO in the region, which won't be complete without Pakistan, an ex-ambassador gloated. That would take care of the threat from India too. The dollars would begin to flow here once again; the U.S. might even look the other way about our nuclear programme.

But Tehran has said only the littoral states will have a role in the postwar security dispensation in the Gulf. An Iranian leader came to Islamabad and said that Pakistan would have no role in such a future arrangement. Eight Arab States have announced the establishment of a peace force. Neither Pakistan nor Iran is in it. It was after this that the authorities in Islamabad disavowed any alignment with a defence pact per se, because "we want to remain independent." A sensible decision, of course.

So much for the Arabs. A strategic consensus with Iran and Turkey too is not plausible. Even if both were agreeable to it—which is unlikely—we can hope to gain little by it, even as surrogates of the NATO Powers. The Arabs, under Western influence, have tried to isolate Iran and Turkey. Turkey values its NATO and EC connection more than the link with the Islamic Ummah, whatever that phrase may mean in post-war Middle East. Unlike Turkey, Iran remained neutral in the war. Yet, it was sufficiently pragmatic to go along with Iraq in removing the debris of their eight-year war (exchange of prisoners and reaffirmation of their adherence to the border treaty of 1975). However, there is a view in Islamabad that to deal with Iran separately from the Arabs, the U.S. may continue to use Pakistan as a backdoor communication link. Iran, on its part, has opted for closer understanding with the USSR. The latter will encourage Tehran to cultivate Baghdad for the Soviets' own version of security arrangements in the region, diplomatic circles here say.

Unless Islamabad can bravely embark upon some bold initiatives in the emergent international situation, it will soon find that it is neither here nor there. The implication of the Pakistani masses' anger against the U.S. bombing of Iraq would not have been lost on Washington and Jeddah. The U.S. has already hinted in Congressional briefings that Pakistan would have to stay the course as a conservative state if it values its links with the West.

Resourcefulness

Iran, unlike Pakistan, has characteristically proved its resourcefulness in making the best of both worlds. It has retained its freedom of action on Afghanistan. One of the important reasons was that it did not let any outside Power tangle with the Afghan refugees on its soil. It also keeps their military activities at a low enough level so that it can have its options open with both the USSR and the PDPA [People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan] regime in Kabul.

Our forces will remain deployed in Saudi Arabia for an indefinite period, it has been officially stated. Their size may be enlarged if the U.S. State Department provides a positive response to our desire for the role in the region. This concession will, however, cut both ways. It will be a sop for Islamabad's worries, while guaranteeing its continued adherence to U.S. strategic interests.

Government circles in Islamabad are blaming the Opposition parties for its present predicament. It has no hopes of a big share in the windfall from the reconstruction of

Kuwait. We can expect Kuwait to absorb only our labour. The Pakistani companies that did get contracts in the Middle East in the late 1970s came back bankrupt. It will, however, be a highly competitive market so far as absorption of our labour is concerned. The government may have labelled the Opposition as agents of a foreign country in order to reassure the American and Arab leaders, but there is no gainsaying the culpability of Saddam Husayn in inviting the catastrophe of high-tech destruction upon his nation. If the U.S. has emerged as the un-rivalled ruler of a uni-polar world, it was the Iraqi President who precipitated the crisis.

The government may indeed go ahead with its declared intent to prosecute Opposition leaders, but can it make the U.S. lift the embargo on its aid? It's a \$573-million question.

The IJI [Islamic Jamhoori Ittehad] has obtained an overall majority in the Senate elections, but it is faced with the ticklish problem of choosing a Senator to fill the Chairman's slot.

Mr Ghaus Ali Shah, who was the President and the Prime Minister's choice for Senate Chairman, lost the election. There is hardly another person in Sindh who enjoys the confidence of the Prime Minister. Keeping in view the composition of the new Senate following the induction in it of veteran politicians like Yahya Baktiar, it would need an experienced and competent person to be its chairman. The obvious choice would be Mr. Wasim Sajjad. But his disqualification is that he is from the Punjab. With a Punjabi as Prime Minister, it would not look politically proper to have another Punjabi in the top slot. But in the circumstances the IJI appears to have been left with no choice but to elect Mr Wasim Sajjad.

Another hard choice the IJI Government is faced with is that of finding a suitable legislator as Foreign Minister. According to IJI sources, the Prime Minister will keep the Foreign Minister portfolio, but appoint a Minister of State for Foreign Affairs.

There is some realisation on the part of some in the IJI that Sindh Chief Minister Jam Sadiq Ali is definitely bringing a bad name to the democratic process in the country. A view held by a minority within the IJI is that the Sindh Chief Minister has outlived his utility. By resorting to high-handedness, he could manage to win one additional seat from Sindh, but for this achievement he has brought the alliance to disrepute. However, it seems that it will still take a while for the IJI's top leadership to realise this.

Benazir Bhutto, on a visit to Islamabad on the eve of the Senate elections, reiterated that the PDA's [People's Democratic Alliance's] boycott of the National Assembly would continue until the Government agreed to meet its demands in relation to the Sindh situation.

Commentary Views MQM Infighting

91AS0773B Lahore VIEWPOINT in English 14 Mar 91
pp 9-11

[Quotation marks as published]

[Text] The in-fighting in the MQM [Muhajir Qaumi Movement], going on for some time, was officially brought into the open last Friday by Chairman Azim Ahmed Tariq when he announced the expulsion of 18 key leaders from the party. He hinted that these expelled had conspired to assassinate the 'Quaid,' Altaf Hussain, and that "certain government agencies" were also involved in the plot. He also cast doubts on the role of the Sindh Chief Minister in this connection and expressed dissatisfaction with Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif.

The expelled leaders include three powerful joint secretaries, Bader Iqbal, Afaq Ahmed and Amir Khan; in charge of Zone E Mujtaba Khan; incharge of Zone A Naeem Hashmat; Zonal committee members Mahmood, Khalid and Rehman; incharge of the Landhi Sector, Zubair Ahmed; incharge of the Federal B Area sector Rafiq Shaikh; incharge of the Liaquatabad sector Sardar Ahmed; Liaquatabad sector Sardar Ahmed; Liaquatabad Sector Committee members Asif, Javed Bhaiya and Naveed; Finance Secretary Zone C Amir Ahmed Guddu; Councillor Malir Asif Hafeez; and Vice-Chairman, Zonal Municipal Committee East, Moosa Khan.

Workers Warned

Party workers have been warned against establishing any contact with the expelled members; anyone found doing so would be expelled, Azim Tariq said. He added that these members had conspired among themselves and with "certain government agencies" to assassinate Altaf Hussain and destroy the MQM. A special appeal addressed to the people of Liaquatabad, Landhi, Malir, Faisal Colony and Korangi to stay loyal to the MQM by the Chairman shows that the revolt against the leadership was widespread in these areas.

Azim Ahmed Tariq alleged that efforts were made to buy the loyalty of the MQM members of the Provincial Assembly. He did not name those involved in this transaction but left no doubt about their identity. Azim Tariq disclosed that Altaf Hussain had asked Jam Sadiq about the whereabouts of Badar Iqbal who was seen with the Chief Minister in Islamabad two days before he was reported to have fled the country. Allegations of involvement of government agencies was a further pointer to the suspects.

Azim Tariq did not stop at the Sindh Government: he pointed an accusing finger also at the Prime Minister, saying that Mr Nawaz Sharif had called on an influential personality of Sindh (the Makhdoom of Hala) and inquired about his health but had made it a point to ignore Altaf Hussain who had been sick for more than a month. What does this indicate, Azim Tariq inquired.

(Promptly, Mr Nawaz Sharif went to see the MQM leader on Sunday and declared that any conspiracy against the MQM would be a conspiracy against the country.)

For more than a month, Karachi city's biggest hospital, the Abbasi Shaheed Hospital, has been the headquarters of the MQM where more attention is being paid to the MQM leader and his companions who come to console him than to ordinary patients. MQM activists remain assembled at the hospital either to pay homage to their leader or to participate in one or other bed-side meeting. The whole of the first floor is in the MQM's use. For about four years the hospital has been exclusively reserved for Mohajirs: during the ethnic riots, non-Mohajirs had found it impossible to get admission there. They went to the Civil Hospital. Recently, the Jamaat-i-Islami has complained that its injured workers, although all Mohajirs, were not allowed admission to the Hospital.

'Death for Treason'

Huge banners have appeared all over the city proclaiming "Jo quaid ka ghaddar hai, voh maut ka haqdar hai" (those disloyal to the Quaid deserve death). In view of the apprehension of the MQM infighting spilling over into the streets, police and Rangers have setup picket posts at important street intersections. Loyalists of Altaf Hussain launched a campaign throughout the urban areas of Sindh for observing a yomi-i-tajdeed-i-ahd-o-wafa (a day of renewal of loyalty and commitment). Workers gathered at zonal and sector offices and swore loyalty to the Quaid and death to the "traitors."

About the resignation of Minister Badar Iqbal, Jam Sadiq Ali confirmed what the MQM had been saying—that the Minister was asked to quit because he was involved in corruption. What the MQM and the Jam have failed to explain is why the allegedly corrupt Minister was not prosecuted and instead was assisted to go into exile to the USA.

Observers say that what is happening today under the IJI [Islamic Jamhoori Ittehad] Government is quite unprecedented: such things have never happened before in the history of this benighted land.

The Sindh Chief Minister has the knack, and Islamabad the ready willingness, to legalise and institutionalise everything that was so far considered legally criminal and politically immoral.

After having regularised political kidnapping, having practised it with perfect impunity several times during the various electoral contests of the Sindh Assembly and having gained approval from the bosses in Islamabad, the Chief Minister has now moved to rewarding the officers who had helped him in his grand scheme of eliminating the PPP [Pakistan People's Party].

Speaking at the annual function of the Civil Services Academy Alumni, Sindh, the Chief Minister announced

that every civil officer would be given two plots so that he could build a house of his own. Elaborating his generous offer, he said: "I do permit that they (civil officers) should sell one plot and construct (a house on) the other."

Decision Defended

The decision is defended on the ground that in their present pay scales, the officers could not build houses of their own. The consideration is laudable, but why is it limited to officers?

Until now the practice of acquiring several plots by officers through their own official influence in the name of family members and later selling them at inflated prices was considered both irregular and immoral. The distinction between legal and illegal and moral and immoral is now being obliterated by the Chief Minister, who vowed to be virtuous after his penance during the last Umrah. The policy of two plots is being widely practised in the defence forces since the days of Gen. Zia.

Among the 50,000 or so Government employees in Sindh, most of the officers, who may be a couple of thousand—even less if the latest favour is meant to be restricted to Grade 16 and above as seems to be the case—come from families who are already well-off, have big houses and also have discretionary powers to enrich themselves through the use of official influence. The bulk of the employees is deprived of a living wage and do not have the clout to make themselves rich. But they are not likely to benefit from the Chief Minister's generosity because their number is too large. Moreover, their collaboration in the execution of Establishment-assigned "jobs" can be automatically ensured if their superiors are made willing, rather enthusiastic, partners. This is exactly what the Chief Minister has in view.

The plots to be allotted to the officers are developed with public money. The officers will sell the second plot to the public at black-market prices. The general public, which will pay for the officers' palaces, may be more distressingly in need of houses than the favourites of the Jam. The State, at present engaged in political kidnapping, will also be encouraging land speculation and black-marketing.

But the MQM-Jam Government does not feel at all embarrassed at the exposure of its white lies and it still persists in its brazen faced "rape democracy" campaign. All the newspapers are by now full of stories of MPAs' [Members of Provincial Assembly] "Kidnappings" but Islamabad and the Jam continue to feign ignorance and deny the State's hand in the despicable crime.

Four PDA [People's Democratic Alliance] MPAs have been missing for more than a fortnight. The family members say they were carried away by the police. The Sindh Government has denied these reports and feigns complete ignorance about the missing MPAs' whereabouts. However, on 4 March, the PPP released a photostat copy of the Mukhtiarkar and FCR [Frontier

Crime Regulations], Pano Aqil, dated 26 February, which allowed remand in police custody for seven 'more' days at least of one of the four missing MPAs, Sardar Haji Khan.

Editorial Supports Accord Between Government, Opposition

91AS0810E Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English
4 Apr 91 p 6

[Editorial: "This Accord Must Be Saved"; italics as published]

[Text] The Government-Opposition accord, ending the latter's protracted boycott of parliamentary proceedings, is one of the best things to happen since the last elections. If the river waters agreement was *the* very best news, surely this is the next best—provided it endures. That's no small if. But small or big, it would depend almost entirely on how the government goes about the commitments which have paved the way for the return of the Opposition to the political stage. The alacrity with which the Prime Minister's side has moved in the matter and gone full length to accommodate the Opposition should normally auger well enough. The formula of equal representation on the committee to study the veracity of the Opposition's grievances about treatment in Sindh could not be more graceful. This demonstration of unhesitant sporting spirit would seem to suggest pretty strongly that Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif does wish that the game be played according to the established rules and time honoured conventions of democratic ethos. He has been more than usually frank and firm in his commitment to promote democratic culture in his crisp talk with the bigwigs of the media in Islamabad Tuesday. Most factors, therefore, tend to promote optimism. Most, but perhaps not all.

If the reports about the gut reaction of the Jam of Sindh to the Government-Opposition understanding is anything to go by, there may still be a slip or two between the cup and the lip. In his newly acquired peremptory majesty, the Jam is reported to have scoffed at the idea of a Committee of the National Assembly nosing around Sindh province. For all the Jam's intents and purposes, Sindh is something of a personal fiefdom. We should like to hope this is not entirely so. The committee of six MNAs [Members of National Assembly]—all from the province of Sindh—constituted to look into the complaints about mistreatment of PDA [People's Democratic Alliance], has the statutory status of a Committee of the House. Nobody in the Sindh government administration, from the Governor downward should have the audacity to be anything but totally respectful to it. That's what the constitutional imperative undoubtedly is. The correct position is that the government of Sindh should be left in no doubt that it absolutely must oblige the Committee of the House in every way possible and with the utmost of respect and obedience.

Let us hope the Jam will not commit or omit any act which may seem to be inelegant or indecorous. Any want of propriety or deviation from duty on the part of the Sindh Chief Minister would land the Prime Minister in a most embarrassing position. It would also lend total credence to the allegations of serious misconduct and miscarriage of justice, putting not only the Jam but the entire IJI [Islamic Jamhoori Ittehad] government in a heavily compromising spot. That is just what neither the Prime Minister nor the country as a whole can afford at this very sensitive moment in the evolution of democratic values in this country still not quite immune to fumbling and derailment. The Government-Opposition accord is of transcendental value not only to the Opposition but also to the Nawaz Sharif government. Perhaps more to the latter. For the Prime Minister it is a matter of personal prestige and one whereby hangs his credibility. If it were to come to that, a thousand Jams can be sacrificed to protect the PM's prestige and political integrity from being sullied in any way, by anybody.

Opposition to Death Penalty Editorialized

91AS0773C Lahore VIEWPOINT in English 21 Mar 91 pp 5-6

[Text] Disregarding centuries of human experience, which has shown that capital punishment does not deter capital crime, Authority in Pakistan has ordained harsh punitive laws for certain grave criminal offences. The relevant laws were promulgated by Ordinance and then endorsed by Parliament without the proper scrutiny and debate required for legislation that relates literally to a question of life and death. Even more reprehensible, laws permitting imposition of the ultimate sentence have been given retrospective effect. Seemingly, legislators of the ruling coalition did what they were asked to do by the law-and-order lobby; in doing so without giving proper consideration to the draconian measures, they neglected their responsibilities as law-makers. They also closed their minds to many uncomfortable truths, particularly the obvious fact that the current wave of crime is a direct result of steady deterioration in social conditions, which can be halted only if effective remedies are found for society's fatal ills. Members belonging to the PDA [People's Democratic Alliance], the main Opposition party, as well as the smaller parties which, though allied to the IJI [Islamic Jamhoori Ittehad], claim adherence to the highest democratic principles, will certainly share the blame for not resisting these flawed laws.

Today's troubled scene evokes great fear and little hope. When the government of the day, repeatedly proclaiming its strength in the legislatures and claiming massive public support, cannot muster the courage to ban the illegal possession of Klashnikovs, when it cannot or will not control the production of hard drugs and interdict their trade, when the state allows large-scale smuggling to flourish, and big money is laundered by government institutions regularly, how can organized crime be suppressed? The new laws may succeed in hanging a few unfortunate persons, and brutalising the people by the

promised public spectacle, but this is not likely to have the smallest effect on checking armed robberies and dacoities; it will not stop the kidnapping for ransom. Many observers also see the danger that these extraordinary laws and special procedures will be used, as in the eighties, for political purposes, and that such misuse will destroy what little sanctity still attaches to the law.

Nor can the fact be ignored that in countries like Pakistan, a police indictment, even when backed by what seems to be substantial evidence, including confessional statements from the accused, cannot be taken as final proof of the suspect's guilt. It is also generally assumed that speedy trials will further reduce the chances of guilt being proved beyond reasonable doubt before the accused is sent to jail or to the gallows. It also needs to be remembered that justice delayed can be justice denied, but a rush to judgment by special tribunals can have far worse consequences. Recent happenings in many other countries have focussed attention on the weaknesses of the system of criminal justice. The frequent wrongs done have strengthened the growing demand for the abolition of capital punishment. Even in a country like England, where the rule of law has had a long time to mature and legal tradition is widely respected, the recent case of the Birmingham Six has shaken British society by exposing the fact that in an atmosphere polluted by sectarian, religious or political prejudices, justice can easily be perverted.

Six Irishmen had been involved in what the State described as an IRA outrage and were sentenced to life imprisonment, on the strength of evidence fabricated by the police and confessions extracted through brutal torture. Persistent efforts by civil rights associations and other groups succeeded in obtaining a retrial where all six were found to be innocent. They were released but after having spent sixteen years in jail; and since the bombing incident of which they were falsely accused had caused many deaths, some years ago they could well have been hanged. It need hardly be stressed that in our land violation of the law by the police occurs with much greater regularity, and the possibility of redressal here is much smaller. Even if all Pakistani courts do not reflect the Establishment's bias, the Judiciary can easily be misled by the prosecution. Further, what makes their position weaker, few of the suspects arraigned can afford a good lawyer able to demolish the prosecutor's charges when they seem to be false.

Another factor that should make one circumspect about hounding the ordinary criminal is that in almost every sector of life, double standards exist and are tolerated. In our country, petty theft is punished, but crooked bankers are treated as honoured State guests because they can travel in executive jets and promise benefits to people with influence. Small drug-pushers may get jailed, but those with the right connections escape even from high security places of detention. Big smugglers are given back their smuggled gold on the plea that private property is sacrosanct. In encounters with the police, suspects are murdered in cold blood, deaths in police custody

have become common occurrences, but few such cases are probed and fewer lead to convictions. Nobody considers it worthwhile to investigate such happenings and prosecute the murderers in uniform. The benefit of doubt is usually given to the oppressor, not to the victim, to the persecuted, not the defendant. Women are raped in the fields and factories, in police stations, in prisons; no-one hears their screams. Children are exploited, tortured, and abused; their tears are not seen, their whimpers are ignored, largely because most of them are destitute, dirty, diseased—and they are always hungry. Yet maulanas continue to declare that family planning is unethical, unnecessary. Kidnapping for ransom is certainly a heinous crime specially when children are involved, but when the mafia holds many State departments to ransom, little or nothing is done to deal with the situation; its influence grows by being able to purchase State functionaries, and it is beginning to infiltrate other national institutions.

Further, in our circumstances, there is always doubt about the guilt of persons sentenced under the present system. When people are sent to prison unjustly, this is a crime. When faulty procedures and false evidence lead to capital punishment, the result can only be described as a judicial murder. This writer recalls an earnest conversation with an experienced jail superintendent, on questions of crime and punishment. The senior official had a reputation for total honesty and integrity, even among those who did not approve of him for sectarian reasons. Asked whether, after having witnessed hundreds of hangings during his service, he could say when a person hanged was actually guilty, the superintendent said that when the moment of truth approached, the condemned one usually made an open confession or indicated in some way whether he was innocent or guilty. He said further that, in his estimate, nearly half of those hanged were innocent of the crime for which they had been convicted. This was long years ago, when the police were less corrupt and the system of justice worked a little better. What is the percentage of innocent persons hanged in our times? Who can tell? Who is interested in finding out the truth? Who wants to face reality? Will the Human Rights Commissions and other groups make the attempt? This may not be easy when every human activity is expensive—and only human life is cheap—, but it must be done.

Our firm conviction that capital punishment should be abolished is not based on abstract idealism. The conclusion rests on being witness to the circumstances of life in Pakistan, and the gross manner in which the State deals with questions of crime and punishment. This belief is further reinforced by the knowledge that at no stage in human history has crime been reduced by harsh punishments. What we require is that the incentives to crime should be eliminated, that laws are made just and are justly administered, that we begin to end the maltreatment of human beings, the oppression of man by man, and even more so of woman by man, and the neglect of children.

Perhaps above all else, we must try to rid society of the almost universal practice of worshipping the golden calf, making obeisance before the bitch goddess of getting on. On this account, a whole generation has been nurtured in an atmosphere of violence, crime, chicanery and corruption, with the biggest criminals easily acquiring immunity. A great deal needs to be done to save Pakistan's society, its polity, its basic structure, from further erosion. Where do we start? No man on a white horse can help. No mantras can rescue the nation. Every citizen must learn to think seriously and act with all possible honesty in his own sphere, however small it may seem to be. On the main matter under discussion, let it be remembered that when we degrade a fellow human being, by subjecting him to the knout and the lash, no matter what sin he has committed, we also degrade ourselves, society is degraded. When someone considered guilty of a capital offence is hanged by the neck until dead, a part of each one of us dies with him; thus, the whole community is diminished and brutalised. Whenever people capable of showing concern for the future find time from their more immediate pursuits to consider what is happening to our people, they must ponder these and all related factors that determine the conditions of our life. Honest thought should persuade one to accept that the remedy lies in transforming these conditions—and that imposition of the death penalty is no answer to any problem.

SRI LANKA

Nongovernment Organizations Said Lacking Coordination

91AS0825D Colombo DAILY NEWS in English
27 Mar 91 p 12

[Article by Pramod de Silva: "Government Policy To Assist NGO's...Deplores Lack of Co-ordination"]

[Text] The Presidential Commission of Inquiry into nongovernmental organisations was yesterday told that it was the government's policy to assist NGOs and that the government recognises the high degree of social motivation, organisational ability and utilisation of diverse skills in work undertaken by them.

This was stated by yesterday's only witness, Mr. K.P.G.M. Perera at present a consultant to the Ministry of Agriculture and a former director of the Ministry of Plan Implementation and in charge of NGO activities.

The seven members of the Presidential Commission comprise former Supreme Court Judges Justice R. S. Wanasundera (Chairman) and J.F.A. Soza; Mr. M.N. Junaid; Dr. K. Velauthapillai; Mr. E. Eramudugolla; Prof. Priyani Soysa; and Mr. Irwin Weerackody.

Senior State Counsel, Nihal Jayasinghe led evidence assisted by State Counsel Jayantha Jayasuriya.

In his testimony Mr. Perera said that the government would like to be kept informed of activities of NGO's. Statements on the utilisation of funds would be one way of achieving this objective.

The government can also assist NGOs by granting duty concessions for imports of equipment, obtaining visas etc.

He said that the government deplored the lack of coordination among NGOs. "NGOs should seek official cognisance of their activities by establishing a link with the ministry concerned," he said.

Rev. Perera stressed that NGOs could be particularly helpful specially if government incomes are limited and there is a need for expanded programs. He observed that NGOs could be very effective in the fields of nutrition and early childhood, as NGOs can provide individual attention in such areas. Fields such as poverty alleviation, self-employment, education for dropouts and drug and alcohol problems were also highlighted.

Mr. Perera's opinion was that the NGO sector remained comparatively small in comparison with the government sector.

"Nevertheless it offers a huge potential for growth," he said. The international NGO's operating in our country have strong management capabilities including access to resources which most national NGOs lack, he said.

"Many financial sources are under utilised. This indicates other inadequacies on the part of NGOs," he said.

He said that the distribution of funds posed problems, especially where foreign donors were involved. It has been revealed that some persons have set up local groups with scant community support with the intention of tricking donors into believing they are quite active in the community. "Therefore, proper identification of NGOs is very important and steps should be taken to monitor their work and eliminate the incompetent or false groups," Mr. Perera said.

Projects funded by financial institutions are of limited duration. Many NGOs face financial obstacles in continuing a project because of this problem," he said.

NGO's Commission

On government-NGO co-operation, Mr. Perera said that NGOs should try to engage public servants as resource personnel. The government, he said needs NGO assistance only for practical-level programs such as job-oriented training. "The administrative machinery will have to be devised to achieve collaboration among NGOs, UN agencies and government.

The government welcomes collaboration of NGOs in development projects," he said. He also said that efforts of NGOs to tackle mass-scale problems usually undertaken by the government may not always be effective.

Replying to a question raised by the Senior State Counsel regarding recommendations which would help NGOs he said, "first, NGOs should be studied on an individual basis. Increased support should be provided to strengthen them.

A resource centre (with advisory functions) for NGOs should be established. A national perspective on NGOs should be evolved and the NGO liaison office of the Ministry of Plan Implementation should be expanded."

The commission resumes hearing today.

Editorial Supports Seeking Reemployment in Gulf

91AS0825C Colombo DAILY NEWS in English
27 Mar 91 p 6

[Article: "Maximising Foreign Earnings"]

[Text] We are glad that the various concerned authorities like the Foreign Employment Bureau and the Foreign Ministry in Colombo are conscious of the need to ensure that Lankans benefit from job opportunities likely to arise in Kuwait, particularly, as the reconstruction effort gets into full swing.

Already, the Colombo foreign office has moved to try and get the embassy in Kuwait City re-opened. How quickly this can be done is anybody's guess. Clearly, countries which directly participated in the war against Saddam Husayn to free Kuwait will have preference in getting their embassies re-opened, and the others will have to take their places in a queue.

However, if no effort is made by those responsible to get the wheels rolling, nothing worthwhile will be achieved. Thus it is heartening that Colombo sent out a team to the Middle East: and however rough the going has been, these officials have been able to get into Kuwait, make a first-hand assessment of the situation there and interview Lankans who opted to remain in that country despite the Iraqi annexation.

The Chairman of the Foreign Employment Bureau (FEB) went on record yesterday as having said that some of the American companies that have contracts to rebuild Kuwait are interested in recruiting skilled workers. A few of our recruiting agencies have connections with U.S. companies, but this is not enough. It is essential that both the FEB and private recruiters quickly touch base with possible employers and seize whatever opportunities are available.

FEB Chief David Soysa has made very clear that working conditions in Kuwait today are not what they were before the war. Kuwait is a devastated country, and living conditions will necessarily be rough for those who seek work there. It is likely that this would mean that pay too would be better than when conditions were normal, but as Mr. Soysa said, those who knew Kuwait before should not imagine that they are going back to those conditions.

The team from Colombo had been pleasantly surprised to find groups of housemaids, who had remained in Kuwait through the war, adapting themselves well to the new order. They had found work as hospital cleaners on terms superior to what they had when they first went out, and were quite content to remain in Kuwait under present conditions.

The FEB, as well as the private sector, must not consider the Middle East to be the only region where jobs can be found for Lankan workers. Possibilities elsewhere, like in Japan, Taiwan, Singapore, etc., must also be exploited to the maximum. Many economic refugees from Sri Lanka, who chose to present themselves as political refugees, have found remunerative work for themselves in Western Europe and parts of North America.

It is unfortunate that a sizeable number of these persons were used as pawns by the LTTE [Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam] and its allies for propaganda purposes. The separatists are also known to systematically extort part of the earnings of many of these expatriate workers to pay for the tragic civil war that continues to rage in Sri Lanka. Although many of these "guest workers" are

unwelcome in most European countries, the fact remains that they are taking jobs which are unattractive to nationals of the concerned countries for pay which is most attractive in Lankan terms.

As long as unemployment remains a problem here, the possibilities of work opportunities beyond our shores must be exploited to the full. Many people from the subcontinent have done very well for themselves in the Middle East and elsewhere by joining expatriate workforces, and their remittances home have been most beneficial to the national economies not only of countries like Sri Lanka, India, Pakistan and Bangladesh but also to countries like the Philippines.

We have not done badly from Middle East jobs upto now. Unlike our professionals, many of whom have done very well in the West, the blue collars who went to the Middle East sent their earnings back home. These remittances have been of great economic benefit not only to their own families but also to the national economy. That is why it is important that we maximise earnings from these sources.

NTIS
ATTN: PROCESS 103
5285 PORT ROYAL RD
SPRINGFIELD, VA

2

22161

This is a U.S. Government publication. Its contents in no way represent the policies, views, or attitudes of the U.S. Government. Users of this publication may cite FBIS or JPRS provided they do so in a manner clearly identifying them as the secondary source.

Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) and Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS) publications contain political, military, economic, environmental, and sociological news, commentary, and other information, as well as scientific and technical data and reports. All information has been obtained from foreign radio and television broadcasts, news agency transmissions, newspapers, books, and periodicals. Items generally are processed from the first or best available sources. It should not be inferred that they have been disseminated only in the medium, in the language, or to the area indicated. Items from foreign language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed. Except for excluding certain diacritics, FBIS renders personal and place-names in accordance with the romanization systems approved for U.S. Government publications by the U.S. Board of Geographic Names.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by FBIS/JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpts] in the first line of each item indicate how the information was processed from the original. Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear from the original source but have been supplied as appropriate to the context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by the source. Passages in boldface or italics are as published.

SUBSCRIPTION/PROCUREMENT INFORMATION

The FBIS DAILY REPORT contains current news and information and is published Monday through Friday in eight volumes: China, East Europe, Soviet Union, East Asia, Near East & South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and West Europe. Supplements to the DAILY REPORTs may also be available periodically and will be distributed to regular DAILY REPORT subscribers. JPRS publications, which include approximately 50 regional, worldwide, and topical reports, generally contain less time-sensitive information and are published periodically.

Current DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications are listed in *Government Reports Announcements* issued semimonthly by the National Technical Information Service (NTIS), 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, Virginia 22161 and the *Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications* issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

The public may subscribe to either hardcover or microfiche versions of the DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications through NTIS at the above address or by calling (703) 487-4630. Subscription rates will be

provided by NTIS upon request. Subscriptions are available outside the United States from NTIS or appointed foreign dealers. New subscribers should expect a 30-day delay in receipt of the first issue.

U.S. Government offices may obtain subscriptions to the DAILY REPORTs or JPRS publications (hardcover or microfiche) at no charge through their sponsoring organizations. For additional information or assistance, call FBIS, (202) 338-6735, or write to P.O. Box 2604, Washington, D.C. 20013. Department of Defense consumers are required to submit requests through appropriate command validation channels to DIA, RTS-2C, Washington, D.C. 20301. (Telephone: (202) 373-3771, Autovon: 243-3771.)

Back issues or single copies of the DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications are not available. Both the DAILY REPORTs and the JPRS publications are on file for public reference at the Library of Congress and at many Federal Depository Libraries. Reference copies may also be seen at many public and university libraries throughout the United States.